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Nazarkin Cites Need to 'Speed Up' START Talks

LD1904195290 Moscow TASS in English 1936 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Geneva April 19 TASS—Speaking at the disarmament conference here today, head of the Soviet delegation to Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments Ambassador Yuriy Nazarkin dwelt on the course of the talks.

The ABM and outer space problem holds a major place at the negotiations, he said and noted an objective interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive armaments.

Touching upon the drafting of a treaty on strategic offensive armaments (START), the head of the Soviet delegation said it was necessary to speed up the course of the negotiations so that the treaty could be initialled at the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting and signed this year.

At the next stage of negotiations the parties will bear special responsibility, since it is necessary to reliably rule out a situation that could be used to get unilateral advantages. It should be done now, without waiting for possible shortcomings of the treaty in its ratification.

The USSR Supreme Soviet's International Affairs and Defence, and State Security Committees have already shown close interest in the process of elaborating the would-be treaty. At its recent meetings they heard the head of the Soviet delegation to negotiations on nuclear space armaments.

Nazarkin expressed confidence that the START treaty would help strengthen international security at considerably lower levels of nuclear balance and reduce the danger of a nuclear war. It would also help improve Soviet-American relations and of the world political atmosphere.

The treaty will facilitate advancement to more radical accords on cuts and qualitative restrictions of strategic offensive armaments.

Correction to Item on 'Breaches' in Warning System

WA2004124090

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "'Breaches' Seen in Soviet ABM Warning System," published in the 2 April Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pages 4-7:

Page 4, column two, next to last paragraph, make read: ...of nine similar ballistic missile early warning system facilities permitted under... (substituting "ballistic missile early warning system" for "ABM warning system")

Page 5, column one, first full paragraph, make read: ...regrettable because the ballistic missile early warning system is a defensive... (substituting "ballistic missile early warning system" for "ABM warning system")

Same column, fourth full paragraph, make read: ..."Why is the ballistic missile early warning system needed?" I asked... (substituting "ballistic missile early warning system" for "ABM warning system")

Same column, last paragraph, make read: ...That is, the ballistic missile early warning system is intended constantly... (substituting "ballistic missile early warning system" for "ABM warning system")

Same page, column two, first paragraph, make read: ...of monitoring, including ballistic missile early warning systems. This is probably... (substituting "ballistic missile early warning systems" for "ABM warning systems")

Same column, paragraph six, make read: ...monitoring systems, primarily ballistic missile early warning stations, located four "fragments"... (substituting "ballistic missile early warning stations" for "ABM warning stations")

Page 6, column one, second full paragraph, make read: ...that there are ballistic missile early warning systems in the Soviet... (substituting "ballistic missile early warning systems" for "ABM warning systems")

Same column, second full paragraph, make read: ...component of a ballistic missile early warning system. Perhaps the verdict... (substituting "ballistic missile early warning system" for "ABM warning system")

Same page, column two, sixth full paragraph, make read: ...system like the ballistic missile early warning system is not needed... (substituting "ballistic missile early warning system" for "ABM warning system")

Next paragraph, make read: ...showing the Soviet ballistic missile early warning system.

In the end... (picking up next paragraph, substituting "ballistic missile early warning system" for "ABM warning system")

U.S. 'Interference' in Lithuania Criticized

LD1904141390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1330 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)—At a briefing today, Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MID], read a USSR MID spokesman's statement.

"The recently stepped up U.S. propaganda campaign on events in Lithuania is attracting attention," the statement says. "Individual political and public figures, who in the main are known for their biased attitude toward everything connected with the Soviet Union and its domestic and foreign policy, are joining it in the wake of the mass media."

"This campaign can no longer be explained by the natural desire to get to the bottom of the complex processes taking place in a neighboring country. The initiators of and participants in the pressure campaign—some of their own choosing, some not—are aiming at the most peaceful revolution that has unfolded in the Soviet Union, at the democracy and renewal born of it, including the renewal of the Soviet Federation."

It would seem that both the authors of these hostile statements and those who are playing up to them realize that this is not the way to defuse the acute situation that has evolved through the fault of extremist elements in today's Lithuanian leadership. On the contrary, by giving the separatists an effective monopoly on interpreting what is happening, certain U.S. quarters are only encouraging those who have no interest in a peaceful honest dialogue and who are working toward an even more profound crisis.

There must be complete clarity about the fact that, guided by the interests of all Soviet citizens and by our common national interests, we will continue to conduct a policy guaranteeing the fundamental provisions of the Soviet Constitution. This is a demand of genuine democracy that has nothing to do with anarchy.

Various lectures and veiled threats heard from the United States represent an intolerable interference in our internal affairs that can only complicate the situation and hamper the Soviet-U.S. dialogue.

Lithuania Seen as USSR's 'Internal' Affair

LD1904204290 Moscow TASS in English 1942 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] New York April 19 TASS—UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar believes that the Lithuanian problem is the Soviet Union's internal matter, UN secretary-general representative Nadia Younes said today at an annual briefing for journalists, replying to a question about Cuellar's opinion on termination of oil supplies to Lithuania.

Earlier she noted that the UN secretary-general did not comment on events taking place inside UN member countries.

Perfilyev 19 Apr Briefing on World Issues

U.S.' Lithuania Stance

LD1904152190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1425 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)—Attention is drawn to the build-up in recent days of a propaganda campaign in the United States about events in Lithuania, said Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, opening a briefing today. This campaign cannot be explained as a natural desire to understand the complex processes occurring in a neighboring country, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman added, pointing out that by providing the separatists with a virtual monopoly on the interpretation of events, certain U.S. circles are merely encouraging those who are leading the matter toward an even deeper crisis.

"It must be made perfectly clear," Vadim Perfilyev said, "that, guided by the interests of all Soviet citizens and by our common national interests, we will continue to pursue a line toward ensuring the basic provisions of the Soviet Constitution." "As far as the various kinds of sermons and veiled threats that are resounding in the United States are concerned," he said, "they represent impermissible interference in our internal affairs, which can only complicate the situation and hamper a Soviet-U.S. dialogue."

Going on to note that at the same time it is understood in Moscow that everything happening in the USSR is of interest to the world public and politicians, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said: "We would like to avoid the kind of public statements in the mass media that do not accord with the actual state of affairs." In our opinion, he added, a "more balanced approach" to this problem is needed.

The diplomat also stressed that he was not commenting on the statements of U.S. officials on Lithuania, but speaking only about the approach to the problem by the mass media and individual nonofficial figures. Assessing Soviet-U.S. contacts at an official level in connection with this, he described them as "good."

Replying to questions about measures of an economic nature regarding Lithuania, Vadim Perfilyev said certain of them are already being adopted in accordance with the message from the president and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers: "The supplies of gas," the Foreign Ministry spokesman noted, adding that "other restrictions also" are possible in the future.

Stressing that "these measures were not implemented after two days, but five or six days on," the diplomat said adoption of them had been held back "in expectation of

replies from the leaders of Lithuania to the clear questions of the Soviet leadership." "Regrettably," he added, "no such definiteness can be traced in the replies." Here the Foreign Ministry spokesman indicated that the USSR's leadership continues to await replies to the questions it has asked concerning the lives of people in the Baltic republic. Among these, he singled out the three most important groups of questions: problems of all-union property, identity cards for Lithuanian citizens, and the decision of Lithuania's leadership on issues of military service obligations.

U.S., UK UNESCO Decisions

LD1904163490 Moscow TASS in English 1628 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vadim Pefilyev told a briefing here today he was perplexed by continued reluctance of the United States and Great Britain to participate in the work of United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

Commenting on press reports concerning the decision by the U.S. Administration not to renew membership of UNESCO, and the decision of the British Government to put off until next year the decision on its membership of this international organisation, the Soviet spokesman admitted that membership of one or other international organisation is the sovereign right of each state and this is how it should be viewed by the world community. At the same time he noted that the U.S. decision was received with incomprehension in many countries.

The spokesman said this attitude can be accounted for by the fact that UNESCO is now the world's leading forum of intellectual cooperation. There are more member-states in UNESCO than in the United Nations—161 as against 159.

"In this situation the stance of the United States and Great Britain, which withdraw from international cooperation in the fields of culture, education, and science, causes bewilderment" Perfilyev said.

"This stance meets with incomprehension in the United States, too, where the National Academy of Sciences favours a return to UNESCO and a U.S. public committee has been set up to press for return."

Perfilyev also noted that arguments about the continued politicisation of UNESCO, advanced by the U.S. Administration, do not hold water.

"At recent sessions of the general conference and the UNESCO Executive Council," he noted, "business-like and constructive exchanges of views were held, without political overtones, and all decisions were taken by consensus, supported by official representatives of all countries, including West European."

U.S. Group's Inspection Visit

LD1904171590 Moscow TASS in English 1655 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—"A group of American observers visited an air base in Uzin (Ukraine) on Wednesday to inspect heavy bombers," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev said at a briefing today.

The visit was held in accordance with the Soviet-American heavy bomber agreement, signed in December 1989, the first in a series of trial verification measures in the sphere of strategic armaments.

"Agreements on trial inspections were concluded in pursuance of the agreement (signed by the Soviet and American foreign ministers in Wyoming in September 1989) on principles of trial verification and stability measures, that could be implemented before signing the START treaty," the Soviet spokesman said.

"The American side's visit to a structure linked with strategic offensive armaments, before the conclusion of the START treaty, testifies to growing confidence between the two countries and their firm intention to conclude a treaty. The Soviet side hopes the tendency will continue to gain in strength during the forthcoming series of mutual display of strategic armaments."

Early next May a Soviet group will visit a U.S. air base to inspect American heavy bombers. Besides, trial inspections will take place to verify the number of warheads on intercontinental ground and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Soviet specialists will inspect intercontinental MX and submarine-based Trident-2, while Americans will examine the SS-18 and SS-H-20.

Cooperation With GDR, Unification

LD1904160990 Moscow TASS in English 1533 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—"The Soviet Union is ready to develop cooperation with the German Democratic Republic on the basis of mutual confidence, equality, and respect for the interests," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfiliyev said at a briefing today.

"An important role is being assigned to the current friendly dialogue with that country's leadership on a broad range of issues, part of which was the Soviet ambassador's talk in Berlin on April 17 with GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere," Perfiliyev said. German unification was discussed.

"The Soviet Union raises no obstacles to the solution of the practical issues of unification of the two German states and creation of conditions for their economic, social, and cultural unity. But in solving the German problem it is necessary to find optimal decisions that would lend a new quality to the situation both in Germany and in Europe as a whole. One cannot but see

the interrelationship between internal and external factors of the unification process which in its development should not impair the interests and legitimate rights of other countries.

The German problem has not only "an internal dimension. It is also inseparably linked with a whole number of external aspects that affect the interests of a broad circle of states," Perfilyev said.

Speaking of the Soviet stand concerning a united Germany's NATO membership, Perfilyev said that "it was unacceptable to us and nothing can be changed here by reservations on the GDR territory's temporary or permanent exclusion from the NATO sphere."

"Germany's foreign policy status and the future of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty concern all parties to these organisations," he said. The establishment of an all-European security system is now the main task, the USSR believes. "A transition from the present-day system of two alliances to collective security structures is the way which presents broad possibilities for a search," Perfiliyev added.

"The Soviet Union's stand is, as before, that the Second World War should be finally crowned with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and that it should be elaborated within the framework of the 'Two Plus Four' negotiations, with the two German states' most active participation in the wording of its provisions."

Kabul Execution of Coup Plotters

LD1904183690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1543 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Vadim Perfilyev reacted to reports in the Western media that allegedly Shahnawaz Tanay, former defense minister of the Republic of Afghanistan, and Dagastir Panjsheri and Muhammed Ziray, members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Political Bureau Central Committee, arrested after the failed coup, had allegedly been executed in Kabul. He also commented on reports that Minister for Border Affairs Sulayman La'eq, and Foreign Minister 'Abdul Wakil had been removed from office. Referring to official information from Kabul, Vadim Perfilyev described these reports as "not corresponding to reality". [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze Discusses Bush-Gorbachev Summit

AU1704113090 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13-16 Apr 90 pp 1, 11

["Exclusive" interview with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, by Vladimir Markow; place and date not given: "Before the Gorbachev-Bush Summit: Reassuring People"]

[Text] [Shevardnadze] During the meeting we should reach agreement on all the basic elements of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in USSR and U.S. strategic offensive weapons and conclude other agreements concerning arms control and disarmament. That aside, the meeting may mark a turning point in bilateral relations between our countries.

[Markow] What problems pertaining to a treaty on strategic offensive weapons was it not possible to resolve thus far?

[Shevardnadze] Primarily problems relating to reductions in land- and sea-based cruise missiles. There is a danger that we will fail to prepare agreements on this issue in time for the summit. That is why during the seven weeks that we have left and at my next meeting with Secretary of State Baker, which is scheduled to take place in the USSR from 16 through 19 May, we will have to do everything possible to find a compromise solution.

[Markow] Once the treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons is signed, what will happen next?

[Shevardnadze] A period of peace in mankind's development will commence. One of the issues is to reassure people, so that they do not feel that they are living under a threat. However, there are no grounds for complacency, because the arms race is still in progress. We have to be vigilant and consistently strive to continue the disarmament process.

[Markow] How do you see the future for USSR-U.S. bilateral relations?

[Shevardnadze] We are witnessing a real breakthrough: More than 10 accords will be signed during the summit. They include an economic-trade accord, an accord on mutual investments, and accords on the establishment of cultural centers, the peaceful use of space, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

[Markow] Has a program for the summit already been fixed?

[Shevardnadze] It has not been fixed yet. We have agreed that in a few days time the American side will submit its proposals concerning Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States. The president of the USSR will then indicate what his wishes are. There will be no problems about agreeing on the program.

[Markow] What are your views on the question of Lithuanian independence and U.S. reaction?

[Shevardnadze] During my visit to Washington it was possible to set out the truth on what is really happening in Lithuania and explain that we are not seeking confrontation, but want to find a sensible solution by way of an honest dialogue. I think that the Americans believe this.

Of course, the Americans are concerned about the problem of Lithuania. We have to appreciate that. However, I did not perceive any signs of malevolent satisfaction in their attitude concerning these current difficulties. The only thing I felt was that they are genuinely

interested in finding the most sensible solution, that they want Gorbachev to bring restructuring to its logical conclusion, and that the Lithuanian nation should also be pleased. We are also concerned about the future of restructuring and about the future of all the Soviet peoples, all the republics, and the entire union.

I think that the United States and other countries realize that stability in the USSR has a great impact on many things in the world—stability in the international arena and the future of peace.

[Markow] How realistic is the synchronizing of German and European unification processes?

[Shevardnadze] I think that in spite of everything the synchronizing of these two processes if realistic and necessary. I do not even exclude the possibility that the process whereby the two Germanies are moving closer together will be halted. A new parliament and government will shortly start work in the GDR. Talks with the FRG on, for example, economic problems will be continued. A great many difficulties have already arisen in this respect. The unification of Germany will not occur as quickly as one might imagine.

Provisions of Explosives-Marking Convention Cited

PM1904144990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Unnamed correspondent dispatch: "'Marked' Explosives"]

[Text] Montreal, 18 Apr—The 27th session of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Legal Committee ended its work here. This committee was instructed to prepare a draft convention on marking plastic (and sheet) explosives for the purpose of detection.

The text of the treaty was approved at the session which has just ended. It now has to be discussed and adopted by participants in the ICAO diplomatic conference to be held early next year.

So what lies behind the idea of drawing up a convention on marking explosives?

"Many terrorist acts on aircraft and other forms of transport," Yu.M. Sharkov, deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry International Law Administration and head of the Soviet delegation at the ICAO Legal Committee session, said, "are committed with the use of explosives. The ICAO has long racked its brains over the problem of how to deprive criminals of the opportunity to freely take explosives on board airliners. It came up with the idea of drawing up an international convention on marking explosives. This idea has now been implemented by the ICAO Legal Committee. Delegations from 67 countries, including the Soviet Union, took part in its work in Montreal."

So what does the draft convention envisage? It proposes that signatory states pledge to mark explosives at the time of their manufacture, i.e. to include an additive making it possible for special equipment at airports to detect the dangerous cargo.

United States & Canada

Lithuanian Impact on U.S.-USSR Ties Viewed

PM1704163490 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 15, 15 Apr 90 p 3

[Vladimir Simonov article: "USSR-US: Lithuanian Dynamite"]

[Text] We seem to have underrated the importance the States attaches to what happned in Lithuania on March 11, and the Landsbergis-Gorbachev war of nerves that followed.

Career diplomats were amazed when the Lithuanian problem bulldozed its way onto the agenda of the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to the American Secretary of State in Washington, pushing into the background rather important issues. The American negotiators were said to have brought lower-ranking participants into the working groups implying, perhaps, that disarmament, economic ties, etc., took the back seat to Lithuania.

One could hardly expect this. Until then the US Administration's reaction to events in Lithuania zigzagged between trying to show restraint and a balanced approach, and periods where emotions gained the upper hand. Meeting the Lithuanian challenge with force, the White House gave us to understand, would wreck Soviet-US relations, including trade, scientific and technical exchanges. At some points the American side was said to have even put into doubt the prospects of the coming Gorbachev-Bush summit.

The Americans, most probably, were bluffing. It is hard to deny, however, that the US administration was under the growing pressure of various forces interested to see the administration's support for advocates of Lithuania's secession becoming more solid. The advocates include the sizeable emigree community made up of more than Balts. They also include Congress whose representatives passed a resolution calling on the president to recognize Lithuania as an independent country at once. There is also public opinion which is divided on tactical particulars but on the whole backs Lithuania's right to secession which can't be ignored by either the legislators or the executive power.

And finally, what I think is the most dangerous. I have in mind the grave-diggers of perestroyka including those within the administration. I have in mind those who care little if Vilnius becomes the capital of a new state. Those who would like to take advantage of the Lithuanian problem so as to hasten the day when the USSR wakes up without Gorbachev and his reforms. And the world reverts to the Cold War. We have given little thought to those people amid the euphoria of steadily improving Soviet-American relations But they are around and kicking.

Lithuania seems to become a sort of an icon at the head of a march bringing together forces of restoration of the past both inside America and here at home. Washington does realize this. Some "elements" inside the USSR would like to use the developments in Lithuania to "create big problems for Gorbachev", warned John Sununu, White House Chief of Staff. The New York Times specified the idea being exploited by these "elements" - Gorbachev has lost the socialist gains, lost his allies, and is now losing the empire.

Like a stick of dynamite, Lithuania is being placed under the warming world relations at the most critical hour. The Soviet economy is having a heart attack which threatens the stability of its foreign policy. Ahead is a series of history-making but delicate talks - the Gorbachev-Bush summit, the conference in November of the 35 participants in the Helsinki process. More than at any other time, there is now the need for trust and tolerance.

But restorers of the past think nothing of disregarding both. Their only objective is to forge a tight linkage between Soviet-US relations and Lithuania. Is this legitimate? "I don't think so," Andrey Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada and a leading American researcher in the Soviet Union, told me. "This would be the same if we claimed, for example, that the use of the National Guard of the US in a certain southern state in the event of racial riots would reverse the entire disarmament process."

Kokoshin simplified the issue for the sake of clarity. But Washington should not forget: the temptation to exploit the situation in Lithuania can go against the West's global and historical interests, which are closely linked with perestroyka's progress. The Lithuanian card could be a trump used against the player. If it is played and backfires, how many more decades will the world wait for another Gorbachev?

Neither should we forget: the American reaction to the "Lithuanian issue" isn't just a matter of good will or evil schemes, this is a hard political fact you can't ignore or bypass. It has to be reckoned with.

U.S. Review of Intelligence Targets Noted

PM1804092590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Intelligence Agencies Change Targets"]

[Text] New York, 15 Apr—In view of the political changes that have taken place in the East European countries, U.S. intelligence is preparing to close or change the direction of activity of the expensive electronic listening posts in West Berlin and also along the FRG's border with Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

THE NEW YORK TIMES reported this today, citing U.S. officials. According to them, a decision on the future of these secret facilities, in which state-of-the-art equipment worth around $1 billion is installed, is to be made over the next two years.

As the paper notes, this step will require that the intelligence services carry out a "large-scale review of U.S. operations in the region." "According to U.S. officials, the United States expects the exceptionally close relationship with West Germany in the intelligence sphere to cool once Germany becomes a European superpower with interests different from the United States," THE NEW YORK TIMES stresses. At the same time the article cites the opinion of a West German official who declared that "some joint operations will probably continue for an indefinitely long time." They include operations directed "against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact."

It is planned to reorient some electronic listening posts toward monitoring compliance with arms control agreements, and also collecting data on new targets agreed with the West German intelligence services. In particular, these may be terrorists and drug traders, as it is planned to expand operations against them.

More on Soviet-American Commission Session

LD1904215190 Moscow TASS in English 2128 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 20 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Matyash:

The first session of the mixed Soviet-American Commission on Cooperation in Basic Scientific Research, which is under way here, is seeking new areas of Soviet-American cooperation and its expansion.

The session is being held within the framework of inter-governmental agreements on exchanges in science and technology, that lent a major impetus to the development of mutually-beneficial Soviet-American relations in science and technology.

Soviet and American scientists and specialists made a substantive review of the broadening cooperation between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the National Scientific Foundation and the Geological Service, on the one hand, and the USSR Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Science and Technology and the Geology Ministry, on the other.

The two sides also considered basic provisions pertaining to the compliance with the agreement and memorandums on mutual understanding, and measures to comprehensively develop Soviet-American scientific-technological cooperation.

In the course of the session it was noted with satisfaction that the United States and the Soviet Union are now successfully cooperating under eight inter-governmental agreements which comprise environmental protection, agriculture, housing and other areas of construction, peaceful uses of atomic energy, world ocean studies, medical science and public health, artificial heart creation.

The two sides expressed readiness to consider questions of development of cooperation in Arctic studies, in forecasting natural calamities and alleviating their consequences and proposed that consultations be held in the near future on questions of handling natural calamities and relief measures.

The session is being attended by a Soviet delegation, led by Soviet Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology Nikolay Laverov, U.S. Presidential Adviser for Science Allan Bromley, President of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Frank Press, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency William Reilly, Presidential Adviser for Economic Matters Michael Boskin.

"Our bilateral cooperation in science and technology successfully develops," TASS has been told by Bromley. There are huge possibilities to broaden and deepen this cooperation, which would meet the national interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, he added.

Rogachev Receives U.S. Cooperation Officials

LD1804200290 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev today met President of the U.S. National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation Richard Fairbanks and committee member, Vice-President of the IBM Company Kenneth Dam, who are in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet National Committee for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

The sides discussed the development of the political and economic situation in the Asian-Pacific region and prospects for trade and economic cooperation between the Soviet Far East and the western coast regions of the United States.

Chaplin Meets U.S. Embassy Counselor 17 Apr

PM1904150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] B.N. Chaplin, USSR deputy foreign minister, received J. Joyce, counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, at his request 17 April. The talks focused on bilateral questions of Soviet-U.S. relations connected with the efforts being made by the sides to ensure the proper conditions for Soviet and U.S. diplomatic and consular missions on each other's territories. In particular, the problems of the reciprocal granting of television services to the Soviet and U.S. embassies in Washington and Moscow respectively were specifically examined.

President Bush Calls for Environmental Awareness

PM1904152790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Statement by G. Bush"]

[Text] Washington, 18 Apr—"No one country in isolation will be able to preserve the atmosphere surrounding our planet," U.S. President George Bush said at an international conference on scientific and economic research connected with global changes in the environment. "The feeling that the whole world is pulling together is necessary if we are to succeed. A new partnership must unite nations."

"Environmental well-being and economic prosperity cannot be separated from one another," the U.S. President stressed. "They are two sides of the same coin. Awareness of this fact is in every country's interests."

Newsman Answers Criticism of Brzezinski Interview

PM1904125190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Reader's letter followed by reply by observer Gennadiy Vasilyev: "Must One Meet With Brzezinski?"—carried as part of "Dialogue" feature]

[Text]**"Angry" Letter**

Incredible but true! I read the interview with rabid anticommunist Z. Brzezinski "Concerning Perestroyka, the World, and Me" and I wondered what PRAVDA was doing publishing that kind of dispatch. What purpose does it serve? What does it do for Soviet people's minds and hearts and for the world's working people in general? For the cause of consolidating socialism, the cause of strengthening peace? The dispatch by G. Vasilyev and A. Lyutyy gave Brzezinski access to PRAVDA and he is dreaming of making further use of PRAVDA to spread his ideas...

PRAVDA ought not to tolerate such concoctions, such nonsense from its master writers, but print articles that convey to the masses the wisdom, honor, and conscience of our era. All purveyors of the ideas of private, capitalist ownership must be uncompromisingly and mercilessly destroyed, by means of the telling logic of life...

[Signed] A. Ya. Korchemkin, veteran and pensioner, Kirov.

Observer's Reply

As one of the writers of the interview with Z. Brzezinski, I can report that it prompted a lively reaction from readers. We received a very large number of letters. They included positive reactions whose authors believe that PRAVDA is correct not to stick to the usual range of topics and "safe" foreign figures. But there were also many letters of the type cited above. Their main argument is that Brzezinski is an anticommunist and he admits it himself. Therefore his pronouncements are out of place in PRAVDA.

I have no personal grievance against the writer of the letter for the unflattering epithets he applies to me and my colleague. I can see how many of our people acquired this attitude. Before perestroyka and glasnost came to our country, we writers on international affairs would talk mainly with foreign figures whose views coincided with or were close to ours. We have a simple way of dealing with "heterodox" figures: They would be labeled "anticommunist," "reactionary" or, for variety's sake, "appeaser," and that would be that. It is now obvious that this approach did us no good. We were sowing illusions, creating the impression that practically the whole world supported us and applauded all our foreign policy initiatives. But the reality was much more complicated and in many respects less favorable. Indeed, ignorance of the real situation is a serious human weakness. And this applies not only to those who govern the country, but also to those who are known as "ordinary people."

The actual argument that Brzezinski is an anticommunist and therefore his opinions are out of place in PRAVDA is obviously groundless. In fact, if one follows this logic, we should not cite the remarks of G. Bush and Margaret Thatcher either. You certainly could not rank them as supporters of socialism.

Of course, we do not agree with Brzezinski's main stance, his opinion that "communism is in the process of collapse." As was said during the conversation, we believe that socialism's administrative-edict system is in a state of crisis and that perestroyka is aimed at extricating the country from the crisis while moving along the path to humane, democratic socialism. I believe that despite this fundamental difference of opinion with the U.S. political scientist, it was worthwhile listening to him. Z. Brzezinski is a major figure in the U.S. academic world. He has direct links with the country's policymakers. Under President Carter he was national security assistant and he is currently a member of a number of councils studying strategy and intelligence questions. His views reflect the mood of influential circles of the U.S. "establishment" and it is pertinent to know them.

Moreover, despite the "Sovietologist's" proud claim that he has not changed, there have been certain adjustments in Brzezinski's views, in my opinion. Adjustments in the direction of a less dogmatic view of the USSR and of Soviet-American relations. They are due to the fact that no thinking American can avoid drawing conclusions from the new situation taking shape in the world.

Northeast Asia & Pacific

Gremitskikh Speaks on Ties With South Korea

PM1704092390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Correspondent G. Charodeyev report: "Unconfirmed Rumors"]

[Text] USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center—Yu. Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, has spoken at a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. He said that the mass media of a number of Western countries and also South Korea are spreading rumors that the Soviet Union has embarked on practical steps to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. Is this so?

"In recent years our ties with South Korea have been experiencing an appreciable upsurge. Trade is developing well, and it totaled $600 million in 1989. Contacts are expanding in the spheres of science and culture. A regular air link between the two countries' capitals was inaugurated recently.

"Relations will continue to be developed with South Korea in various spheres," the Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized. "However, we are not conducting any discussion on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This topic was not even broached at an official level in the talks with the politician Kim Yong-sam, who was in Moscow along public-scientific lines.

"As regards the prospects of establishing diplomatic relations between the USSR and the ROK, we believe that on a practical plane this question can be considered only in the context of the general development of the situation on the Korean peninsula..."

The briefer went on to report:

"In accordance with a 15-year intergovernmental agreement, the Soviet side will obtain three billion cubic meters of gas a year from Iran, above all for the needs of the Soviet Transcaucasian republics. The commencement of Iranian gas supplies to the USSR puts into practical realization the large-scale accords reached in Moscow in 1989 during the Soviet-Iranian top-level meeting."

Petrovskiy Calls for Euro-Asian Security System

LD1904203690 Moscow TASS in English 1817 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Tokyo April 19 TASS—"The changing world, which is entering a new, post-confrontation peace period in its development, needs new multilateral and regional mechanisms to ensure peace and stability," Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy said at a news conference in Tokyo today.

"The all-European process now provides a pattern for different countries to launch cooperation in a broad range of areas of international activity and to create new relationships of mutual understanding and mutual confidence and a really strong security system," the Soviet representative said.

"A qualitatively new process of collective efforts is unfolding in Europe, marked with the concern to see to it that the current changes should be accompanied with guaranteed stability."

"Europe may be a good example to Asia, where regional processes are lagging behind. The time has apparently come to launch an all-Asian dialogue to form new security structures in the region, considering Asia's specific conditions. It is important not just to cooperate in settling regional conflicts, but to create a mechanism to prevent crises before they spring up.

"This process should not copy the all-European process. The situation in Europe differs from that in Asia. This is natural, since we are living and will continue to live in a multi-polar world. The all-Asian dialogue could begin with the development of confidence-building measures, specifically in the seas, in the areas of sea lanes, which are of great significance to Asian countries.

"The dialogue may then embrace a broader range of questions, linked with the reduction of military confrontation in all other areas, the prevention of proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the limitation of naval activity, and the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments."

"Viewing the future with due account of the rapid changes in the world, it is necessary to establish reliable security structures that would help channel these changes into the bounds of stability. The European and Asian processes should merge into a single Euroasian process, with all countries to be able to find their place in it. What is at issue is not just replacement of the existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, which are functioning in Europe and Asia.

"The Euroasian security system should be an extra factor that would amplify processes in that region and help pool efforts in one direction—towards establishing a system of a positive peace, marked by no war, and moreover it would comprise relations between states and the mighty infrastructure of relationships between nations and between people."

"The Soviet Union, as a nuclear Euroasian power, which spans bridges of cultural and economic cooperation between Asia and Europe, may play a very constructive role," Petrovskiy said.

"We seek to make our European and Asian territory open for international cooperation. An illustration of such cooperation may be a project of laying an optic fibre cable communication line between Europe and Asia across Soviet territory. We are opening up our

territory for ecological cooperation. In other words, the Euroasian approach is already manifesting itself and it is very important to make it a factor of ensuring stability in the present-day changing world."

Moscow City Soviet Deputy Explains Reform Stages

SK2004014090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1000 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Text] [First announcer] On 16 April, a conference of the new Moscow City Soviet will be convened in Moscow. Now, we will listen to an interview between (Sergey Senkevich), a 35-year old deputy to Moscow City Soviet and Soviet historian, and (Ludmila Machinko), reporter of this radio station.

[(Ludmila Machinko) questions read by second announcer] My first question is: What type of forces came to organizations of power in the capital city as the result of the elections held in March this year?

[Begin (Sergey Senkevich) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by first announcer] A democratic breakthrough was made in Moscow, Leningrad, Gorkiy, Dnepropetrovsk, and some other large cities. In the city soviet, people who have faith in democracy won many seats. I am one of them. Thus, a responsible stage in the development of reform has begun. Whether or not the alliance of democratic forces will be successful in city soviets depends on many things. This will be a huge task going beyond welfare of the citizens residing in some cities.

It is no longer considered a secret that the local (?assembly) in the past played the role of merely an ornamental organization which approves the decisions of the party and administrative organizations.

Using as an actual example Moscow and other cities where democratic forces won victory, we intend to infuse the Soviet countenance—a new Soviet countenance of totally exercising sovereign power in a (?practical manner)—into consciousness of the people.

[(Machinko), read by second announcer] The majority of Moscow City Soviet deputies, who are from the democratic alliance, are neither professional politicians nor functionaries of business organizations [kyongyong kigu]. With regard to this, I would like to ask the following question:

Do you intend to continue to use the former Moscow City Soviet administrative organizations?

[(Senkevich) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation, read by first announcer] We have no intention of (?removing) all of the old cadres. Our attitude toward these cadre members will be discriminating and prudent. We have already asked all of the former administrative functionaries of Moscow city to make clear their attitude toward the overwhelming majority of democratic forces in the new deputies' group. If they agree with our political creed, we will continue working-level cooperation. However, without a certain reorganization of personnel management, we can hardly start such work because the number of administrative functionaries who have the modern way of thinking among those in the offices of the old Moscow City Soviet was not many to our regret.

[(Machinko), read by second announcer] What are the programs for activities of the deputies from the alliance of democratic forces?

[(Senkevich), read by first announcer] First of all, we will strive to improve housing conditions. With the help of social circles, we are examining the funds of the housing and non-housing buildings. We are planning to allocate in proper sequence the empty buildings or inefficiently-used buildings to those who need houses. We will reduce industrial construction to the minimum. We will then concentrate the capacity of the industrial domain on building and repairing houses. We will direct our strength to building schools, clinics, kindergartens and other facilities which our capital is short of.

The major principle in our activities is to (?operate) the city which has the face of mankind.

[(Machinko), read by second announcer] In the capacity of the Soviet People's deputy and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, you, well known as a social movement activist, ran for the Moscow City Soviet. What are the motives of your struggle for the seat of deputy to the capital city soviet?

[Begin (Senkevich) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation, read by first announcer] This was my own voluntary choice. Only in large cities is there the possibility of practically showing the difference between outdated bureaucratic system and fresh democratic regime.

We do not intend to promise the citizens in Moscow a paradise. However, we will have each team carry out its work so that people feel the air of genuine reform.

[(Machinko), read by second announcer] What concrete measures will be taken for these plans by the Moscow City Soviet to be revealed when the current conference ends? (Sergey Senkevich) promised that he will let us know its results. Thus, we will have another interview with (Sergey Senkevich), a Moscow City Soviet deputy, about a week from now.

CPSU's Role in Perestroyka Examined

SK1904101790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Text] [First announcer] Now, when the passion inflamed by the effort to remove Article 6 from the Soviet Constitution has to a degree died down and the problem has been solved, one is simply stunned at the realization of how much effort has been necessary to

make such a decision possible and how difficult a task it was to make sound thinking prevail over other thoughts.

Let us recall the fact that up until recently the guiding role of the CPSU, the one and only political party in the Soviet Union, had been guaranteed by the Constitution. Never before has the CPSU's role in deciding the future course of policies, of fulfilling major economic tasks, and of guiding such things as the purchase of grains, [word indistinct] committee, electoral districts, film studios, trade unions, and women's organizations been called into question.

Millions of Soviet citizens, including the CPSU members, knew about the exceptional nature of such assertions. Nevertheless, it has been impossible to try to change anything in the society of the administrative bureaucrats already in existence.

Even to speak of the need to change or completely abolish Article 6 of the Constitution was impossible. This is because through the party, which [passage indistinct], the bureaucrats can exercise their vested power. However, the wind of the overall changes that began blowing in the course of restructuring has now reached the point where it affects the political system of the society.

In this regard, station commentator (Aleksandr Kusko) writes: [Second announcer] Seen at the meetings of the supporters of restructuring, with thousands of participants attending, held in (?February) in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and other cities, were very short but strongly appealing slogans.

Many of the slogans written on the boards were of the figure 6 crossed off. This is the way the people expressed their opinions about Article 6 of the Constitution.

According to Article 6 of the Constitution, the CPSU is a leading and creative force, the nucleus of the society's political system, as well as the nucleus of the state and social organizations in the Soviet Union.

[First announcer] The session of the Congress of the People's Deputies, which met following these rallies, has amended the Constitution and abolished Article 6, which stipulates that the party has the leading role, from the Constitution.

After examining such a decision, many political scholars in the West have come to their own conclusion: The Soviet people have triumphed in their struggle against the CPSU. Then, this means that the Soviet people have risen up in the struggle against the Marxist-Leninist ideology, as well as against the socialist system.

This is an important trick that reporters frequently employ, a trick in which one interprets an event in one's own way by slightly changing the essence of the event, leaving something unexplained and adding a little of something to it.

Now, let us review the event as a whole. In this case, not all of the Western political scholars' interpretations are wrong.

First, the Soviet people have in fact stood up against the leading role of the CPSU, which was guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution.

Second, during a period of (?stagnation) the prestige of the party really dropped and the previous party leaders had defamed the party with various wrongdoings and, more importantly, with the anti-democratic system under their control.

Third, the party was already unable to live up to the demand of its own vanguard role in the process of restructuring and also failed in leading the democratization movement sweeping through the entire country. These are true.

However, there are other things that should be taken into consideration when making an objective assessment of the event. It was none other than the party itself that has taken the initiative in restructuring. Before anyone else, the party declared that drastic changes are necessary in the economy, political system, and spiritual development in society. This was a bold revolutionary step that has laid the foundation for restructuring.

The second fact is that among those who were against Article 6 of the Constitution and those who stood up against the one-party system in the Soviet Union were many Communist Party members. For example, the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee held on the eve of the session of the Congress of the People's Deputies introduced very detailed proposals aimed at changing the (?substance) of the Constitution.

The third fact is that the CPSU members have gained an indisputable victory in the elections of the Supreme Soviet and local soviets. They occupy an absolute majority in the newly-established Congress of the People's Deputies. More than one candidate ran in the recent election and votes were cast (?fairly) and secretly.

On the whole, the elections have reflected the public opinion.

Fourth and finally, the party has gone through fundamental changes over the past 5 years of restructuring. The party is no longer the party it once was and is not obedient to high-ranking bureaucrats. Political pluralism, free discussion, and the open struggle of expressing opinion affect the norms governing the party life more vigorously.

The CPSU leadership has been replaced with new figures who insist on effecting epochal changes.

Let us introduce to you one such person. He is (Boris Volodzin). He is the first secretary of the CPSU committee in (Rostov) Oblast, member of the CPSU Central Committee, and a deputy to the Congress of the People's Deputies.

[Recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by second announcer] (Boris Volodzin) says that the restructuring of society would have been impossible without the party and without the CPSU members. Now, when people say that the party is falling behind in restructuring, I think it is the leading institutions of the party, not the party itself, that have fallen behind in restructuring. What we need now is to make the restructuring process more vigorous in the next stage. Above all, the restructuring should be more rapidly carried out in the leading institutions of the party.

[Second announcer] Let us sum up what has been said. As you may have been convinced, people have not identified the party with the conservatives inside the party. The people have also supported the lines of the CPSU that declared the restructuring.

The mass struggle against Article 6 of the Constitution was in fact not directed against the party itself. Of course, there were some voices that denounced the CPSU itself in the course of holding rallies. Nevertheless, sound thinking has prevailed.

People have already demonstrated their political maturity and their ability to make an assessment of the events taking place.

Next, I would like to note the role and prospective of the party in our society's future.

The CPSU currently has about 19 million members rallied behind it. This is indeed an enormous political force. Even if we move toward a multiparty system and various factions are born inside the CPSU and struggles involving sharp differences in opinion are waged, there is no other party in the country that is capable of realistically uniting all the forces.

Some may argue: There is no such party, but there may be one tomorrow. I am not inclined to take it upon myself to do this. But I would like to express my expectation that in the course of democratization, the prestige of the CPSU will rise. When this prestige becomes a genuine one, gained as a result of concrete work performed by the party, instead of a hypocritical prestige or one that is forced down from above, the party will continue to live up to its own vanguard role and serve the people, not only in words, but also in practice.

Program Discusses on Leninism, Perestroyka

SK2004035290 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Unattributed talk]

[Text] April 22 is the birthday of Lenin, who was a great revolutionary and ideologist and the founder of the Communist Party and Soviet state. On this occasion, we will carry a program headlined "Leninist Ideas Are Being Materialized Through Perestroyka."

Marking the 120th anniversary of Lenin's birth, we would like to evaluate his role in history, his contribution to developing revolutionary theories, and the whereabouts of his ideological legacy from the perspective of today.

As was the case 10 years ago, 20 years ago, or 30 years ago, his works are the (?most widely read) throughout the world. This is plain fact, and this fact is confirmed by the materials published by UNESCO and by the polls conducted in many countries.

Ironically, however, until some time ago, during the period of depression, virtually compulsory study of Lenin's works was demanded by most of the dictators. By saying "virtually compulsory," we mean that there was, of course, no official order with regard to this.

To finish college or vocational school courses, the compulsory study of Lenin's works was mandatory. In other words, the basics of Leninism had to be grasped.

In addition, tens of thousands of people, as members of the various teams of enterprises and organizations and as students of Marxism-Leninism evening colleges, had to study Lenin's works, regardless of their wishes.

Administrative bureaucratism developed in the Soviet Union turned the study of Leninist theories into something insubstantial and superficial.

Today, however, there is no such phenomenon. No one forces people to study Lenin's legacy. Still the number of those who study Lenin's works is not decreasing. Instead, simply out of their own desire, people study Lenin's works in a very ambitious and attentive manner, as a thirsty person looks for water to drink. In doing so, they find answers to their most urgent questions.

In this course, it has been clarified that Lenin was not correctly understood in the past. This was partly because Lenin's theories were distorted in many aspects and his keen reasoning was ignored by the ideological functionaries of the Stalin and Brezhnev eras, by those who were elucidating Leninism in a superficial manner, and by those who were responsible for publishing Lenin's works.

As a result of this, Leninism in reality turned into dogmatism and into a list of unproductive formulas and this affected the course of history of the Communist Party and Soviet state.

Today, however, we have eventually come to read Lenin's works with refreshed minds under new circumstances. No blind espousal any more, but in reading his works we try to comprehend the events developed during the revolution and during the post-revolution period and try to understand the heritage of the era more deeply.

We listened to the very scarce phonograph records of Lenin's voice many times. At the same time, we memorized what he had said and we still remember even the tone of his speaking. However, we still feel excited whenever we listen to the recordings of his voice.

Let us now listen very attentively to a recording of his voice again.

[Begin Lenin recording in Russian fading into Korean translation by announcer] We are well aware there are still many flaws in organizing the Soviet regime. The Soviet regime is not an establishment which creates miracles. The Soviet regime is not able to remove the problems of the past, its illiteracy, lack of culture, the aftermath of the bestial war, and the remnants of plundering capitalism all at once. The Soviet regime, however, will provide an opportunity to advance toward socialism and will help those who were once oppressed rise up and come to control the management of the state, economy, and production more and more extensively and completely.

These remarks are on page 239, Vol. 38, of "The Complete Works of Lenin."

What Lenin said is precisely what is taking place before us today. It seems to be something for us who live in the current era.

Perestroyka has returned power into the people's hands, and has toppled the foundation of the system of the coercive administration. For the first time in many decades, people have come to speak out on what they think and to elect those whom they trust to the organs of power.

As a result of this, today, we see those soviets elected in a democratic way come to control the management of the state, economy, and production more and more extensively and completely.

So, what Lenin said was prophetic and this has become an action program for the newly organized soviets. At the same time, the outcries of the people who demand at rallies and demonstrations that power be turned over to the soviets are also according to what Lenin had said.

The articles and speeches which Lenin published in his later days are particularly important for us who live in the current era. When Lenin was seriously ill, through his articles and speeches he disclosed his thoughts on the tasks to be accomplished by the country which had set out on the road of socialism, and elucidated the difficulties which can be encountered, and their dangers, and the way to cope with such difficulties and dangers.

Lenin wrote: Even a casual act against the law or a negligible violation of the Soviet order can become a big crack and the enemies of the workers will immediately exploit this—page 156, Vol. 39, "The Complete Works of Lenin."

Comrade workers: Remember that you are now the managers of the state. If you fail to unite and to control all the business of the state, no one can help you—page 66, Vol. 35, "The Complete Works of Lenin."

The duty of the members of the Communist Party is not to be silent about the defects of their movement, but to openly criticize them in order to remove them even more swiftly and even more basically—page 184, Vol. 41, "The Complete Works of Lenin."

Today, in the course of perestroyka, we are coming to even more deeply believe in the wisdom of Lenin's (?theories) and in his great (?confidence) in the state.

Lenin warned of the danger of bureaucratism which can develop in the party and state and stressed on many occasions the need for openness, collectiveness, and free discussion in settling political matters.

Today, we come to more and more deeply believe in Lenin's amazing insight. At the same time, for the first time, we evaluate his views also in a critical perspective, disagree with some of his ideas, and point out his blunders.

For example, one of his blunders was his prediction that capitalism would collapse before long and the world revolution would be victorious. Some Soviet experts in the West are extremely delighted about this. They say that history is not developing according to Lenin's prediction.

At the same time, we cannot support the piercing tone which Lenin adopted in debates and we cannot support his unsympathetic attitude against his ideological foes and the discourteous attitude he occasionally adopted.

But, today, we can be objective only by correctly understanding the situation at that time and the (?bloodiness) of the political struggle, and the extreme outrage which prevailed during his time, and the acts of his opponents.

In general, in evaluating Lenin's legacy in a critical manner, we should acknowledge that he was not afraid of openly admitting his blunders, and that he was a bold but flexible politician.

We can convincingly say that our life is developing as Lenin forecast.

Discrepancies developed in the development of our society, because Lenin's theories had been violated in the operation of cooperative associations and the Soviet state, in democracy, and in respecting principles of the relations between nations.

Today, in the course of perestroyka, we are trying to return to his original socialist plan and to his ideas apropos of social justice.

Comrade Gorbachev noted precisely this in his report at the 19th meeting of the representatives of the (?All-Union Komsomol) of the CPSU.

[Begin Gorbachev recording in Russian fading into Korean translation by announcer] The policy of perestroyka, which is being implemented through the specific social and economic programs, has now become the practical task for millions of people and this is an essence of our country's political situation. We see that the

society has now become very active. Our spiritual life has become very diverse, very interesting, and very rich. New elucidation is being given to many theories of Marx and Lenin which had been unilaterally interpreted or completely ignored until awhile ago. Through the struggle against dogmatism, the creative foundation of scientific and humanitarian socialism is being restored.

The Leninist principle of accommodating the people of broad strata in settling the matters of state and society is being inconsistently maintained in the Soviet Union. The people now hold their heads up triumphantly and have come to realize what is their right. They are intentionally participating in all events of social life.

Today, in the Soviet Union, plant managers, economists, collegians, social scholars, directors of the cooperative associations, and activists of the public organizations; all people study the Lenin's works and come to realize that this is necessary in order to push ahead with practical business and perestroyka.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister Sarasin Visits

Meets Stepan Sitaryan

LD1604225990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1810 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 16 Apr (TASS)—Today a meeting took place between Stepan Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Phong Sarasin, deputy prime minister of Thailand, who is in the USSR on a working visit as a guest of the Soviet Government.

During the conversation, in a business-like and constructive atmosphere, a wide range of issues was discussed regarding the development of Soviet-Thai trade and economic relations in the context of the results of the meetings and talks that took place during the official visit of Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to Thailand in February.

Speaks With Ryzhkov

LD1904220790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, today received Phong Sarasin, deputy prime minister of Thailand, who is in the Soviet Union on a working visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Having expressed their satisfaction with the dynamic development of Soviet-Thai relations the sides exchanged views on concrete measures for further activation of bilateral cooperation in light of the political and economic agreements achieved in the course of the official visit to Thailand by the head of the Soviet Government in February of this year. Hope was expressed that Sarasin's visit and the detailed talks that took place during his stay in Moscow will be conducive to a more effective use of the existing potential of cooperation.

U.S.-Burma Cooperation Urged in Antidrug Effort

BK1904095590 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Station observer (Aleksandr Moyeseyev) commentary]

[Text] In recent times, international news agencies have been focusing their reportage on the problems associated with illegal production and trafficking of narcotic drugs. This is particularly true for the drug trade in Myanmar [Burma]. Station observer (Aleksandr Moyeseyev) made the following observations for you listeners.

The Yangon [Rangoon] government has been refuting charges made by foreign journalists that it gives encouragement to the drug gangs. For instance, news bulletins issued by the Myanmar embassies classify as groundless reports by foreign journalists that the opium yield in Myanmar this year will be around 2,000 tons.

Citing estimations by international organizations engaged in narcotics control, the news bulletin released by the Myanmar Embassy in Moscow firmly states that not more than 400 tons of opium can be produced on the land in Myanmar where opium plantations are being cultivated. Since it is impossible to differentiate between opium plantations and agricultural crops from high above, results of high altitude and aerial surveys have frequently proved to be incorrect. In addition, since opium is usually grown together with the other crops on same plots of land, it is difficult to estimate the correct situation of opium production. Myanmar authorities have announced quite frequently that those who exaggerate opium production in Myanmar are simply people who want to find fault with the Myanmar government. The announcement is directed particularly at some of the U.S. administrative officials. For instance, Melvin Levitsky, deputy assistant secretary of state, who visited Bangkok in March this year, said the Myanmar authorities have been ignoring the drug problem and clandestinely cooperating with heroin traffickers.

According to Myanmar news circles, Myanmar delegates to the 17th special conference on narcotic drugs at the UN General Assembly had talks with the officials of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA] as well as with (David Reister) of the Justice Department and other high-ranking officials and briefed them about the efforts being made in Myanmar to combat the threat of drugs. In addition, members of the Myanmar delegation to that conference also had talks with [U.S. Representatives] Charles Rangel and Lawrence Coughlin of the U.S. organizations which are handling the drug problem. In the talks, Myanmar delegation leader U Ohn Kyaw said that in his opinion, the most effective way of combatting the threat of drugs was not through the launching of military operations to destroy opium crops but through

the process of making short- and long-term plans to raise the standard of living of the people in the opium-growing regions.

According to the MYANMAR NEWS AGENCY, U.S. Congressman Rangel was said to have shown interest in how U.S. organizations could help Myanmar in its fight against the heroin trade.

The United States has for a long time been legally providing assistance to combat opium cultivation. Many experts have pointed out that the aircraft and defoliant chemicals supplied by the United States have been very effective in the war against drugs in the Golden Triangle. But Washington stopped aid to Yangon when the military government came into power in 1988 and accused Yangon of slowing down its anti-drug efforts.

According to the HERALD TRIBUNE published in India, four DEA agents are now in Yangon. But leaders of opium gangs, particularly the drug kingpin, Khun Sa, have pointed out that the DEA is so inept that it encourages people to smuggle heroin into the United States. Other news reports also say the United States has no clear-cut policy as to whether it should resume the aid to help Myanmar's anti-drug programs or to continue criticizing that country for not doing enough in the anti-drug efforts.

It has been pointed out that some people may use the heroin excuse to slander the Myanmar military government as well as the multiparty general elections it is holding. On the other hand, leaders of the anti-government ethnic minority groups may also exploit the drug problem to their personal advantage. For instance, a Wa rebel leader recently accused the Yangon government of secretly cooperating with drug traffickers.

The lack of coordination in dealing with drug-related problems in Myanmar proves once again that political aspirations or political gains should not be placed before other issues when working for such a noble cause as combatting the threat of heroin. An overt and sincere cooperation is needed at the international level if such an evil criminal activity as drug trafficking is to be defeated.

Soviet-Indonesian Cooperation Program Signed

LD1804223290 Moscow TASS in English 1947 GMT 18 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrov]

[Text] Jakarta April 18 TASS—A programme of cooperation between the Soviet and Indonesian Chambers of Industry and Commerce for 1990-1991 was signed here today.

The programme envisages, among other things, assistance to organisations and companies of the two countries in holding and participating in exhibitions in the Soviet Union and Indonesia, in the exchange of business delegations, information, periodicals and other materials about their activities.

The Soviet Chamber of Industry and Commerce will help interested Indonesian organisations and companies to establish contacts, if required, with the Soviet Association of Business Cooperation with Countries of the Asian-Pacific Region and to organise trips by Indonesian businessmen to regions in Siberia, the Soviet Far East and Uzbekistan in order to identify specific directions for the development of trade and mutually-beneficial economic cooperation.

In order to further expand contacts between the two countries' business communities, possibilities will be studied for establishing in Jakarta of an Indonesian Soviet trade chamber. Other plans include regular meetings and seminars on the development of bilateral, trade and economic relations and the exchange of visits by the leaders of the two countries' chambers of industry and commerce.

"The signing of the programme," chairman of the Indonesian Chamber Sottion Arjangi [name as received] told TASS, "became another specific step in the realisation of the agreements on the expansion of trade and economic cooperation between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, reached during President Suharto's visit to Moscow last autumn.

"The two chambers can contribute substantially to the development of mutually-advantageous cooperation between our countries, including by promoting business contacts between Soviet and Indonesian companies and organisations, both state-owned and private.

"Recently an association for the promotion of trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union was set up at the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry," Arjangi said. He expressed hope that a similar association would be soon established at the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

"Talks in Jakarta were constructive and very useful," said head of the Soviet delegation Vadim Yefremov, who is deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

"They centered around the development of joint ventures, direct business links between enterprises, companies and organisations of the two countries and the provision of comprehensive services to them, including the selection of partners, the conclusion of profitable deals, marketing and specialist training.

"We plan to step up the exchange of specialized exhibitions, to expand contacts between the two countries' business communities and to arrange regular exchange of commercial information and experience.

"The discussion of further aspects of trade and economic cooperation betweeen the Soviet Union and Indonesia will continue during the forthcoming return visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation from the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry lead by Arjangi," Yefremov said.

He also favoured the establishment of a committee for trade and economic cooperation with Indonesia at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Near East & South Asia

Afghanistan's Wakil Stops En Route to New York

PM1804123990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] 'A. Wakil, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan, arrived in Moscow 16 April on his way to New York to attend the UN General Assembly special session on international economic cooperation.

'A. Wakil was met at the airport by A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy foreign minister, and S. Murtaza, charge d'affaires ad interim of the Republic of Afghanistan in the USSR.

Received by Shevardnadze

LD1904155490 Moscow TASS in English 1512 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today received Afghan Foreign Minister 'Abdul Wakil, who stopped over in Moscow on his way to New York.

The conversation, marked by a frank, friendly atmosphere, involved a substantial exchange of views on a political settlement in Afghanistan, as well as several aspects of bilateral Soviet-Afghan relations.

The ministers stressed, in particular, that the Afghan settlement process is entering a very responsible and decisive stage. As the consensus grows worldwide in favour of political means of settling Afghan problems, priority importance is attached to achieving agreements on starting an intra-Afghan dialogue between all sides. This would be followed by general democratic and free elections in Afghanistan, under international supervision, in order to form a broad-based government. In this contect, the importance of a range of Soviet-Afghan initiatives that laid the groundwork for the transition from war to peace was noted.

Shevardnadze specially pointed to the importance of the role that United Nations and its secretary-general are destined to play in accordance with the resolution of the 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly and because of this world body's participation in settling other regional conflicts, including in Namibia.

Wakil dwelt on the Afghan leadership's measures aimed at normalising the political situation in the country in the context of the national reconciliation policy. The Afghan foreign minister also noted that in the complex conditions of continuing war the Afghan Government led by President Najibullah consistently prioritises peaceful means in the settlement of intra-Afghan differences.

When discussing ways of developing multilateral Soviet-Afghan cooperation, the ministers noted that it is fully geared to facilitating the process of political settlement, to developing political and economic pluralism in Afghanistan. On behalf of the Afghan leadership, Wakil expressed profound gratitude for the Soviet Union's political, moral and other aid at a crucial stage of its historical development.

POWs in Afghanistan To Receive News From Home

LD1904152690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] In a few days time Soviet servicemen, who are being held in captivity by the Afghan mujahidin, Valentin Dubina, Aleksey Olenin, and Yuriy Stepanov, will for the first time in many years be able to receive news from their relatives and near ones. Parcels for them were handed over today in the Pakistani capital to a representative of the opposition group, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, by members of the committee of the Soviet public for the liberation of Soviet servicemen taken prisoner in Afghanistan.

UN Findings on Human Rights in Iran Reported

PM1904151790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

["Own Information" report: "Report by the UN Commission on Human Rights"]

[Text] A report by a special representative of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran was published in Geneva at the end of February. A group of experts from this international organization, led by R. Paul [name as transliterated], was invited to Iran for the first time by the Iranian Government to study this question.

While visiting Evin Jail in Tehran, the UN representatives met N. Kianouri, former first secretary of the Iranian Tudeh Party Central Committee. It is well known that N. Kianouri, other Tudeh Party leaders, and several thousand of its members were arrested in 1983 during the campaign of repressions against this and other Iranian parties. They stand accused of "spying for Moscow" and "organizing a conspiracy to overthrow the revolutionary government." Televised statements by N. Kianouri and other Tudeh Party leaders, in which they "confessed to the crimes they had committed," have been used as the main "evidence" against them.

As R. Paul indicates in his report, during their conversation Kianouri "hotly denied allegations that he had been spying for a foreign power and had taken part in a conspiracy to overthrow the revolutionary government. In the presence of officials and staff of Evin Jail, he said

that he had been subjected to torture, showed his partially paralyzed arms and broken fingers, and described the beatings and other degradations he had suffered." Moreover, N. Kianouri "condemned the execution of thousands of young people whom he believes were totally innocent" and who had been "accused of association with the Tudeh Party."

It is well known that R. Paul's report has been, on the whole, given a positive assessment by the Iranian authorities for its objectivity and veracity. It is logical to expect that justice will be restored to N. Kianouri and other incarcerated Tudeh Party members and that they will be released.

Andreyev Comments on Iranian Economic Situation

NC1904144790 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Dear friends: According to unofficial sources in Tehran, confidential negotiations on a $10 billion loan for the Islamic Republic of Iran are under way between the World Bank and the IMF and Iran.

It should be noted that official representatives of the Iranian Government have denied reports of such negotiations. Mr. Mohsen Nurbakhsh, the Iranian minister for economic affairs and finance, had previously told correspondents that Iran does not wish to join the IMF's official assistance scheme and will depend on its own resources. However it is known that a World Bank delegation was in Iran some time ago and discussed various aspects of cooperation with Iran. Iran continues to fulfill its commitments in all spheres and is abiding by its right of membership in a very systematic manner in this institution. It has also become the head of the Group of 24 which unites the developing countries and is constantly seeking to expand contacts with the IMF.

At least two factors obstruct Iran's cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank. First of all, there is the political image of the Islamic Republic of Iran. International lenders have viewed the Islamic fundamentalism prevailing in Iran in past years with suspicion. The Islamic intransigence of Iran and its rigid stance as regards its domestic and foreign policy created serious obstacles to its obtaining Western loans. Second, the economic model that had been adopted in Iran made Iran's cooperation with the World Bank difficult. IMF experts had demanded a greater role for the private sector in Iran's economy, a halt to subsidies on basic commodities, the depreciation of the rial, and a freeze on salaries and wages. It can be said that the new Iranian Government has taken steps in this regard.

Do these steps include the recent measures taken by the Iranian Central Bank to create a competitive rate for the rial? Of course. The depreciation of the rial appears inevitable. The official exchange rate of 70 rials to the dollar is completely unrealistic. The dollar's black market value of 800 to 1,000 rials is closer to a realistic rate. It is no coincidence that the Iranian Central Bank was forced to implicitly accept a partial depreciation of the rial by allowing the competitive rate to fluctuate. Otherwise it would have set a fixed rate.

This is probably the first step. Experts believe the Iranian Government's approach is very realistic. This government is ready to take major steps in this regard. Today, many realize that the official exchange rate of the rial is not only creating bottlenecks in Iran's official foreign exchange mechanism, but also narrows the scope for foreign investment in the Iranian economy.

DFLP's Hawatimah Assured of Continued Support

PM1804140990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] At the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, a delegation of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP] headed by Nayif Hawatimah, the Front's general secretary, has paid a working visit to Moscow. The delegation was received at the USSR Foreign Ministry, the CPSU Central Committee International Department, and the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries. Readiness was expressed on behalf of the Soviet public to continue to support the just struggle of the Palestinian people.

East Europe

Workers Give Walesa 'Rough Ride' on TV Program

PM1904145190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Poland: Shock Without Therapy"]

[Text] Lech Walesa, chairman of the "Solidarity" trade union, had a rough ride when he answered TV viewers' direct questions on Thursday's "Interpellation" TV program.

Workers at a Lodz factory, Warsaw working people who gathered outside the "Junior" supermarket on Marszalowska Street, and peasants from a rural area expressed to this prestigious Polish figure their dissatisfaction with the current economic situation in the country, the growth in unemployment, the fall in living standards, and the failure to keep the promises about showing concern for working people's interests that were made by "Solidarity" when it was founded 10 years ago.

Life has become considerably worse, the constant promises about an improvement have come to nothing, costs are again rising, and the housing problem is deteriorating, the Lodz workers stressed in front of the cameras. Most of those currently being fired are women, and the percentage of women workers in Lodz is the highest in

the country, they told L. Walesa. Instead of going in for big-time politics, it is necessary to do more to protect working people's interests.

A whole number of TV viewers expressed concern about the fact that one nomenklatura in Poland is now being replaced by another, and that "cozy jobs" are being divided up among "Solidarity" figures who have come to power.

Answering these rebukes, Lech Walesa repeatedly stressed that he is not part of the government, and that the "Solidarity" trade union should first hold a congress and work out a line of behavior so as to carry out its protective functions to a greater extent. The "Solidarity" leader called on working people not to wait for help from above but to tackle matters more boldly themselves, making use of the current situation and the coming elections to organs of territorial self-management. I, too, am afraid of a new monopoly on power and the appearance of a new nomenklatura in the country, he said, sharing his interlocutors' concern and promising for the umpteenth time to combat these phenomena.

Soviet-Bulgarian Foreign Policy Meeting Held

PM1904145590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Improving Foreign Policy Cooperation"]

[Text] Soviet-Bulgarian consultations were held in Moscow 16-17 April on a wide range of issues connected with improving foreign policy cooperation between the two countries, on the situation in East Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, and on the progress toward a Near East settlement.

Bulgaria To Reduce Exports to Soviet Union

90UF0075A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Bulgaria: Exports to USSR Will Decrease"]

[Text] **The newspaper DUMA (this is the name under which the newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO is now published) published an interview with the Bulgarian deputy minister of foreign economic relations, K. Popov, who said, in particular, that commodity exchange between Bulgaria and the USSR would reach 12 billion rubles in 1990.**

But as compared to last year Bulgarian exports to the Soviet Union will decrease by R800 million. The deputy minister also added that deliveries to Bulgaria under long-term agreements will decrease by 70,000 tons of canned vegetables, 75 million bottles of wine, 11,000 tons of tobacco, and 100 million rubles' worth of veterinary preparations.

True, noted K. Popov, regardless of the difficulties being experienced by the Soviet economy, the volume of deliveries of raw materials, fuel, and consumer goods from the USSR to Bulgaria is expected to reach R3.1 billion. The fact is that Bulgaria has practically no alternative to commodity exchange with the USSR. For, the administrator said, it provides most of the raw material supplies and fuel and a considerable volume of consumer goods and guarantees a market for Bulgarian goods.

Prague Prosecutor Threatens Ban of CPCZ

PM1904150990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov dispatch: "Prague Prosecutor Planning to Ban CPCZ"]

[Text] Prague—In a 17 April letter to the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] Central Committee, Prague Prosecutor T. Sokol has threatened to ban the CPCZ's activity in the Czechoslovak capital.

The prosecutor announces that, as of 1 May, the CPCZ will be checked for the possible existence of support and propaganda for... fascism in its activity. The letter quotes the criteria on the basis of which Czechoslovak law defines the typical signs of a fascist movement: "destruction of all democratic rights"; "terror and social demagoguery serving as the main political methods." The prosecutor claims that "in its essence, the communist movement is geared toward the violent seizure of power" and so forth.

As RUDE PRAVO stated 18 April, the city prosecutor's letter, whose contents were reported on television, has caused readers to express their disagreement and surprise that the prosecutor should be whipping up such an atmosphere. Readers are demanding, the newspaper writes, that the republic's President V. Havel and Justice Minister D. Buresova make an assessment of this action. RUDE PRAVO Chief Editor Z. Porybny writes in a commentary: "The CPCZ is a legal political party respecting the country's Constitution and laws; it is quite clearly listed in the law on political parties and movements dated 23 January this year." Nobody, the writer continues, knows better than CPCZ members just what fascism is—more than 25,000 Communists died in the fascists' hands.

It is hard to say as yet just what prompted the Prague prosecutor, on the eve of the election campaign, to take this action which is totally incompatible with the existing law on the territory of all of Czechoslovakia, which was adopted after the autocratic rule of the former CPCZ had become a thing of the past.

Romanian Socialist Democrats' Leader Interviewed

PM1904084190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Volodin incorporating interview with Marius Circiumaru, chairman of the Romanian Socialist Democratic Party: "Heeding the Voice of Reason"]

[Text] Bucharest—In a house, inhabited until recently by one of Ceausescu's minions, and which is now the seat of the headquarters of the Romanian Socialist Democratic Party, I met Marius Circiumaru, the party's chairman, who recently returned from Moscow which he visited as the head of a delegation of Romania's "lesser parliament."

"This was my first trip to the Soviet Union, but my schedule was so tight, that I got to see Moscow only from the window," he told me. "All the members of the delegation came back with impressions of having been accorded a warm, cordial welcome. The only thing we regret is that we did not manage to meet with Mikhail Gorbachev..."

M. Circiumaru told me that wherever the delegation was received, from the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities to the Soviet-Romanian Friendship Association and the "Rodina" Society, open dialogue enabled them not only to exchange opinions on the situation in Romania and the development of perestroyka and glasnost processes in the USSR, but also to find points of contact in the perception of the complex processes of transformations under way in Eastern Europe.

Naturally, having touched upon the question of the need for stability in Eastern Europe in our conversation with M. Circiumaru, we could not but touch upon the theme of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina which is currently being whipped up by a number of Romanian newspapers. My interlocutor told me that the Romanian Socialist Democrats share the view of the Romanian Government. In other words, while respecting the inviolability of the Soviet Union's borders, they want to develop economic and cultural ties with the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. M. Circiumaru believes that the attempts of certain circles artificially to tear Soviet Moldavia from the USSR threaten the stability of other borders in the region, too.

I could not help asking the chairman of the Socialist Democratic Party of Romania what he thought of the stances of the free Romanian press which is not loath to throw stones at its neighbor from time to time. According to Circiumaru's opinion, the December revolution has washed up quite a few unscrupulous elements. Many of them were until recently extolling Ceausescu's "golden age" but are now, in view of the new political conditions, demonstrating their anticommunism, and trying to appear "holier than the pope," as the saying goes.

The chairman of the Romanian Socialist Democratic Party believes that in time everything will fall into place. The scum will subside, but meanwhile there are attempts negate anything good which has been created by the Romanian people over the past 45 years and which is totally unconnected with the dectatorship. Some people are trying to consign to oblivion also the assistance which the USSR gave Romania from the first days of the December revolution.

My interlocutor noted quite rightly that it is currently fashionable in Romania to flaunt one's anticommunism. The forces of the right-wing opposition which include the so-called "historical" parties are also developing their activities, riding the wave of this mood. "They seem to think that they are leading the country forward," M. Circiumaru said. "But in actual fact, by trying to pick up the thread where it was broken off in 1947, they are not offering the Romanian people anything new..."

Frankly speaking, if you compare the numerous political programs of the parties, it may appear to you at first glance, that they have all been cut according to one pattern. They all speak of democracy, the market, and private property. The difference, the chairman of the Romanian Socialist Democratic Party explained, lies in the methods by which the parties intend to achieve these goals. The Romanian Socialist Democrats, for instance, reject the economic shock therapy, advocated by the liberals. According to the program of the Romanian Socialist Democratic Party the way to commodity-money relations leads through a transitional period. During this entire period, alongside private enterprises in agriculture and industry, a powerful state sector will remain in existence, serving as a kind of buffer during the switch of the economy to a market footing, protecting the working people from all kind of shocks. Furthermore, M. Circiumaru believes, an abrupt switch to market conditions will entail rising unemployment, poverty, and inflation which could engender a yearning for a firm hand, subsequently even for a dictatorship. And there is no guarantee that it will not be even more terrible than Ceausescu's rule.

Article Analyzes Plight of Slovak Communists

90UF0079A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by TASS correspondent A. Shapovalov, special to RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: "An Attack Against Communists"]

[Text] **The wind was warm, absolutely spring-like. The sun was bright. There was an abundance of color on the streets of Bratislava coming from numerous slogans and banners displayed by the activists and supporters of the Civic Forum and its Slovak analog, Society Against Violence. There also were appeals worded by persons unknown, for example: "Slovakia for Slovaks, Jews to Palestine, and Gypsies to India."**

The people, especially the young people, were merry and unrestrained. In the shops, and not only there, there were signs of affluence and stability. The streets were jammed with cars with Austrian license tags. You could hear everywhere: "Wie viel kostet, geben sie mir bitte" (How much is it, could you please show me?).

Travel without visa requirements has been introduced, and this is why the onslaught of tourists spells real trouble, and not only on Saturdays and Sundays. Vienna

is 1.5 hours away by car. Prices for foodstuffs in Bratislava are six to 10 times lower than in the capital of Austria. So, representatives of the free world, which is advertised in every way possible, come here to dine at a restaurant with low prices, engage in business, and grab several canisters of gasoline which is also much cheaper here than in Vienna, rather than to see the places of interest. It went so far that the authorities had to resort to restrictive measures. They explained that Slovakia would have been bought up otherwise.

However, the stream from Bratislava to Vienna is also impressive: The line of cars with Slovak license tags at the bridge and on approaches to it gets to be several kilometers long on the days off. However, you cannot get too far in Vienna: The prices are "sky-high," and only a small amount of money is exchanged.

Undoubtedly, the republic follows the overall Czechoslovak pattern of changes and transformations. However, their political tint, external and internal essence, and dynamics in Slovakia differ from those in, say, Bohemia. Things are clearer here and more unequivocal. Rallies, get-togethers, and meetings are held in the cities and villages of the republic almost every day with the participation of the top leaders of the Communist Party of Slovakia. What are they about?

Some people began to seek that the V.I. Lenin Museum in Bratislava be closed. Supposedly, the building should be converted for other, more important uses. A rally was held on the initiative of communists, impassioned speeches were made, and weighty arguments were offered, of the kind "museums of Lenin exist to this day in England, Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland, and why should they be desecrated here, in Czechoslovakia?" A decision was made to preserve the V.I. Lenin museum, open a club, an art gallery, and a meeting hall affiliated with it.

Passions flared up at a construction combine in the locality of Pesku. Its collectives elected engineer Pavel Stulrajter its director through democratic procedures. However, representatives of the movement "Society Against Violence" objected: Supposedly, he is not the right man. What was the justification? Hints followed in response which made it clear: He is not the right one because he belongs to the Communist Party of Slovakia.

A spontaneous rally came together, and all 600 people expressed their support for the director. Subsequently, a conference of delegates had its say: One hundred and forty-eight out of 149 in attendance voted in favor of P. Stulrajter praising highly his competence, professional training, and his desire to consolidate rather than mess up the combine and to improve the financial and social position of its employees.

The director was also supported by the trade union committee and the employee council which, we will note, made a bold decision: The committee of the movement "Society Against Violence" should discontinue its activities at the enterprise and focus it at the place of residence, which organizations of the Communist Party of Slovakia had already done.

The party brought to its knees showed no desire to hibernate; as the newspaper of the Communist Party of Slovakia, PRAVDA, wrote, it began to get back on its feet.

Obviously, they did not like this bold declaration. The newspaper of the Democratic Party, LUD, pointed out: We find that the actions of the Communist Party of Slovakia parallel in a certain sense the assertions of Minister of Propaganda Goebbels who proclaimed the slogan "Lies repeated a thousand times ultimately become the truth," in our case, PRAVDA ["truth" in Slovak].

Despite PRAVDA not being particularly hopeful, a flood of letters of support and approval reached the editorial office. Non-party member Magdalena Sincikova wrote that until very recently LUD was buddy-buddy with the communists, putting forth the same slogans and views. But now, it has gone over to the side of the Society Against Violence and the Civic Forum, and exudes malice and hatred. Democrats, whatever happened to your ethics as journalists and not just journalists?

Another reader noted that she has to get up at 08:00 in order to buy PRAVDA because the newspaper is snapped up. It is objective and interesting from its first page to its last. This is the only newspaper in Slovakia which comes out on the side of truth and democracy. Your actions have proven this. Go on speaking out in favor of justice and against lawlessness. We, the readers, are with you.

Given the circumstances, I could not but go to PRAVDA and talk to its staff. It was warm around the table not only due to hot coffee but also to the meeting itself: They were open-minded, and free in their judgments. The journalists explained: The same thing happened in the Communist Party of Slovakia and to it as with the entire Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Many people still do not understand why their positions were surrendered so quickly. During last November, the dilemma was whether to surrender everything or nothing. They opted for the first scenario because the second one could have brought about events similar to those in Romania. Only now do they realize how many mistakes were made in the past, especially in the recent past. At present, the party is actually in opposition. The situation is complicated, but it is going to get even more complicated. At present, perhaps the most conservative regime in Europe is evolving in our country. It may seem at first sight that the Civic Forum, as well as those who are in power at present, allow mistakes to occur. Actually, everything has been very cleverly and precisely calculated. By now, it is possible to say unequivocally that a policy of Western orientation is being implemented, and conditions for the receipt of Western capital are being created. Many shocking moments are in store for our society; its disappointments will be many.

The blow will be struck primarily at cooperatives in the countryside because they are like an eyesore, they get in the way, including in the way of the influx of private capital from the West. Even now it is clearly seen that they will try to split up and break cooperatives. For now, there are no special problems with foodstuffs; however, soon a situation may develop along the lines of that in Hungary. They are already bringing paprika there from the West whereas recently paprika was abundant for both their own consumption and exports. My interlocutors explained that PRAVDA did not trail behind the November events. The journalists selected a saying by the great French philosopher J.J. Rousseau as their motto, so to say, their guide for action: Deep down, I disagree with what you are saying but I will always defend your right to say this everywhere.

When you open a newspaper, turn on the radio or television, you get to see or hear the first president of the republic, T. Masarik, glorified. In conjunction with this, PRAVDA points out that we should be afraid of demagogic assessments of history and biased nostalgic memories. A set of letters from readers follows. In particular, P. Sklar writes: Under President T. Masarik, the country had a million unemployed, mostly Slovaks. All profitable positions were taken mostly by the Czechs. The Slovaks were forced to emigrate. Those who went on strike were fired upon. Slovakia at the time appeared to be a colony of the Czechs. This is how democracy in Slovakia looked under T. Masarik, the son of a Slovak worker.

Also, there was a meeting at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia. The comrades familiarized me in detail with the state of affairs. They assume that during the November days the events developed spontaneously, though it is debatable. However, what has been done has been done. In general, it is clear by now that the opposition worked, and is working at present, having already taken power, proceeding from a precisely developed and profoundly thought-through scenario. Primarily, the elements of psychological shock influence which power-behind-the-throne deals dominate in its program. Their tactics also merit attention. Civic Forum, which actually carries on as a party, criticizes and accuses the government, supposedly showing its courage and democratic nature. Actually, it continues to strike blows at the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

The search by the party for excuses for its own mistakes may be lucrative but it is dangerous: At a time when action is called for one may sink into self-analysis and self-flagellation which undoubtedly brings about self-liquidation: The ranks of the once 460,000-strong party organization of the republic are shrinking. Understandably, the process of formation of a new society has now begun. The communists have just one chance to join this process on the left flank. However, the party does not yet feel that this is the last opportunity. Previously, the party organizations at plants and factories were a force. Now many of them have fallen apart, but the propensity of communists to unite has survived. Recently, party members have frequently gathered outside the gates of plants. Discussion clubs of journalists and lawyers are being created...

The second important aspect of the present situation is that the communists do not attribute their defeat solely to the inability of the former leadership to solve problems in a modern manner. It is necessary to rearm the party theoretically and ideologically, to impress on it that the struggle should proceed for a society of social justice, that it needs to operate in an environment of pluralism, and so on.

Having acknowledged their mistakes and honestly repented, the communists attempted to act properly, but this was ignored. For example, access to the mass media is blocked. Leader of the party P. Veis is not allowed to speak on local TV. The Coordinating Center of the "Society Against Violence" said that there is no problem with this; however, the committee of radio and TV broadcasting of the Society Against Violence did not agree with this.

At present, at issue are not only the blows struck at the Communist Party but also the elimination of all left-wing forces altogether. This is necessary for Western capital to rush into Czechoslovakia. At present, Civic Forum, other similar parties, and even many members of the government, talk about anything at all rather than the economy. The latter is, as a rule, discussed in obscure and hazy terms with preference given to pragmatic steps rather than a long-range program. As my interlocutors saw it, this tendency is going to become more pronounced as elections draw nearer. What is the goal? To create political prerequisites for attacks, for dismantling the existing economic basis. A beginning has already been made: Structural changes in industry, banking on privatization, initial attempts to destroy cooperatives, primarily in the countryside.

...We took another trip, to the Czechoslovak-Austrian border. Everything was flooded with sunlight. The Danube glistened, and cars speeded by one after the other. There was a fortress which, it seemed, rose miraculously on a cliff high above the Danube. At one point, it protected the forward edge of the Roman Empire which fell apart. At the foot of the fortress, there is a frontier as well. To be sure, the obstacles on it were recently removed, but sometimes one does find a piece of barbed wire which is immediately picked up by passers-by. This is an open contact point of the two worlds.

Space and freedom are intoxicating. The Slovak bank of the Danube was like a central avenue during rush hour; there were fewer people on the Austrian side. The people waved their hands and tried to shout something. However, the Danube is a deep and wide river at this spot, and the southwestern wind was strong and brisk.

What other events may the ancient fortress witness?

When the Issue Was Being Typeset

Prague—The CTK agency reports that Julius Hribik, 58, has committed an act of self-immolation in the compound of the "Paliva" Enterprise in Bratislava. He worked as general director of the Slovak trade inspection, but was recalled from this position on 12 February of this year.

Today, the newspaper RUDE PRAVO published an article by its correspondent which sheds light on the motives for the suicide. As a representative of the investigative organs of the Public Security Service of Bratislava said, J. Hribik committed the act of self-immolation in order to protest his unfair dismissal, as well as the defamation and dismissals of other employees of the Slovak trade inspection, primarily members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

A letter written by J. Hribik the day before the tragedy and addressed to his wife, sons, and friends says so.

Yugoslav Union Leader on Impact of Reforms

90UF0056A Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Apr 90 p 3

[Interview with Andzhelko Vasich, chairman of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, by A. Poroshin: "A Way Out of the Triangle"]

[Text] **The deep economic and political reforms being carried out in Yugoslavia today have not bypassed the trade unions. The way these reforms are proceeding is discussed in an interview conducted by our Belgrade correspondent, A. Poroshin, with Andzhelko Vasich, the chairman of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (CTUY).**

[Poroshin] As the leader of the largest social organization, could you give us an assessment of the situation in Yugoslavia and the attitudes among the workers now?

[Vasich] A lengthy and difficult process of implementing radical reforms, whose goal is to construct a society of economic effectiveness and political democracy, has begun in Yugoslavia. We are trying to achieve economic effectiveness with the help of market mechanisms in a mixed type of economy, and political democracy—through consistent observance of all human rights and freedoms.

The main motivating force of this process is the workers, and not only the rates of implementation but also the final success of the work that has been started will depend largely on how they accept the reforms.

It must be emphasized that a deep crisis that has been continuing for ten years now in Yugoslavia has dealt a sharp blow not just to pensioners and the unemployed. It is also hard on the workers, especially those who live exclusively on their own earnings. Today they have the hope that the end of the crisis is near. This cautious optimism flows from the feeling that the reforms are in keeping with their long-term interests. But at the same time the majority of the workers are aware that the period of reforms will be neither quick nor easy.

[Poroshin] The reforms that are being conducted bring the workers into direct contact with the market and increase the price of their own labor. But, as the president of the Federal Executive Council, A. Markovic, noted, the country cannot emerge from the crisis without scars. What are the trade unions doing to keep these scars to a minimum?

[Vasich] Understanding the gravity of the situation in which the reform began, we are insisting on so-called transition decisions—the creation of something like economic and social bridges which would make it possible to enter the domain of market competition less painfully. We have demanded the introduction of an incentive system for distribution of incomes and implementation of an adequate social policy. We are especially insistent about avoiding administrative control and restrictions in the area of wages. And we still think that this step on the part of the government was not sufficiently thought out.

[Poroshin] What goal is pursued by the reforms begun in the Yugoslavian trade unions: to adapt to the new economic conditions, to get out from under the thumb of party-state structures, or to create a basis for a real worker organization that defends the interests of the workers?

[Vasich] These three goals together comprise the essence of our reform. And the major task—and this comes from the workers themselves—is to create an organization that will assert itself primarily in the struggle for their interests, rights, and freedoms. As concerns liberation from any tutelage, by a decision of the CTUY council, the trade unions as a sociopolitical organization will soon leave the institutions of the system, they will begin to operate differently in the local councils, and they will follow an independent personnel policy.

[Poroshin] Are you not afraid of the appearance of alternative trade unions?

[Vasich] We think this is a normal phenomenon but a temporary one. Because the main factors giving rise to their appearance will disappear with time. Some of them have appeared with the goal of achieving more political than trade union independence. Others are trying to cause a split in the worker movement, which causes harm to the unity and weakens all organizations, and it does not work to the advantage of these same "single" trade unions. Recently we began a dialog with them and we think that the path to cooperation has been opened up. For as I have already said, there are fewer and fewer reasons for starting alternative trade unions.

[Poroshin] Let us consider the alignment of forces in the classical triangle under socialism: the party, the state, and the trade unions. To what extent does the reform begun in the CTUY council violate this trinity?

[Vasich] Under the new conditions this triangle really does assume a different measurement and different content. And so there are the party and the trade unions. Yugoslavia, as you know, is becoming a country with a multiparty system. This means that the workers can be members of various parties. The trade unions will not participate in this process. The range of their concerns includes economic, social, and trade union rights and freedoms of the workers. Political affiliation is a matter of the convictions and choice of the workers themselves. The CTUY will cooperate with all parties, organizations, and societies that set the goal of developing democratic socialism and self-management and speak out in favor of national equality and improvement of the position of the working person.

As concerns relations with the state, the trade unions will no longer transmit and interpret its decisions. They will become its opponent. We will be partners with equal rights in making decisions that affect the interests of the workers and we will participate in negotiations on wages and all other issues that are of vital significance for the workers and the entire society.

[Poroshin] The new laws make the two kinds of ownership equal in Yugoslavia. At private enterprises it is permitted to increase the work force a great deal. How will the trade unions carry out their protective functions with respect to this category of workers?

[Vasich] We will strive to improve the position of trade union members, regardless of where they exercise their right to work. In the private sector as well we will protect the rights of workers with all the means at the disposal of the trade unions: through negotiations over wages, legal protection during the course of judicial investigations and arbitration, and, finally, with the help of strikes when all other methods fail.

[Poroshin] At the beginning of June it is planned to convene the regular congress of trade unions of Yugoslavia. What will you take to this forum?

[Vasich] The forthcoming congress could turn out to be a turning point in the fate of current and future trade union organization. To some degree this congress will also be a constituent one since the trade union will assert itself as an independent and autonomous organization operating exclusively in the interests of the working class.

We do not expect any significant differences of opinion on any of the worker-related issues. The task will be to make the congress truly for the trade unions, so that everyday political problems will not take over the agenda. We must not allow ourselves to be drawn into a discussion of issues that are within the competence of the state, government, or republic leaders. The Kosovo problems and the methods of solving them, the economic blockade of Serbia and Slovenia—all these issues could, of course, arise at the congress. But we are exerting ourselves to find solutions to these problems before the congress and we are suggesting our own concrete program for this.

If we do what we have earmarked the forthcoming congress will be a congress of Yugoslavian workers who want to work and live better under conditions of democratic socialism and self-management.

West Europe

KGB Statement on Expulsion of British Tourists

LD1904222590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1705 GMT 19 Apr 90

["Announcement" issued by the USSR Committee for State Security in Moscow—date not given]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)—"At the start of April 1990, British subjects Charles-Humphrey Maynell, born in 1954 in Honingham, and Susan Lloyd-Morris, born 1950 in London, personnel of the "Roberts" firm, who were in the Soviet Union as tourists, committed a grave violation of the existing rule for visitation and movement by foreigners through the territory of the USSR.

According to the entry visas issued to Maynell and Lloyd-Morris, they were to visit Tallinn, Riga, Leningrad, and Moscow in the period 4-30 April. However, having deviated from the tourist route, they illegally entered the city of Vilnius, where, accompanied by three citizens of the Lithuanian capital, they appeared near the training center of the Vilnius Higher Command School of Air Defense, which is situated a considerable distance from the city. Having twice gone around the military installation in a "Dzhguli" car, the foreigners and their companions went through the wire fence onto the military installation's territory, and, using two video cameras, began to film the training and combat equipment concentrated there. Having noticed the approach of a guard, the infringers ignored his commands and attempted to flee but were detained by the guard detachment which was scrambled. During the investigation which followed, Maynell and Lloyd-Morris motivated their appearance on the territory of the training center by a "desire to admire nature before departing for home." Their illegal acts were documented under the relevant act, and the video cassettes were confiscated. The day after the above incident, the English people were compelled, having cut short their tour, to leave the confines of our country ahead of schedule.

It is symptomatic that, according to the date of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Tourism, Lloyd-Morris visted Yerevan in December 1989 "to admire nature", and Maynall visited Baku and Tbilisi in January this year.

The USSR Committee for State Security is compelled in this connection to state that such actions by foreigners do not promote the process of development of mutual

understanding and confidence between states, and can lead to grave consequences for those who violate Soviet laws.

Britain's Hurd Views Europe, Soviet Relations

PM1804164290 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 15, 10-16 Apr 90 pp 20-21

[Article by UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd: "'A Historic Breakthrough Likely'"]

[Text] I am grateful to have been asked, on the eve of my visit to the Soviet Union, to contribute an article to NEW TIMES on relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. My visit—from 9-12 April—will be my first to the Soviet Union as secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. It is part of what I am glad to see is becoming a regular exchange of high-level visits between our two countries. Mr Gorbachev has now been to Britain three times, most recently last April. Mr Shevardnadze came to London last December. Mr Medvedev was here in February, and the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, will visit Moscow and Kiev in June. This busy programme is one tangible expression of the marked improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations over the last few years.

Our two countries are on better terms with each other now than at any time since our wartime alliance. For a long time we saw each other as potential adversaries. That has now changed. Bilaterally, the emphasis is more than ever on cooperation. We are talking frankly and productively about issues as diverse as arms control, health care and industrial management.

President Havel of Czechoslovakia spoke in his New Year address of infusing international politics with "love, understanding, the power of spirit and ideas." Where better to do that than in contacts between young people? The programme of school exchanges agreed in 1988 is succeeding beyond our wildest dreams - over 350 British schools are involved or hope to become involved in the programme. Our peoples are coming to think of each other as partners.

We are also doing more business with each other. Last year our trade increased by 16 percent. There are now over 70 Anglo-Soviet joint ventures. But we should not be satisfied. We can do much better. As the Soviet economy opens up, as as our bilateral relationship develops, new opportunities for investment and for commercial and industrial cooperation will be taken up. The british government is doing everything it can to encourage this. We are for example strongly supporting the proposal to establish a major British-Soviet trade center in the heart of Moscow.

We also have a growing cultural relationship. Much of it, I am glad to say, goes on without any government involvement. Musicians, artists and theatre groups from the U.K. are keen to perform in the Soviet Union, and Soviet dancers, singers, orchestras find a ready audience in Britain. Through television, which in recent months has brought into our homes dramatic events in Europe, our peoples have been able to look into each other's eyes. Last year, a week of British television programmes was shown in your country. Earlier this year, one of our television channels concentrated for a month on a variety of films and programmes from and about the U.S.S.R. Our viewers saw Soviet news, documentary and entertainment programmes and Soviet people speaking frankly about their history, their problems and their hopes.

In June, we shall be mounting an exhibition in Kiev designed to show the Soviet public what life is like in modern Britain. It will be the largest ever event of its kind organized in the Soviet Union. The exhibition will be opened on the fourth of June by the Queen's daughter, the royal princess, and between then and the end of June Kiev will be visited by British performers of all kinds: opera, theatre, ballet, a military band, an aerobatic display team and many others. Russian-speaking guides will help to explain the exhibits and answer questions. I hope that many of the readers of NEW TIMES will be able to visit the exhibition.

These days, British people are interested in all aspects of Soviet life. There is great fascination and enthusiasm in Britain for glasnost and perestroyka. Mr Gorbachev's courageous decisions have been central to the progress of reform in the Soviet Union, to the beginning of the construction of a new peaceful order in Europe, and to an improvement in international relations across the board. There should be no doubt about Britain's support for these changes, which benefit our people and yours alike.

We are doing our best to contribute to the developmnent of perestroyka. We are promoting exchanges between members of the British parliament and the Supreme Soviet. Soviet parliamentarians and business people are expressing great interest in our experience and our style of management and of course we are more than happy to share this with them. We are promoting an increasing number of parliamentary exchanges. We are running courses in business management. We are sharing experiences in converting factory production from defence to consumer goods, and in the management of small highly flexible companies able to respond quickly to market shifts. Hardly a week passes without a delegation going in one direction or another discussing such varied subjects as the training of civil servants, equal opportunities for women, the process of legal drafting and cooperation in the fight against drugs and terrorism. During my visit, I shall be exploring other areas where we can work together.

The improvement in relations between the U.K. and the Soviet Union has taken place against a background of remarkable change in Europe. In the West and in the East, change has been far faster than anybody could have predicted only a few years ago. With our partners in the European Community, Britain is moving towards ever

closer cooperation. There is at present a lively debate about where exactly this process will end up, but there is no doubt of the fact that the twelve members of the Community are building a new and unique kind of international partnership. The Community will be stronger economically as a result of the single market, and politically more cohesive. It will, I am confident, be outward rather than inward looking. It will be a central player in the Europe of the future.

In the East, too, we have seen extraordinary changes. Governments have fallen, constitutions have changed. The Soviet Union has played a key role in bringing about the conditions for reform in the countries of Eastern Europe. I believe that the changes now taking place will serve the cause for long-term stability and security throughout Europe. It is for the peoples of Eastern Europe to decide how they will use their new found freedoms. But it is important for all of us, for our security and for the stability of our continent, that they should exercise those freedoms against the background of guaranteed individual rights, of democracy, of freely elected governments which can be trusted by the people, and of economic success. The East European nations have made a brave start on the path of reform but the road will be long and hard. We and our partners will help where we can, as I am sure will the Soviet Union, but successful reform will depend on the East European peoples themselves. All of us have a stake in the success of these reforms. All of us must work together to build a new cooperative structure in Europe.

One of the most striking changes has been the rapid movement in recent months towards German unity. For over four decades, families and friends were divided and kept apart. I visited Berlin last November, soon after the Berlin Wall was opened up, and again in January. No one could fail to be moved by the deep emotions which were on open show, the joy and happiness of thousands of ordinary people coming together in freedom.

But I know that some people in the Soviet Union may have mixed feelings about this process. I can well understand this, given the terrible losses suffered by the Soviet people in the last war. But I believe that Germany has changed fundamentally since those dark days. The Federal Republic has spent forty years building a strong liberal democracy, with full public accountability and the rule of law. It is integrated into the Western alliance and the European Community. The German people share the aspirations of their partners and allies. I am confident that the new German state will build on these democratic foundations and that the healing of divisions in Germany will contribute to the healing of divisions in Europe as a whole.

For our part, we shall be working together with all our partners, including, of course, the Soviet Union. The framework agreed at Ottawa of the four wartime powers (U.K, U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and France) and the two German states provides a valuable mechanism for discussing external aspects of unification. We shall also be having discusions in other relevant fora. Our aim will be to ensure that the process of unification takes place in a way that bolsters stability in Europe, andd leaves our continent secure.

The Soviet leadership has spoken on a number of occasions of the need to construct "a common European home." Whatever we may call it, we need a political and security structure in which every nation in Europe can feel safe. We need to bury forever antagonism and mistrust between East and West. We need to build a common prosperity. We need to cooperate against the common threats which face us all; not least environmental problems. We have already made a useful start. But we are only beginning to realize the seriousness of the problems which lie ahead of us, and the extent of the damage that has already been done to the global envirnoment by the scale of man's industrial and agricultural activity.

I do not think that any of us, in East or West, now seriously believes in the likelihood of war launched in Europe. It is simply not conceivable that NATO, or any of its member states, would ever launch any kind of attack against the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union. It is equally clear that there is no aggressive intent on the part of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. This does not mean that we can be complacent or careless about security issues. NATO will remain essential for us in the West as a defensive alliance underpinning our security. Moreover, the alliances form a community of countries with shared values, interests and aspirations. As such it will continue to be stabilizing factor in Europe - a Europe where a united Germany need be no treat to anyone.

Arms control must be approached carefully, on the basis of balanced and verifiable reductions which lead to a stable and secure end result. It has always been true that security arrangements should be based on capabilities, not intentions. I believe, however, that there is now a greater political will than there has ever been, amongst all the nations concerned, to work toward the achievement of significant cuts in levels of armaments. We saw further evidence of that recently, in Ottawa. But arms control agreements can only function if all parties to them are confident that others will hold to their commitments. That is he kind of agreement for which we are working in the negotiations in Vienna, and for which I believe the United States and the Soviet Union are working in their talks on strategic arms reductions.

For the longer term, I see important possibilities in the Helsinki process. I know that in all the capitals of Europe, governments and ministries are looking at ways in which the process might be developed into the foundations of a new European structure. The summit meeting later this year will pay an important part in launching this debate in which we all have a vital stake. I hope that it will break new ground in re-invigorating the CSCE progress and that it will also lead to further agreements at the Helsinki meeting in 1992. If it does, it will have been a historic break-through - the first time

that our strive-torn continent has been fully united in peace and in freedom, looking to trust, confidence and cooperation as its corner stones, not to the detracted balances of armed deterrence. My generation grew up in a period of tension and war. We graduated in the cold war, and we took our place in society in the so-called postwar period. How good it would be if the British and Soviet people could work together to lead our continent into a new era - one which no longer needs the name with the word war in it at all. That is our goal. The prospects have never been better.

CPSU Officials Meet With FRG Politicians

LD1804211890 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The joint working group of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) and the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) met at the CPSU Central Committee today.

Group co-chairmen Valentin Falin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and Egon Bahr, member of the Presidium of the SPD Board, and other participants discussed a wide range of issues, including the situation in Europe, the unification of the two German states, arms reductions and the creation of an all-European security system.

The group heard reports on results of work by experts from both parties, who had studied possibilities for the sides' cooperation in the economy, environmental protection and the conversion of the defence industry. The sides will continue efforts in these areas.

The meeting was held in a frank and constructive atmosphere.

Bundestag Environment Commission Visits USSR

PM1904144590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "People's Common Concern"]

[Text] Concern for the environment is the common concern of people on earth. The improvement of the atmosphere of large cities and major industrial centers and the elimination of harmful discharges into the air are of key significance in the implementation of nature protection measures. This was pointed out during a conversation 18 April in Moscow with a delegation from the FRG Bundestag Commission for the Environment, Nature Protection, and Nuclear Reactor Safety. The delegation is in Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources.

The delegation will visit Leningrad as well as Moscow.

CPSU-SPD Meeting on European Security Held

PM1904144790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A meeting of representatives of the CPSU and the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] within the framework of a scheduled session of the CPSU-SPD working group on the problems of building a "common European home" was held at the CPSU Central Committee 18 April.

The cochairmen—V.M. Falin, member of the CPSU Central Committee, and E. Bahr, member of the SPD Board Presidium—and the other participants in the meeting exchanged opinions on a broad range of issues: the situation in Europe as a whole, the processes of German unification, continued arms reductions, and the creation of an all-European security system.

Reports were heard on the results of work by experts from the two parties who have been studying the potential for cooperation in the economic, environmental, and conversion spheres. Work in these directions will be continued.

The working group session proceeded in a frank, constructive atmosphere. The following took part: On the CPSU side, V.V. Zagladin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and adviser to the Soviet president, and senior officials from the CPSU Central Committee International Department; on the SPD side, K. Fuchs, member of the SPD Board and Bundestag deputy, and Bundestag Deputies E. von Buelow, G. Heimann, and E. Horn.

Irish Parliamentarians Received at Supreme Soviet

PM1904151190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Irish Delegation's Visit"]

[Text] The Irish National Parliament delegation headed by Senate Chairman S. Doherty, which is on an official visit to the Soviet Union, met with I.D. Laptev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union, in Moscow 17 April.

The Irish guests were briefed on the present stage of perestroyka in the USSR, the content and course of the implementation of political and economic reform, the development of the processes of democratization and glasnost, and the structure and activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet, its committees, and the chambers' standing commissions.

The same day there was a substantive and frank exchange of opinions between the Irish parliamentarians and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet International

Affairs Committee on ways to deepen Soviet-Irish political dialogue on a wide range of world and European problems and on questions of bilateral relations.

A luncheon was given in the Irish guests' honor on behalf of the chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers.

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuban Military Chief Arrives in Moscow 19 Apr

LD1904215490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1331 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)—Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, chief of the Cuban General Staff and first deputy minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba, arrived here on an official visit today. At the Sheremetyevo Airport in the capital he was met by Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy minister of defense, at whose invitation the Cuban general, other officials, and also Colonel Ricardo Ernandes Merino, a military attache attached to the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in the USSR, have arrived here.

During the visit, which will last until 22 April, the Cuban military chief will meet the top Soviet military leadership, visit the Mikhail Frunze Military Academy, the Kubinka air force garrison, and the Kantemir guard tank division deployed near the Soviet capital.

On completion of the visit to the USSR, the Cuban guest will leave for Pyongyang.

Raul Castro Gives Address at 16 Apr Festivities

PM1804124790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS report under the rubric "From Abroad": "Celebrations in Cuba"]

[Text] Havana, 17 Apr—"The motherland or death." "We will continue building our socialism, no matter what." These and similar slogans set the emotional mood of the celebrations held in Cuba Monday. They were held to mark two memorable events: the 29th anniversary of Fidel Castro's proclamation of the socialist nature of the Cuban revolution and People's Militia Day. Rallies and demonstrations, military sports festivals, performances by masters of culture, festive gatherings, and carnivals were held throughout the republic.

The celebrations began in the ancient Morro Castle, near which were held a military parade and a ceremony of presenting awards to representatives of the creative intelligentsia who have made "a great contribution to strengthening the revolutionary traditions of the Cuban people." Welcoming those present, Raul Castro, second secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, said that the republic is not interested in war but, should it come under attack, the aggressor would come up against resistance from the entire nation.

Solton Comments on 'Strained' Cuban Ties

LD1904142390 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] A joint Soviet-Cuban commission on economic and technological cooperation has held a session in Havana. Agreements have been signed on a considerable rise in the two sides' trade turnover and on Soviet technical aid to Cuba. Here is a commentary by Yuriy Solton, and this is what he writes:

The intergovernmental commission has been working on a regular basis but the latest session has been an extraordinary one. It is no secret that Soviet-Cuban economic relations have lately been somewhat strained. Criticism has been levelled at the bilateral cooperation both in Cuba and the Soviet Union, some of it not without foundation. But some negative remarks have been made without a clear understanding of the true state of affairs. Deputies in Soviet parliament, for instance, have been calling for scaling down economic links with Cuba as too burdensome for the present difficult economic situation in the Soviet Union. We have interviewed on the phone the head of the Soviet delegation in Havana.

[Begin Albalkin recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] People who are calling for curtailing our ties with Cuba and other countries have no idea of the actual situation. Suffice it to say that one-third of sugar consumed in the Soviet Union comes from Cuba. [end recording]

Leonid Abalkin rejected a prospect of phasing out Soviet economic relations with Cuba. We are acting today, he explained, in a cautious and balanced way, opening new and promising lines of cooperation.

The results of the session held by the intergovernmental commission confirmed the assessments by the leader of the Soviet delegation. This year trade with Cuba is to grow by eight percent to a sum of 9.2 billion rubles, about 14.7 billion American dollars. Soviet technical aid to Cuba will also rise. That will help finish some important industrial projects in that country. An iron and steel mill in Havana is about to start production; an oil refinery will soon be commissioned in Cienfuegos. A special working group is being set up to improve the mechanism of the two countries' cooperation.

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries 19 Apr Supreme Soviet Session

Lukyanov Chairs Session

LD1904164790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 19 April begins broadcasting a recording of the 19 April USSR Supreme Soviet morning session in the Kremlin. The session is chaired by Anatoliy Lukyanov, and 408 deputies are present at the session. Lukyanov reports on a meeting of the Presidential Council on a radicalization of economic reform. A package of legislation will be presented to the Supreme Soviet for discussion which will be published, Lukyanov says. There will be some changes to the session's work next week. Chernobyl is on the agenda. The economic reform will be discussed after the May break.

Lukyanov says that today the question of pension provision is to be discussed in a second reading. Over 500,000 suggestions have been received from citizens since the publication of the draft. Yesterday the Presidential Council discussed the matter and noted that if tax legislation was not passed then there would not be any money to pay pensions with. So, these two aspects are directly linked.

At 1508 GMT Gritsenko of the Labor, Prices, and Social Policy Commission, is to present a report. First, Lukyanov welcomes a delegation of the Irish Parliament.

At 1509 GMT Gritsenko explains the work which has gone into elaboration of the draft. An opinion poll has revealed public attitude to the draft, says Gritsenko. He added that the present draft contains alterations introduced as a result of the nationwide discussion.

Gritsenko says that the old pension law is out of date and needs to be replaced. Gritsenko outlines the improvements contained in the new draft. Gritsenko goes through the law point by point where alterations have been made. Deputies wanted to see higher levels of pensions. There is a need to alter wage levels.

Gritsenko says that there have been many suggestions on old-age pensions and the retirement age. More and more people are requesting special treatment due to the dangers and discomforts of their work. He states that 670,000 people suffered industrial injuries last year, including 14,000 deaths.

Gitsenko continues the point by point explanation of changes to the draft. He gives total figures for pension payments; they will account for 14 percent of national income. The law will be implemented gradually.

Gritsenko announces that the law will now be discussed, with contributions from the government bodies and deputies.

At 1556 GMT Lukyanov reads out a question from Deputy Akhromeyev about pensions for servicemen. Gritsenko replies.

At 1558 GMT Obolenskiy raises a procedural point about lesser-known speakers in the debate. Lukyanov claims to know almost all the deputies by name.

Pension Provision Draft Debated

LD1904173590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian resumes at 1613 GMT on 19 April its recording of the 19 April USSR Supreme Soviet session from the Kremlin in Moscow.

Lukyanov announces that Shcherbakov, chairman of the State Commission on Labor, will address the Supreme Soviet.

At 1614 GMT Shcherbakov asks for 40 minutes to explain his points and is given 30. He says that payment of social benefits is greatly restricted by a lack of money. He talks about the difficulties of his job arising from the evolution and development of various professions. He says that average wages have doubled over the last 20 years, whereas there has been a roof on pensions. He says that the payment of pensions should be governed by one principle: Pensions should be geared to levels of labor contribution. Shcherbakov says that nobody in the country will be paid less in a pension as a result of the new proposals, and adds that everybody will get an increase of at least R5.

Shcherbakov says an additional R40 billion is being allocated now for the payment of pensions. He goes on to discuss the pension position of people who do more than one job and who work in their spare time. He says this is not an option available to people who do hard, manual work. But others are needed to do more than one job because of the shortage of specialists e.g. teachers, doctors, even cleaners. He says the country needs a flexible system of pensions which can be applied nationwide.

Shcherbakov says that the law will not resolve all the problems of encouraging pensioners to keep on working after they retire. He says that 13 million people are not involved in the national economy. There are others who are unemployed in the real sense of the word. Therefore, there are no grounds for encouraging pensioners to go on working after retirement. He says the world practice is not to pay pensions for the first five years after retirement. He suggests the level of payments for people working in tough areas like Murmansk and for those doing hard physical work like miners. But it is up to individual enterprises to make their own arrangements, Shcherbakov adds.

Shcherbakov then discusses entitlement to social pension. He says the question of privileged pensions is a complex question. He says the number of people receiving such pensions is growing at disastrous rates,

and calls for the reform of privileged pensions. He says the USSR is the only country in the world which lacks legislation on this subject.

Shcherbakov goes on to talk about financing the new law. He says it will be very expensive. It will cost R40 billion, taking account of amendments which have been received. He says the financial basis of the new law needs to be improved. He notes that certain organizations like political parties and social groups should be responsible for paying pensions for their staff. Shcherbakov reminds the deputies that the cost of the new pension scheme could fuel inflation in a market economy situation. People must keep calm and not get emotional about the government's proposals. The government realizes that the law is not ideal. It admits that the reform will not be completed. The question will have to be returned to in a few years' time. He says that union republics and Soviets will have freedom to make their own provisions.

At 1650 GMT Sukharuchenkova, secretary of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], takes the floor. She talks about the drafting work done on the proposals by deputies and trade unions. She says that on the whole the new law is welcomed by working people, but goes on to criticize certain aspects. She says particular groups of people will be badly affected, particularly those already receiving pensions. The AUCCTU supports the proposals of some pensioners for changes in the law. She says the question of how to pay pensions for people doing more than one job is a serious one.

Sukharuchenkova says the AUCCTU has also supported other proposals for changes to the law. It also has its own proposals to make. The pension position of specific groups of workers should not be made worse by the new legislation. She says that up to now Soviet workers have never had to pay contributions toward their pension. Now they will have to on a compulsory basis. Although it is only one percent, it could be increased in future years. People do not want to sponge off the state, but they also want to know how much they will really have to pay in future. She says the new proposals are premature. They should only be introduced after a fundamental reform of wages. She says the proposals on compulsory contributions to pension funds should be dropped from the draft. She asserts that the position of pensioners is not being improved by the new law.

Sukharuchenkova says certain groups of workers, like air hostesses, sea fishermen, and others will be deprived of certain rights which they already have. She calls for fundamental changes in the way people are paid. Finally, she asks deputies to support the new law and pass it.

At 1705 GMT Sukharuchenkova concludes, and Lukyanov explains certain points about the draft to the deputies. He talks about the help received from the International Labor Office. He says the true cost of the new measures has been explained. He says that Candidate Politburo Member Biryukova is present, as is Coal Minister Shchadov; so is the new chairman of the AUCCTU. Various lesser government officials are also present. These people are all experts, therefore the deputies should put their questions to them. Pensions are a very important question because they concern a fifth of the USSR's population. Lukyanov talks about procedural questions affecting the second reading.

At 1710 GMT Lukyanov explains that many deputies have put their names down to speak. This would take five hours. Therefore, he proposes that each should be allowed to speak for five minutes at a time, until 1800, and then questions will be allowed. He reads out a memo submitted by Deputy Engver on war veterans. A 30-minute adjournment is announced.

Deputies Make Comments

LD1904211490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 19 April USSR Supreme Soviet session from the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1713 GMT Lukyanov proposes to allow speakers until 1800 from the list who have put their names down.

At 1715 GMT Gutskalov, in naval uniform, talks about the special requirements of inhabitants of the far north and of seamen.

At 1721 GMT Pavliy talks about the funding of pensions from workers' insurance contributions, the requirements of war veterans, and the need for special personal pensions for those who have provided services to the state.

At 1727 GMT Pamfilova questions how the law will affect the poorest pensioners. The principle of equal treatment should be adhered to; the system of personal pensions has been discredited as perks for apparatchiks.

At 1735 GMT Opolinskiy points out contradictions within the law involving the right to earlier retirement from dangerous professions. He says that the law should come into effect earlier than specified.

At 1740 GMT Mongo speaks about the problems of inhabitants of the far north.

At 1747 GMT Neumyvakin talks about invalidity pensions.

At 1753 GMT Rogozhina condemns the AUCCTU representative for trying to legalize poor conditions of work. There must be objective criteria for deciding on the level of danger and discomfort in working conditions. The Council of Ministers should be instructed to draw these up.

At 1758 GMT Yerokhin tells of the hard life of airline stewardesses and their need for special pension provisions.

At 1801 GMT Annamukhamedov presses the claims of aircrew for special treatment.

At 1806 GMT Nikolaychuk says the list of harmful professions should be restricted. Inhabitants of the far north should have better treatment.

At 1812 GMT Panchenko says that the discussion of pensions in commissions had been stormy. The rights of women had been defended. Pensions and minimum wages should guarantee a reasonable standard of living.

At 1821 GMT Akayev tells of the harmful working conditions of tobacco workers. Previously this was recognized, but the new law reduces their privileges.

At 1827 GMT Zakharov calls for test drivers to be given special pension privileges.

At 1830 GMT Fedorov says we are putting the cart before the horse. Also, do we still need so-called personal pensions?

At 1836 GMT Shekhovtsov wants the range of issues that should be dealt with by the Council of Ministers to be defined. Regional variations must be considered, he says.

At 1842 GMT Lukyanov calls a two-hour interval. The recording continues immediately with the next session. There is a quorum—373 deputies are present.

At 1845 GMT Shust puts the case for farm workers, who do a difficult job. Kerimbekov agrees with Shust. Bosenko says it's a good thing veterans should do well out of the new provisions.

Orazliyev expresses anxiety about working mothers and paintshop workers.

At 1910 GMT Ponomarev puts the case for chemical industry workers.

At 1917 GMT Obolenskiy says the bill should be sent back to the commissions and committees for revision. He complains about sexual discrimination in favor of women. He says the new law should be applicable to all who were repressed in the past.

At 1924 GMT Deputy (Yeroshenskaya) talks about social justice in pension legislation. She puts the case for teachers who have to work in overcrowded classrooms, and for other categories of workers who have to put up with hard conditions. She recommends the complete abolition of personal pensions.

At 1931 GMT Ivchenko asks his fellow deputies how he is to explain the new pension provisions to rural workers. He says the reason why the principle of social justice is being violated is that the country simply does not have enough cash. He calls for a revision of certain articles. He says people who were repressed in the 60s should be treated the same way as those who were repressed in the 30s.

At 1935 GMT Kopylova talks about the pension position of people doing more than one job, saying the law is not being uniformly applied. She says teachers are outraged by aspects of the new law. She says schools and kindergartens are state-run institutions and therefore cannot improve pension provisions. She calls for more consideration to be given to rural workers. She supports the present draft, provided it is further improved.

At 1941 GMT Babchenko says that, because of financial constraints, the most acute and pressing problems must be tackled by the present law. Soviet people have been looking forward to this law. He mentions the need to take inflation into consideration. He speaks about the stress on public transport drivers and blames this for large numbers of accidents. More work needs to be done on the law.

At 1947 GMT Grib says millions of people have been involved in the drafting and discussion of this important document. The transition to a market economy could have great repercussions and allowance must be made for this. He calls the pay rises recently granted to party and Soviet workers blasphemous. He supports Pamfilova's remarks about personal pensions.

Many Work Categories Defended

LD1904212190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 19 April USSR Supreme Soviet session from the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1954 GMT Vasilets supports remarks by N.V. Fedorov. He speaks about categories of workers who deserve favorable treatment, like air hostesses, who have to leave their children for long periods in creches. He also mentions long distance bus drivers and the great stresses they are subjected to.

At 2000 GMT Kasyan makes three proposals. First, certain farmworkers should become eligible for pension after a certain length of service, regardless of their age. This is important to encourage food production. People born before 1905 should get special consideration. Finally people who worked on the land during the last war should be treated the same way as servicemen who actually fought.

At 2004 GMT Andreyeva says that because of financial constraints it is a question of priorities at the moment. The most vulnerable groups should be considered first. She says that people were not only repressed during the 30s, 40s, and 50s, but throughout the entire period from 1917 to the present day. All these people should come within the compass of the present law. She calls for more articles in the law dealing with persons who were repressed then rehabilitated. She also talks about the position of wartime labor veterans and the members of creative unions.

At 2011 GMT Gen Shabanov, deputy defense minister, talks about the pension position of servicemen and the difficulties they face, including separation from families and additional problems in finding a job after discharge

from the services. He says servicemen should be included in the category of those eligible for pension after a specific number of years' service. He says the minimum pension for disabled veterans should be increased.

At 2016 GMT Yefimov says many enterprises do not have the money to pay pensions. Therefore, the central government will be asked to chip in.

At 2020 GMT Moteka brings up the question of rural workers and villagers again, who should get priority treatment. She also puts the case of workers who work in harmful environments, like medical workers, electrical riggers, and building workers. Many building workers become chronically sick at 40. A lot of them are women.

At 2026 GMT Lukyanov says that a number of deputies still want to take part in the debate. Some of them have come a long way for the debate. He defends the choice of speakers, saying many of them were making their maiden speeches. He says from now on speakers will only have three minutes.

At 2029 GMT Beyshekeyeva speaks on behalf of shepherds and shepherdesses who work in hard conditions and don't have days off. She says animal husbandry workers who take their animals into the mountains should get special treatment.

At 2032 GMT Kiselev says the principle of social justice is not fully adhered to in the draft. He insists that a special case should be made for people working in Siberia. He supports Shekhovtsov's proposals. He says the Council of Ministers should prepare a draft law on the plight of invalids.

At 2036 GMT Suprunov starts speaking, but is interrupted by Lukyanov who talks about the waiting list of deputies wanting to speak. Suprunov continues by saying that special consideration should be given to regional differences, mentioning Maritime Kray as an example. He says that bus drivers should get compensation for their difficult work.

At 2041 GMT Vyucheyskiy demands special rights for northerners, especially pilots working in the Polar night and reindeer breeders. He says the average life expectancy in the Nenets area is 43. He says the average wage paid in the northern areas should be R600-640.

At 2048 GMT Demakov talks about the position of air traffic controllers. He says their pension position needs to be improved. They also want longer holidays and shorter working hours. He says woman controllers should retire at 45.

At 2050 GMT Telegin advocates a number of changes to the draft.

Debate Ends, Work To Continue

LD1904220190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 19 April USSR Supreme Soviet session from the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 2053 GMT Vasilyev says that the draft must be adopted. Further delay cannot be allowed. He supports the institution of personal pensions and cites a worthy recipient.

At 2056 GMT Demchenko is opposed to personal pensions. He cites British experience on such pensions, which is negative. He suggests removing the list of harmful professions and adopting a more flexible approach.

At 2059 GMT Lukyanov says that the leader of the New Zealand opposition and that country's ambassador are present.

At 2100 GMT Lemesheva talks about the special requirements of rural workers which have not been met, allegedly because of lack of funds. But this is leading to the outflow of population from the countryside.

At 2103 GMT Lukyanov remarks that 41 deputies have spoken in this debate. He reads out the names of those who put their names down to speak but have not been given the floor.

At 2106 GMT Lukyanov puts to the vote ending the debate: 296 for, 16 against, nine abstained.

At 2107 GMT Lukyanov asks the two rapporteurs to speak again.

At 2108 GMT Gritsenko is given the floor. He says that the various proposals will be taken into consideration. He gives replies to specific questions that have been submitted. The commission will work on the various proposals to have them ready by Saturday [21 April].

At 2120 GMT Shcherbakov is given the floor and says that the proposals will be worked on overnight and conclusions will be ready by Saturday. The law on military pensions shoud be passed in its first reading and can then be discussed together with the current one. The average pension is to be increased quite considerably under the current law. Minimum wages should not be lower than minimum pensions. Maximum pensions will be five times greater than minimum ones. Not very many people will receive the top level pension. The Supreme Soviet cannot take every single case into consideration when establishing pension categories. This law sets the unionwide minimum pension. Union republics have the right to increase their pensions as they see fit.

At 2148 GMT Lukyanov says that the text will be available on Saturday. The next step is to go through the law point by point. The Supreme Soviet will try to pass the law on Saturday. He hopes there will be a quorum.

At 2150 GMT a deputy complains that no one knew there would be a session on Saturday and many have made other plans.

At 2151 GMT Lukyanov puts to the vote whether to meet on Saturday: 187 for, 121 against. They will meet on Saturday. The session ends.

Supreme Soviet To Vote on Pensions Bill 21 Apr

LD1904211990 Moscow TASS in English 2054 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Report by TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS The Soviet parliament today held the second reading of a bill on pensions. Chairman of the State Committee for Labour and Social Issues Vladimir Shcherbakov who introduced the bill described it as "the most important social measure in the history of the Soviet state". To implement it, another 34 billion roubles must be allocated from the state budget annually in addition to present 65 billion roubles. Another six billion roubles have to be added to increase minimum pensions in accordance with the decision made by the parliament last year.

The draft is based on the principle of accord between the pension size and the labour contribution as well as the provision of pension to all categories of citizens. The bill lays down guarantees of social protection of retired people by raising pensions in keeping with changes of the cost of living index.

The lion's share of finances to implement the new bill goes to pay recalculated pensions. Of the 40 billion roubles added annually to the pension fund, 38 billion roubles are earmarked to cover additions to earlier pensions.

According to the draft, most Soviet citizens will be paid so-called labour pensions. Men will be entitled to receive pension upon reaching the age of 60, with the length of service record not less than 25 years. Women—upon reaching the age of 55, with the service record of 20 years.

A new kind of pension pay is introduced for the first time—for people whose service record is shorter than required. Union republics, local councils and work collectives are granted the right to establish additional pensions.

During the nation-wide discussion of the bill, most proposals were made to expand the range of people entitled to pension privileges. At today's discussion, in which more than 40 people's deputies spoke, demands were repeatedly voiced for privileges to workers in one or other branch of the economy.

The government, however, differed on this score—there is no point in granting privileges for work under arduous conditions, it is better to improve work conditions. This attitude was shared by many deputies.

The new law is expected to be enforced stage-by-stage in order to avoid the growth of the mass of money for which nothing can be bought. The law will eventually come into effect across the country on January 1, 1995. Many participants in the discussion noted that the increase of pensions will be truly effective if the rouble is stabilised and the consumer market is saturated.

It was decided to take a vote on the bill on Saturday, April 21.

Lukyanov on Upcoming Agenda

LD1904221790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Remarks by Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at opening of 19 April USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] There are 408 members of the USSR Supreme Soviet present. We can open the session. I just want to report to you, comrades, that yesterday, from 1200—and then somewhere around 1750 I was forced to leave. A session was held until late in the evening of the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation. Measures proposed by the government on matters to do with the radicalization of economic reform were discussed in the most scrupulous manner. It has to be said, moreover, that this was discussed in very great detail, in the course of two days, as you will know. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was in the chair. Almost all the members of the Presidential Council and members of the Council of the Federation spoke.

There were many matters—and I had to speak at 1800—many matters connected with the activity and the necessity of the Supreme Soviet examining a package of legislative acts connected with the development of our economy and the radicalization of reform. At any rate, around 15 such acts aimed at accelerating reform, enabling socialist entrepreneurship to develop in our country, and at resolving many other matters were tabled at these sessions. I'd like to inform you of this because I think that all the rest will, as far as possible, be published.

Aside from that, it has to be said that the measures which have been outlined will necessitate certain changes in our agenda. In particular, next week we shall definitely consider the Chernobyl program—on the 25th, as agreed. And I'd like you to have the program on Monday, so that you can have two days to take a look at this very major document—and Ukrainian and Belorussian comrades, and comrades from a number of oblasts in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic asked for this in particular—so that we can take a look at it and listen on Wednesday at the joint session on the government report. This is so that, as far as possible, we can complete our program by our May recess, and immediately after the May recess hear the government report on the radicalization of reform and the stabilization of the economic situation in society, and so on.

That's what was outlined at the session of the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation. This seems to me to be extremely important, and the Supreme Soviet needs to get involved in this large-scale, complex, and crucial work, since it is the leading body that will be addressing legislative matters connected with the implementation of the program.

Moscow TV Carries 17 Apr Speeches on Gdlyan, Ivanov

USSR Procurator Sukharev

LD1904125890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1625 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Speech by USSR Procurator General Aleksandr Yakovlevich Sukharev at the USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin on 17 April—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies! The USSR Procuracy proceeds from the premise that the statement submitted for your examination contains the necessary factual and legal grounds concerning People's Deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov. We are, of course, prepared for the appropriate clarifications. Nevertheless, I would like, in my brief address, to draw your attention to certain factors. I believe that, in itself, the inclusion of such a matter on the agenda of the session in a special case in the history of legislature. Formally it is connected with the new law which has strengthened deputies' immunity. But it is clearly important to bear in mind why Comrades Gdlyan and Ivanov became deputies. The paradox of the current situation lies in the fact that people who managed to discern the public mood and then gained deputies' seats under the banner of fighting for legality, should themselves now—yes, I would like to say this—themsleves now, in the view of the procuracy, answer for violating that legality. This is a bitter, grave truth, and unfortunately it cannot be evaded either by the procuracy, which engendered this problem, or the electorate, or the Supreme Soviet, even taking account of all the useful and complex work carried out by the investigators in the bribery case.

When I said at the first congress and at the session of the Supreme Soviet that there lay a great deal of truth and dangerous lies in the corruption case in Uzbekistan, this was not rhetoric. Today, on its completion, such a conclusion is fully confirmed. In all, over six and a half years the Gdlyan group, in which up to 600 investigators worked overall, brought 61 people to criminal account for bribery. And the courts delivered guilty verdicts against 35 persons. Ten were acquitted. Cases were dropped against eight persons by the procuracy on rehabilitating grounds. Legal proceedings are currently under way in eight cases, we'll see what the results are. Over this period cases have also been discontinued against more than 100 persons who had been illegally detained and placed under arrest, and who had been charged, in the main, for concealing criminally obtained valuables. Such is the overall picture.

Of course, investigating bribe taking is most difficult, and not all dismissed cases are the result of deliberate abuse on the part of investigators. There are gaps of an objective type and difficulties, there are also attempts to slander investigators and other officials. One cannot fail to take account of all this. You know that the procuracy submitted to you a statement following nine months of work by a large investigative team, formed from qualified and experienced specialists. Thousands of statements and complaints and hundreds of testimonies by defendants and witnesses have been checked out. Confrontations of witnesses, expert enquiries, and inspections of documents and material evidence have been carried out. Many of the testimonies by investigators who worked in Gdlyan's group were sifted through. We don't want today fully to resolve the volume of charges, assessment of actions, and resonsibility of one or another investigator, prosecutor or leading official. This is the work of the concluding stage of the investigation, and of course, of the court if there are substantial grounds for that. But the information contained in the statement and other data which the investigation currently has at its disposal irrefutably testify to the existence of indications in the activities of Gdlyan and Ivanov of serious abuses and crimes against the administration of justice.

It is enough to say that 50 innocent people were kept in custody for three months to three years. They included sick and elderly people and mothers of large families with eight to 10 children in their care. Cases of violence with a tragic end and suicides were ascertained. As it turns out, many illegal decisions on arrests and detentions were taken at the initiative of Gdlyan and Ivanov, or with their knowledge. What has already been ascertained by the investigation and the courts—and they have already brought to light seven individual definitions: blackmail, insults, falsification of investigation documents and other impermissible methods—is not the consequence of errors and delusions, but calculated actions, in which Gdlyan and Ivanov were directly involved.

Such are the facts of the case. Were only Gdlyan and Ivanov guilty of the violations committed? No, they were not the only ones. We have already levelled charges against their former boss, (Korokosov) chief of the investigative department and several investigators from Gdlyan's entourage. We are taking acation against oblast deputy prosecutor (Titarenko) who rubber-stamped arrest warrants on the decision of Gdlyan and Ivanov and a number of other investigators. Supervising prosecutors and former Deputy Procurator General Soroka, who was in charge of the Main Investigative Directorate of the USSR Procuracy, have been questioned. I want to assure people's deputies that the leadership of the procuracy, by which I mean the collegium and the deputies—it is up to you to decide the question of the procurator general—but I know and declare with all responsibility that the present leadership have sufficient will and responsible to be self-critical and principled,

regardless of rank, in investigating all officials who have committed abuses or acts of negligence and assessing them accordingly.

My next observation is this. I will not conceal the fact, comrade deputies, that even at the initial stage of the investigation there were signs of transgressions, and much later, when many things became obvious, we were left with a difficult question: what to do about Gdlyan and Ivanov who had become idols not only of their electorate, but also of a considerable section of the populaton? We did our utmost to sort out the complaints and claims of Gdlyan and Ivanov with their participation. A number of collegiums were held, including one inviting the public of the town of Zelenograd. Two party meetings [words indistinct] were held. Unfortunately, our opponents provided no opportunity for a reasonable and professional dialogue. They completely ignored the opinion of their own collective and began to appeal to rallies, inventing all kinds of cock-and-bull stories about the collapse of the case they had instigated. In so doing, I tell you frankly, they were not shy of blatantly juggling with the documents of the investigation which today, dishonestly and with the help of all kinds of machinations, found their way in to their hands.

Permit me, comrades, to give you the facts. The majority of the accused, including Usmankhodzhayev, former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Party, have already been condemned to lengthy terms of imprisonment. That's the first thing. I stress—the majority, the overwhelming majority. Second, 25 of the 30 invstigative subgroups which carried out work with the accused right up to the completion of the investigation were headed by investigators who had been selected by Gdlyan and who worked with him permanently. They are the same investigators. In all, we dismissed nine investigators. Yes, including Comrades Gdylan and Ivanov, we consider them to have abused their office and the law and we were unable to trust them.

I will add another detail: The cases in relation to all six persons which were halted at the investigation stage—I will name them: Osetrov, (Radzhabov), Smirnov, Umarov, Rakhimov and (Ruzmetov)—were conducted by investigators who worked with Gdlyan. This also applies to the conducting of the investigations against (Abdullayeva), (Zabarov), and (Turapov) which were later approved by the court. It is not difficult to be convinced of all this—the documents are there, the people are there, the investigators are there. [word indistinct] Deputy Ignatovich said in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY—I read this the day before yesterday—if there was anyone who assisted in causing the case to collapse, then they were Gdlyan and Ivanov themselves and their approach to proving crimes.

What I think is this: It was precisely the initial interweaving of lies and truth in the case, the repression of innocent people, and the cover-up of out-and-out plunderers which prevented an operative and qualified conclusion to the matters exposed by the work of the state security bodies back in 1983. The trade-and-supply Mafia, which fed corruption in the power apparatus, remained virtually untouched. The colossal material damage caused by embezzlement and fraud against the working people has not been reimbursed. The confusion and powerlessness of the investigation was undoubtedly taken advantage of by the criminals who, with the knowledge and indulgence of Gdlyan and Ivanov, continued up until recently to occupy high and lucrative posts and to direct the shadow economy. This is also the truth, this is the documented truth.

Thus, comrades, is how the myth of the collapse of the case and the breaking-up of the investigative group appears. As you know, it is also linked with another speculation—about corruption in the Kremlin and patronage of the Mafia on the part of the country's leadership. I shall now report about those facts and statements which existed in various pronouncements by Gdlyan and statements, and so on, and what was the subject of the investigation. I am for the moment only taking this aspect. I can report to you, comrades, that in this case all of the statements by Gdlyan and Ivanov, in the press, on television and at meetings, in which, as they put it, the nams of leading officials could be glimpsed, were checked out by the USSR Procuracy in the most careful manner and investigated in strict accordance with the criminal procedural law. Persons over whom a shadow had been cast were interrogated, as were their acquaintances from their working environment, and other investigative actions were carried out. Dozens of our staff were engaged in this, dozens of people from the investigative apparatus of the USSR Procuracy and the procurator. We ascertained that these people were the victims of slander and libel which had been put into the mouths of some of those arrested by those very investigators and their assistants. Truly the height of hypocrisy—to inspire slander themselves and then whip up the public.

The procuracy believes that the continuing speculation around some leaders, the insinuations directed at the USSR president, bear the nature of a major political provocation. Its secondary aim is to delay the inevitability of responsibility from Gdlyan and Ivanov.

A last thought, comrades,

I am convinced that the issue being discussed today goes far beyond the framework of a private case, although it is of course an important one, which concerns deputies. In the final analysis, Gdlyan and Ivanov are not the point. The fundamental significance of this issue is obvious. After all, it is a matter of the global value of perestroyka, of social justice and legality which have been lacking to such an extent in our society. If we have proclaimed the formation of a rule-of-law state and the primacy of the personality, everyone needs to be consistent with regard to the law and put up a firm barrier against arbitrariness.

There cannot be two approaches here. A special danger of hidden breaches of legality, of doing violence to

people and mocking them—and this has been established—consists in the fact that these things were perpetrated precisely by those to whom the law, justice, and the protection of people's destinies has been entrusted. You understand, comrades, they represented our country's highest investigatory hierarchy. They could not but realize what damage was being inflicted upon perestroyka in our law enforcement system. Comrades, I shall touch on only one aspect. You see, in this group I have mentioned a figure to you. These were mainly young specialists. What could they learn there when they came up against, it can be said outright, Beriya methods there. Hatchet men and all kinds of blackmailers appeared in this group, you understand. Files appeared where compromising material was held in store for extorting the testimonies needed. We are all studying the lessons of Stalin's repressions and yesterday's arbitrariness in order that no such varieties again penetrate justice, even on the most noble pretexts. That, comrades, is why I reject the inconsistent arguments which one can sometimes read and hear: You can't make omelettes without breaking eggs, that the actions of Gdlyan and Ivanov were allegedly forced actions, in the fight against the Mafia. With such a philosophy we will never get out of the vicious circle of lawlessness, the more so as the majority, the overwhelming majority of investigative and other officials of our system and indeed of other law enforcement bodies are honest, principled people, who have worked a great deal and have also done so in complicated conditions.

Yes, comrades, I want to reply to the questions which have already been raised here, and the Procuracy is burdened by this, as, I think, other bodies, law-enforcement bodies, have been in the past. But we do not want to avoid the awkward points. Over the last year, 63 staff have been made criminally liable for violations of legality in inquiries and investigations. And we start from the premise that one can only embark on the struggle to cleanse our society of parasites, criminals, and corruption if one has clean hands and clean intentions. What has happened in the bribery case is an important experience also for the leadership and for the whole system of the procuracy. We are drawing serious conclusions from it, including in the personnel and organizational context, particularly in procuratorial supervision. But we also understand the limited nature of the steps we are taking, because we need to tackle improving the whole legal system.

The voices heard today, the opinions concerning how the procuracy should improve its work are right. I am not taking the aspect connected with my own position as general procurator, that is for the Supreme Soviet and the congress to judge. I would just like to say something else, comrades. If one is talking about supervision of the procuracy, then it is only recently that we really started dealing with this. Were there no supervision of the procuracy, the new supervision for which we are striving, we would not be discussing this question today. That was the first, bold truth that our people and our deputies should know. And it took a great deal of trouble, to be frank, to arrive at this truth. We have organized new supervisorial structures in the procuracy system. I do not want to say that this is the work that has already brought us to the supervision that the deputies and everybody speak about and think about. No. I can only say one thing: I have worked honestly, and I try to work in a principled way, and I cannot make compromises, if someone, for the sake of some interest, for the sake of balance, for the sake of consensus, wants to blacken the work of the procuracy. I cannot agree with that. We do have major deficiencies, and we are working on them, but I cannot agree that supervision is just the same as it was, it is not true. I am prepared to answer any of your questions concerning the affair, comrades, and I would like to assure you, without reference to my own person, that the procuracy is drawing principled conclusions from this important experience in the context of improving supervision and all of our work.

Thank you for your attention.

KGB Chairman Kryuchkov

LD1904195790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1847 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Address by KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov following introductory remarks by session chairman A.I. Lukyanov at the USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow on 17 April—recorded]

[Text] [Lukyanov] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, before you start perhaps you have some information. I have a question here asked by a deputy who says it would not be a bad idea for Comrade Tutov and anyone else to explain what happened about the health of Gdlyan and Ivanov because they themselves stated they made the only correct decision in this dramatic situation, not to take part in the outrageous thing being done: This is a reference to their speech. Perhaps you have some information?

[Kryuchkov] Then let me begin, esteemed comrade deputies, with some information, with an answer to that question. During the interval I telephoned Yerevan, the State Security Committee of Armenia, and, mentioning rumors and reports in Western mass media, I asked whether Gdlyan and Ivanov were there. The comrades replied that they have been there since Sunday. They have been meeting representatives of the labor collectives. Gatherings have been taking place. Gdlyan has been nominated as candiate people's deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia from the Artashatskiy Rayon, did I get it right?

[Unidentified voices] Yes, yes.

[Kryuchkov] Ivanov has been nominated candidate people's deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia from the (Leninakanskiy Rayon). [applause] Since I was present at the first half of your sitting I naturally inquired about their health. I was told that judging by the way they have

been looking during their participation in the meetings and by the way they appear in the mass media they are in excellent health so there are no grounds for anxiety. But of course I did not ask for anything in greater detail for reasons you will understand.

Esteemed comrade deputies! On the agenda today is an unusual question, the violation of legitimacy by two representatives of the corps of deputies, members of the staff of the USSR Procuracy.

A few words about the factual side, which lies at the bottom of our stance on this issue. For many years the State Security Committee has been waging a struggle against organized crime and corruption. In particular, KGB bodies were conducting investigations into the so-called cotton business long before the beginning of the 1980's. True, this was not being done so loudly; there was no pomp and no sensationalism, but it was thorough and on a big scale.

These were major criminal cases. Investigators from the KGB bodies did a colossal amount of work on them. From the big boys in the shadow economy they took a lot of money and valuables, which had been acquired illegally.

At the end of the 1970's the KGB bodies of Uzbekistan and the USSR reached the people plundering state property in particularly large amounts. The investigation brought to light instances where bribes had been given by defendants to responsible officials, including officials of the state apparatus and the law enforcement bodies of the republic. During the years 1981-85 alone money and valuable worth R21 million were confiscated by KGB staff in these cases in Uzbekistan. This figure includes 13 million in cases handled by the Gdlyan investigation group. All individuals arrested during that period were found guilty by the cours of the crimes that had been committed and were convicted.

During the course of the investigations a number of new criminal cases made their appearance, including the case concerning Smirnov, which caused a sensation.

Permit me to dwell on this one for two reasons. First, KGB investigators were involved in it; and second, serious instances in which socialist legitimacy was violated by Gdlyan and Ivanov were brought to light while it was being investigated, as happened in several other cases.

Smirnov was arrested in January 1989 on the strength of the evidence of 20 individuals who had been brought to justice earlier and who stated that in 1975-1984 they had given him bribes totalling R400,000. The task of carrying out the investigation was given by Gdlyan and Ivanov to investigator Kravchenko of the USSR Procuracy and to (?Dukhanin), State Security Committee investigator.

Because (?Dukhanin) refused to issue a warrant for the arrest of Smirnov on the basis of data that had not been checked, this was prepared by Ivanov himself. But the first investigations aimed at checking the charges made against Smirnov showed they were groundless.

Searches conducted at Smirnov's apartment and those of his daughter and son-in-law, who live separately, did not provide any material evidence of complicity of Smirnov in crime. At interrogations conducted with the participation of supervising procurators, all the persons who allegedly gave bribes to Smirnov testified they had committed a slander against him, which they did as a result of threats, blackmail, and impermissible methods of conducting an investigation. At that time I, as KGB chairman, received a number of written and oral reports from investigators and KGB staff who had been included in Gdlyan's group not long before this, saying that crude violations of legality were occurring in his work, in light of which they requested to be released from joint conducting of investigations. May I quote just two excerpts from these statements? Here is one: It is characteristic of work on the case that the investigation is engaging in exposure of guilty parties generally not by gathering evidence, but by extraction of confessions from arrestees, often getting them by illegal means. The second extract: Gdlyan has repeatedly stated at conferences concerning the work of the investigations group: Each of you has only two paths—either up, or into the gutter. There is no third way. On to Moscow. Comrade Sukharev and I had a conversation, during which I reported the recall from Gdlyan's group of KGB investigators in light of the reasons stated. The general procurator requested the investigators not be recalled, explaining that more and more questions about the work of Gdlyan and Ivanov were coming up for him. Apropos, we know there have been shortcomings in the work of the procuracy in the past, and they exist now as well. But Comrade Sukharev came to the post of USSR General Procurator at precisely the period when the deficiencies there were burgeoning. It would be difficult to expect that in such a complex and neglected garden, one could get to the bottom of everything all at once. But after a few months, and I can testify to this, he started putting things to rights. A series of interrogations of people who had been charged was carried out, and other evidence was gathered from which it became clear that Smirnov had been charged without justification. The same applied to several others.

Investigators and procuracy staff who completed the case on Smirnov and delivered the conclusion that he was not guilty are sometimes accused of acting with excessive haste in the criminal process.

But I would like to ask this question: If the investigator comes to the conclusion that a person has been brought to account under the criminal code and is moreover being held in custody without good reason, then what moral right does he have to hold that person under conditions of imprisonment for even one unnecessary hour? That kind of conviction did exist with regard to Smirnov. Illicit methods of conducting the investigation

were brought to light: physical and psychological pressure upon those who had been arrested; unfounded mass arrests of the relatives of those who were under investigation; falsification of the evidence of witnesses and promises of rewards for false testimony.

In February. 1989, while investigator Kravchenko was questioning (iliade)—who was under investigation—on the eve of a forthcoming confrontation with Smirnov, the latter admitted that he had earlier slandered Smirnov under coercion. However, Kravchenko did not include this evidence in the protocol because he feared—in his words—that that would make Gdlyan angry. How many people, slandered by Gdlyan and Ivanov, are running through the courts and making appeals to the mass media in efforts to prove their innocence?

Comrade deputies! Think about this. This fact alone is terrible in itself. Where is the presumption of innocence, which both investigators talk about so often in their interviews and speeches?

The atmosphere of lawlessness was encouraged by slack supervision by the procuracy, which was pointed out quite justifiably by the commission of the Congress of People's Deputies. I have absolutely no intention of casting a shadow over the work of all investigators who belonged to the Gdlyan-Ivanov group. But one cannot remain silent about blatant instances of lawlessness. Under no circumstances must we forget that legitimacy must be observed scrupulously, especially when we are working with someone who is in custody. We have to understand the moral and psychological state he is experiencing in this. This of itself is capable of leading to false confession and ill thought out evidence against other people. When pressure is put on a person under these conditions sometimes one cannot believe this is happening in our day when much work is being done to rehabilitate the innocent victims of the repressions of the period of the cult of personality.

But what assessment can one give of a situation in which Gdlyan and Ivanov, in violation of the law, have arrested people's deputies at different levels, without having the appropriate agreement to do that? Do you not think the investigation methods used by Gdlyan and Ivanov are in some respects a kind of return to the practice of the 1930's?

How should the state security bodies have reacted in this situation? There can only be one answer: by defending socialist legality in a principled and consistent way; and by preventing the condemnation of innocent people. It was difficult to do this. Public opinion, warmed up by the constantly sensational reports of Gdlyan and Ivanov, had become overheated. Some of the mass information media, caring little about the truth, also allowed themselves to be carried away on this wave.

Recently a lot of items have appeared in the mass media attempting to justify the actions of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Attention is drawn to the fact that lack of proof, tendentiousness and excessive emotion are characteristic of a considerable part of these. In time, under the influence of the irrefutable evidence that the investigation has at its disposal, people will realise that they have been mistaken and many will be embarrassed at the way their trust was manipulated.

Today Gdlyan and Ivanov have moved over to direct and wide confrontation. Their support is the fervor of the mass meeting and the voices of those who do not know the actual circumstances of the case but who disseminate falsehood and slander from the words of Gdlyan and Ivanov. The impression is created that Gdlyan and Ivanov are using everything to escape responsibility for what has been done.

In general it is woe betide anyone who tries in some way to move against Gdlyan and Ivanov. As long ago as the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989 both investigators were profuse in their expressions of gratitude to the staff of the State Security bodies. In December, 1988, Ivanov stated in a radio interview the KGB is the organization that is the purest and most dedicated to the people and the law. But from May, 1989, their assessments made to the KGB became the direct opposite.

Am I being notified here?
[Lukyanov] Yes. we will give you more time.
[Voices from floor] Yes.
[Lukyanov] Please continue.

[Kryuchkov] Recently Gdlyan and Ivanov and those supporting them have been doing a lot in their attempts to compromise the investigators of the KGB and Comrade (Dukhanin) in particular. I would like to speak resolutely in their defense. These are honorable and hard-working people, who have to their credit several criminal cases carried out magnificently in exposing spies, plunderers of state and public property, and bribetakers. What wrong have they done to Gdlyan and Ivanov? They have rebelled against their illegal actions and have defended human rights that have been trampled on.

The corps of deputies has also become a target for attack? Any deputy merely had to condemn the position of Gdlyan and Ivanov to receive insults and badgering in reply.

Today it is moral terror, but tomorrow the innocent person may deprived of his liberty: In that way will not we get to something even bigger than that?

In the words of USSR People's Deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov themselves, parliamentary ways of resolving issues are now no longer to their liking. Nor is parliament itself to their liking. They refuse to publicly give it their confidence, just as in the past, one after the other, they have denied their confidence to their colleagues at their work; to the leaders and members of the deputies' commission; and in general to everyone who has not shared their views.

Having begun with the handling of a specific criminal case in an arbitrary way, Gdlyan and Ivanov have reached the stage of adventurism on a statewide scale. Is this not the reason why they needed a hunt for representatives of the country's topmost leadership, for the purpose of completing an imaginary pyramid of criminality that they themselves had built?

There is unquestionable evidence of illegal actions by Gdlyan and Ivanov. In making a juridical assessment of them there is every foundation for mentioning, too, insults and slanders against state and public figures and other citizens; abuse of power; exceeding the authority of their office; and in essence, even, calling for the violent overthrow of the constitutional system. How can one view in any other way the call they made in an address which was printed in one of the Leningrad newspapers and I quote: Start general political demonstrations and strikes and cast off the hated, anti-law, political clique that is leading the country to social disaster.

During a recent viewing of certain individual video clips on Leningrad television, viewers might have been won over by the admissions of several defendants with their show of objectivity. But once again they were counting on influencing the inexperienced person. The camera recorded the evidence of individuals who were already cowed and inclined by the self-same Gdlyan and Ivanov to the giving of deliberately false testimony, which was subsequently refuted by the evidence gathered in the case. The calculation was a simple one: Influence those people who are capable of taking on trust what is offered to them, without being initiated into the actual circumstances of the case. What we have before us is a typical example of political and criminal adventurism.

By way of a rejoinder I would like to make one small observation about relations between the State Security Committee and the highest state and party bodies. This issue was touched upon today with reference to the law enforcement bodies. I have only been concerned with the KGB and I would like to say quite categorically that no pressure is put upon the State Security bodies. On the contrary, the requirement to intensify the struggle against crime and primarily organized crime is being raised.

Esteemed comrade deputies! The work of the USSR Supreme Soviet is a school of political activity and struggle. Passing through this school with you are Soviet people. They trust and expect from you decisions that are correct and just in principle. When I was making my way to the Supreme Soviet session this morning I met one people's deputy whom I know, allow me not to name him. He said the situation today in our fatherland is such that to speak against Gdlyan and Ivanov requires courage. I told him it was a pity that one had to resort to that kind of thing, although there is something else that is much more important today: conscience. One may assume that each will have its own bearing upon your decision. Something else is important, tht it should be just and objective, that it should be based in full measure upon the material and the facts and that it should call for the affirmation of legitimacy. No one can be an exception to this rule, irrespective of his merits and his position. Thank you for your attention.

Lukyanov Cites Corruption Statistics

LD1904120490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1837 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Remarks by A.I. Lukyanov at 17 April session of Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin, Moscow—recorded]

[Text] The question has arisen as to whether actually, while the Gdlyan and Ivanov case is under examination, as to whether our fight against corruption and bribery has indeed been discontinued; this was voiced in several speeches, and a note followed immediately. I was obliged to ask for material on this matter. I can report to you that in the period 1986-1989, 363,000 cases were brought in the country concerning theft using official position, including 39,500 cases on a large and particularly large scale, and 28,500 cases concerning bribe-taking. Investigation has been completed on 105,300 cases of this type and they have been sent to court. The losses resulting from cases investigated during this period concerning theft of this kind amounted to R900 million. The investigative organs have recovered R432 million in real terms.

What occurred in the courts during this period? Here are the figures of the Supreme Court. Cases concerning liability for mismanagement, bribe-taking, theft, abuse of office and other economic and office related crimes comprised 41 percent of overall convictions during this period, that is, the percentage went up a lot. Note should be made that in the second half of the 80's major cases concerning bribe-taking and other abuses for the purpose of gain were being examined in practically all regions of the country, in various departments, and at varying levels of official position and authority; they included ministers, deputy ministers, first deputy ministers, directors of major associations, and so on.

Over the last five years, 1985-1989, about 14,000 persons have been convicted just for theft on a paticularly large scale, for bribe-taking, more than 19,000, and for abuse of office, nearly 1,000 persons. In 1989 alone, last year, when the whole thing actually got going, 81.2 percent of those brought to criminal account for theft on a particularly large scale were sentenced to imprisonment; for receiving bribes under particularly aggravating circumstances, 88.3 percent of all those brought to criminal account were imprisoned. One person was sentenced to the supreme penalty for these crimes. These are the figures of the Supreme Court, and I think that they will be of use to deputies.

Decree on Implementation of Self-Government Law

904A0317B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[USSR Supreme Soviet Decree on Procedure of Implementation of USSR Law "General Principles of Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in the USSR"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To implement the USSR Law "General Principles of Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in the USSR" from the time it is published except for Article 2, Clause 3, Clauses 1, 4 and 5 of Article 6, and Clause 1 of Article 25, which take effect as of 1 July 1990. To implement Articles 16 and 17 of the law as of 1 January 1991.

2. To determine that until legislation of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics has been brought into line with the USSR Law "General Principles of Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in the USSR" current legislative enactments will be applied, unless they conflict with the said law.

3. To recognize as invalid as of the implementation of the USSR Law "General Principles of Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in the USSR":

The USSR law of 25 June 1980 "Basic Powers of Kray and Oblast Soviets of People's Deputies and Soviets of People's Deputies of Autonomous Oblasts and Autonomous Okrugs" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No. 27, 1980, Article 526);

USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edicts of 19 March 1971 "Basic Rights and Duties of the Rayon Soviets of Working People's Deputies" and "Basic Rights and Duties of City and Municipal Rayon Soviets of Working People's Deputies" in the 28 November 1978 version of the edicts (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No. 49, 1978, Articles 795 and 796);

USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict of 8 April 1968 "Basic Rights and Duties of the Village and Community Soviets of Working People's Deputies" in the version of the 28 November 1978 edict (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No. 49, 1978, Article 797).

4. To recommend that the Supreme Soviets of the union and autonomous republics provide for the elaboration and adoption of legislative instruments regulating local self-government in the republics and bring the legislation of the union and autonomous republics into line with the USSR Law "General Principles of Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in the USSR."

5. That the USSR Council of Ministers prior to 1 July 1990:

submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals on the alignment of legislative enactments of the USSR with USSR Law "General Principles of Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in the USSR;"

revoke or bring into line with the said law ordinances and regulations of the USSR Government;

ensure the revision and revocation by USSR ministries, state committees, and departments of their enforceable enactments, including sets of instructions, in conflict with this law.

6. That the USSR Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviets of the union and autonomous republics in conjunction with the local soviets of people's deputies determine the procedure of the transfer and list of property to be transferred and acquired free of charge as part of municipal property of various territorial levels.

That the Supreme Soviets of the union and autonomous republics determine the quotas of budget provision per inhabitant of the republic.

That the Supreme Soviets and Councils of Ministers of the union and autonomous republics and the local soviets of people's deputies implement a set of measures pertaining to the preparation of the local economy and the material-technical base for work under the new conditions of self-government and the new economic and legal relationships.

8. That the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Work of the Soviets of People's Deputies and the Development of Management and Self-Management provide for supervision of fulfillment of the USSR Law "General Principles of Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in the USSR."

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Moscow, the Kremlin, 9 April 1990.

Deputies Discuss Trade Sector Problems

PM1904141190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[S. Karkhanin report under the rubric "In USSR Supreme Soviet Committees and Commissions": "Taking Charge of Goods"]

[Text] The first to arrive for the closed sale of consumer goods to deputies at the capital's "Krasnodar" department store were correspondents from a popular weekly who had been tipped off by unknown "exposers" and had come in the hope of a sensational scoop. However, there was no sensation.

"Bazaars like this are held at virtually all Moscow enterprises," I. Andreyeva, deputy chairman of the Commission for Parliamentary Ethics, said. "So why not organize a sale for those who work at the Supreme Soviet? We constantly hear complaints about our diplomatic representatives' embarrassment at the clothes in which deputies arrive abroad as part of delegations!"

That is just one example which confirms that the deputies who work in the commissions on prices, social policy questions, trade, and consumer goods came to the meeting with K. Terekh, USSR minister of trade, fully aware of the prevailing situation. There was no need to mention again the humiliating waiting lines and the empty store shelves. But is it fair that the formula "we can only sell what has been produced" is quite often used to cover up the sins of the trade system itself, for which shortages are a guarantee of a comfortable existence?

As recently as two years ago there was much talk about progressive methods of trade in the Baltic republics, about Moscow stores operating on the basis of family contracts, about experiments with bonuses for the absence of lines.... Now, the deputies noted, all this is never mentioned any more. Instead, spot checks on store back rooms always end with amazing discoveries, revealing goods and food products which never appear on shelves.

Incidentally, the minister noted that the recent Decree of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium on measures to combat violations of trade rules was received with hostility by the trade sector, there were even strike threats in some places. Why? B. Tereshchenko, head of a department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Main Administration for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation, to whom I talked during the break, explained:

"Last year only two people were sentenced to imprisonment for violation of trade rules in the country as a whole. Now that we have been given a truly effective legally enforceable act, during 20 days in March as many such violations were exposed as during the whole of the previous two months."

Trade turnover figures are constantly rising, yet the stores remain empty.... Most probably this sort of situation will prevail for as long as no one is in charge of goods. One-third of the vegetable harvest and 2.5 million tonnes of meat fail to reach the consumer, according to information from the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform. Of the 1,200 categories of goods monitored by the Ministry of Trade in 140 cities, only 100 categories are freely available. It is this level of total shortages which has given rise to the "clamor of unsatisfied demand" about the sharp contradiction between statistics and the actual situation.

Industry must, of course, accept its share of the blame. As of 31 March, trade was unable to conclude contracts totaling R7.3 billion with producers. This means that goods have to be bought abroad for foreign currency. Some 120 million pairs of women's tights have been bought abroad—a third of the country's output of these items. As for razor blades, we import more of them than we produce ourselves!

The Ministry of Trade is looking for innovations. One of these is auctions. So 130 "Volga" cars have been sold "under the hammer" for R60,000 each. It is planned to open specialized shops for the sale of high-grade Soviet and imported goods at commercial prices. It has also been proposed to lift restrictions on prices in commission stores, allowing the person who hands in the article to set the price. Will this not mean a legalization of speculation? In order to forestall this, legal experts advise that this measure should be introduced only after the integrated taxation system has come into force.

The deputies maintained that, despite all the difficulties experienced by the national economy, the excuse that there is nothing to sell is unjustified. Incidentally, it is possible to even sell stores. Forty percent of state trade enterprises employ between two and four people. Why not lease these stores to them initially, allowing them subsequently to buy the fixed assets, or simply sell the stores at auction?

There was a clash of opinions at the session. Some people proposed that the question of whether K. Terekh is equal to his job be investigated, others raised the question of eliminating the whole ministry.... A certain amount of the temper displayed by deputies is understandable. The disintegration of the consumer market has hit voters particularly hard. Nonetheless, the debate managed to focus on the key problems of the strategy of the economic reform.

K. Terekh gave assurances that he knows nothing about any upcoming price hikes, about which so many rumors are currently circulating. He stressed that, in his opinion, prices could only be revised as part of a price reform whose draft would have to be submitted for nationwide discussion. Thus the theme has arisen again of a reform of the monetary system capable, by temporarily "freezing" accumulations, of halting the mass dumping of money on the consumer market. The pressure created by unsatisfied demand continues to mount. During the first quarter of the current year the population's incomes have risen by a further 14 percent.

The Presidential Council intends to examine within the next few days a package of normative documents called upon to accelerate the economic reform. When they have been adopted, the Ministry of Trade will finalize its comprehensive program and submit it to deputies. Then the debate will resume. The sector is waiting for changes.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Reviews Councils' Economic Discussion

LD1904224190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 19 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] We are transmitting the report of the Press Service attached to the USSR President:

On 18 April at a joint session in the Kremlin of the Council of the Federation and Presidential Council of

the USSR, held under the chairmanship of Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR President, there was continuation of the discussion of the possibilities and ways of moving the country onto the rails of a regulated market economy. Speakers at the session were: Comrades Dementey, Makhkamov, Bakatin, Primakov, Karimov, Shevardnadze, Shevchenko, Ryzhkov, Masaliyev, Vorotnikov, Kryuchkov, Gumbaridze, Aytmatov, Shatalin, Yakovlev, Rasputin, Lukyanov, Sitaryan, Revenko, Arbatov, Maslyukov and Laptev.

Reviewing the outcome of the discussion, Mikhail Gorbachev said: The discussion that took place produces a feeling of satisfaction. It has made it possible, I think, to realistically assess the situation in the country and ways of reforming the economy, to present the prospects of the work more clearly.

I fully agree with those who, speaking here, have said we are discussing the fundamental question of our development. It is a question of the biggest turning point since the time of October. Therefore, the concept of the transition to a regulated market must be worked out more carefully and cast in a concrete program. This transition is not easy, it will affect the position of various strata of the population. This must be seriously thought about, one must concern oneself about firm social guarantees which would be understandable to the people.

[The Moscow TASS International Service version of this report, transmitted in Russian at 1620 GMT on 19 April, adds the following:

"But let us ask ourselves: Can we go without changing today's economic situation? Obviously, we all agree one cannot stay on the spot and fail to move forward on the road to radicalization of the economic reform.

"Our concept of transition to a regulated market economy is fully in keeping with the choice that has been made, the movement toward a humane, democratic socialism. It is important to understand that in putting forward this concept we are not changing the direction of our development. But we are developing and deepening our understanding of socialism, we are sharply changing many of our ideas about socialist society."]

What is more, without working out the mechanism of these guarantees, of countermeasures capable of neutralizing possible side-effects for the working people when changing over to the market economy, such a program cannot be launched altogether. Such is my firm position. Having said that we are abruptly changing many of our ideas about socialist society, President Gorbachev noted: We must not be tardy and we must not hesitate, but no less indubitable is the following: On the road to a regulated market economy we must pass through a series of stages, having properly thought through all the repercussions of the steps being taken in this direction and worked out a reliable social protection mechanism for the population, particularly the poorly off sections of it.

In planning to accelerate the economic reform we must take the real state of our society into account. The reform program can only hope to be successful if it gains the support of millions of Soviet people and is in tune with their interests. In this connection the moral and psychological factor must also be taken into consideration. For many decades Soviet people have been taught the solution to all their problems depends on the leadership, above all on the top authorities. The country's leadership is held responsible for everything, from the housing shortage to the absence of nails in a local village shop. Closely bound up with this are such phenomena as the desire for universal levelling down, the lack of initiative and the parasitism that have affected the psychology of our people.

It is also essential to take into account the federative structure of our state and the profound regional differences in the economy and social sphere. The living standard and interests of the population do not by any means always coincide.

It would be wrong, however, to devote attention only to the factors that complicate the implementation of the planned reforms. Out country has tremendous economic potential, rich national resources, a competent and educated people and a developed scientific sector. All this constitutes the basis for success.

In drawing up a program of intensification of the economic reform, we must seriously think through a mechanism for implementing it and clearly work out a system of managing both the program as a whole and its individual components. For this we must draw the proper conclusions from the failures in the government's implementation of the system of measures endorsed by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, make sure that the planned actions are given a more profound scientific analysis and consult more with economic scientists, managers and representatives of the republics and the local bodies of power. In short, what is needed is serious preparatory work and a clear understanding of the stages of the forthcoming transition to a regulated market.

It is necessary to move forward along the entire front; it is necessary to put the land reform into practice in a more urgent way, to solve the problem of training and retraining of cadres, and to take into account the change of psychological climate in the society. we must fulfil everything that has been planned for the coming year in the sphere of economic stabilization and especially the consumer market, including anti-inflation measures and reduction of the state budget deficit. In parallel with this it is necessary to take care of the legal back-up and to work out laws and other documents that would create a favorable legal environment for implementing the planned measures.

Finally, we cannot solve the problems that are facing us without the consolidation of all forces interested in the success of perestroyka. This is not merely a formal

coming together. We must also derive fresh ideas that will help us finally draw up this most important program through extensive consultations with work collectives, representatives of different strata of our society, trade unions, and other public organizations and scientists.

In a word, we have a lot to do; we must implement the measures for stabilising the economy, which have been planned by the government, simultaneously complete the working out of a program for transition to a market, draft and adopt a packet of legislative acts, presidential decrees and government decisions for these purposes, and set out to put them consistently into practice. Now we must concentrate all our intellectual and political resources and the attention of all working people in this major direction."

Democratic Platform To Hold Session 21-22 Apr

LD2004111990 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the "INTERFAX" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] On 21 and 22 April a session of the Coordination Council of the CPSU Democratic Platform will be held. The issue of the attitude to the open letter of the CPSU Central Committee and of the tactics of the Democratic Platform in the immediate period will be examined. Also discussed at the session will be the issue of preserving unity of the different trends in the movement.

Thus, an INTERFAX correspondent has learned that yesterday Yuriy Afanasyev, member of the Coordination Council of the Democratic Platform and USSR people's deputy, left the party of his own accord.

Leader Outlines Objectives

PM1804154890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 15, 15 Apr 90 p 7

[Article by Ilya Chubais, member of the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Platform: "Democratic Platform. What Is This Alternative Plan To Reorganize the CPSU?"]

[Text] The Moscow Party Club, the first in our country, was organized last April. For several months we tried to directly implement our plan - to convene a non-scheduled CPSU Congress for a radical reforming of the party. We sent a relevant letter to the Central committee, held a lot of meetings, spoke at enterprises and offices, collected signatures and took part in rallies.

But quite soon it became clear that we wouldn't be able to collect (as the Rules require) the amount of signatures necessary - a third of all Communists (6 million people!) - to hold our planned emergency congress. Then we decided to change the scenario.

It is no use trying to influence the stiff, official structures—so let's create our own, new and alternative ones, create our own, left and democratic association within the Party—the Democratic Platform! [DP]

The All-Union Conference, at which this left bloc in the CPSU was organizationally set up, took place on January 20-21.

Some 100,000 communists joined the DP at the moment it was set up. If we are to judge the social composition of the DP by the social composition of the delegates to the All-Union Conference, then we can say that 40 per cent are represented by learning establishments, research isntitutes, design bureaus and research-production associations, 20 per cent—by industrial enterprises, over 5 per cent—workers, and some 20 per cent—full-time Party functionaries. 60 per cent of participants have been Party members for over 10 years.

Now we are holding an all-Union action on registering the advocates of the Democratic Platform, and registering are both CPSU members and non-party people. Democratic association and Party clubs now exist in all union Republics, in more than 100 cities—from Murmansk to Simferopol and from Kaliningrad to Sakhalin. Regional coordinators and a 57-person All-Union Coordination Council have been elected.

The Democratic platform is also the name of our newspaper. Its circulation—50,000 copies—its fairly large for an independent organ.

Our project was published in the official Party press, particularly in the newspapers PRAVDA, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and others, and it is discussed widely in the Party also because the February Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee approved and published another project—the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 29th Congress.

These two platforms have differences of principle. I'll try to point out some key differences. Only an association, built on democratic lines, can implement democratic transformations. That's why we reject the "democratic centralism" principle. Formally, democratic centralism is reporting from top to bottom (it is interesting whether anyone in a grassroots Party organization has ever heard a report by a Secretary of the Central Committee or a Regional Committee?), elections from bottom to top (did many communists elect the secretaries removed in Volgograd, Tyumen and other cities?), etc. In practice, democratic centralism means the fulfilment of the notorious principle—divide and rule. All the Party organizations are separated and isolated from one another so that even close neighbours don't know what is going on next to them. And looming over each primary Party organization is the many-storied, ruling pyramid—party committee, district committee, city committee, region committee, Central Committee of the Republic, Central Committee of the Party, Politburo and General Secretary. Therefore, the Democratic Platform is for a radical reduction of the Party apparat, for horizontal associations— councils of secretaries instead of district and city committees and for guaranteed rights to the minority.

Recognizing inter-Party democracy, we are also for democracy in relations between parties, for a consistent and absolute political pluralism. We think that the role and place of a party in political life are determined by the electors during the election when they give or withhold their votes to candidates.

The Democratic Platform announces a very profound crisis, that officials, the apparat, and the so-called Marxist-Leninist ideology are all exhausted. We think that even if all the deformations and distortions to which the Soviet version of Marxism is constantly subjected now are removed, it is impossible to be guided today only by what's taught in the classics. The new problems can be understood only with the attraction of new ideas, new names and new concepts.

When it rejects the all-pressing apparat and the obsolete dogmas, what, then, does the left wing of the Party support? Of course, we don't accept Stalinism, we are against national patriotism, we don't share purely bourgeois, capitalistic ideas, even though Party bureaucrats are consciously trying to discredit our movement, ascribing to us senseless affection for capitalism, exploitation and private property.

The true aim of the left in the Party is democratic socialism, a socialism with a human face—it is the programme, which is the basis of the international Social-Democratic movement, of socialist internationalism. We declare the inevitability, due to activities of conservative forces, of a division of the CPSU and declare our intention to set up a new party on the basis of the Democratic Platform and the platform of the interregional group of deputies—a party consistently built on a federalist principle.

Late in May we'll hold a conference or the 1st Congress of the Democratic Platform. There, apparently, the question of time limits and the procedure of dividing with the conservative part of the CPSU will be solved.

Yazov Addresses War Anniversary Conference

LD1904181690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 19 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A scientific-practical conference devoted to the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War took place in Moscow today.

[Correspondent A. Balabanov, identified by caption] The subject of the conference is the significance of and the lessons from the Soviet people's victory connected with the present time. An introductory address was made by USSR Defense Minister Army General Yazov.

Taking part in the conference were representatives of the central apparatus of the Defense Ministry, of the branches of the Armed Forces and of the military academies, of leading humanities institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the CPSU Central Committee, and a number of other organizations.

After a joint session, work in sections started. They discussed the role of the Armed Forces, of the Communist Party, and the work of the Soviet rear during the war years.

Tomorrow, after a plenary session where the results will be summed up, the conference will complete its work. [video shows Yazov, among others, in the presidium of the conference. To Yazov's left is Sokolov, and further to the left but still in the first row is Ogarkov]

'Victory Transformed the World'

LD2004081190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2330 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] On 19 April, an all-union scientific conference devoted to the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 started work in Moscow. The conference was opened with an introductory word from Army General Yazov, candidate CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR minister of defense.

He said that our victory transformed the world and opened up new highways in the development of world history. Even today it is actively influencing all social processes, constitutes a powerful factor in the maintenance of peace and international security, and is a source of our country's revolutionary renewal.

Much has been written about the Great Patriotic War. However, the truth about it has still not been completely revealed. Many problems have frequently been reported in simplified and tendentious fashion. Serious miscalculations committed in the strengthening of the state's defense capacity and the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces have been hushed up. Contradictions between the Soviet defense doctrine and offensive strategy have remained beyond analysis.

The minister continued by saying that the purpose of our conference is to work out a scientific, strictly objective and truthful conception of the history of the Great Patriotic War and to give a modern treatment to the events that preceded it, the course and outcome of the war.

In light of the new political thinking, all aspects of the war should be thoroughly illuminated—the political, economic, sociopsychological, and strategic—the blank spots of military history should be revealed and the grandeur of the victory we achieved and its world-wide historical importance should be displayed.

Army General Sukhorukov, deputy USSR minister of defense, gave a report entitled: The Soviet People, the Victorious People in the Great Patriotic War. We will adduce certain premises and figures from his report.

Victory was bought at a high price. For a long time, the true data of our losses were hidden or distorted. In 1946, Stalin represented them as seven million people. Later, Khrushchev gave a new figure—about 20 million. But all these data were derived on the basis of dubious assessments. Now, as the result of painstaking analysis, more realistic data have been established. The overall losses of the Soviet Union in the war have been assessed at 27-28 million people.

Combat losses of the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War, including the Far East campaign, have been fixed at 8,666,000 people killed, dead from wounds and illness, as well as failing to return from captivity. Losses of wounded, shell-shocked, and sick amounted to about 18 million people.

The greater part of our losses belong to the first period of war when the Soviet Armed Forces were fighting in conditions which were extremely difficult and unfavorable for them. In subsequent operations, the enemy suffered no smaller—and in the concluding period of the war even greater—losses.

Our victory was not only a military victory, but also an economic one. Historical experience has demonstrated that even the USSR's deformed socialist economy proved in practice to be more efficient than the capitalist system. The plan system of administration of the national economy on the basis of public ownership of the means of production made it possible under war conditions to maneuver war production flexibly and to transfer means of production and people to any point in the country over a short period of time and to carry out construction projects that were vast by war-time standards.

The total number of the evacuated population came to about 25 million people. To the East were rebased 1,360 major industrial enterprises. Agriculture, despite the temporary loss of extensive regions and the departure to the front of the fittest and most qualified workers, in the main provided the country with foodstuffs and raw materials.

Of even greater importance in the successful conclusion of the war was the moral and political superiority of our people and the personnel of the Armed Forces. An extremely important factor was the friendship of the Soviet peoples. The basis of their mutual understanding was provided by common ideals and an aspiration to support one another in the struggle against the foe. The main role in political leadership over the whole duration of the war belonged to the Communist Party. It truly became the soul of the martial and labor deeds of the people. Yesterday, [19 April], thematic sections began work at the conference. Today the all-union scientific conference will continue work.

PRAVDA Discusses 'Ideological Wavering'

PM2004101190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Ideology of Renewal"]

[Text] Life has shown that when we embark on the path of revolutionary transformations and perestroyka we must correlate our actions with the future and be concerned about the fundamental theoretical interpretation of all of our work. Otherwise it is hard to make progress or speed up the pace of acceleration.

In abandoning obsolete formulas, canons, and dogmatism the party is not restricting its ideological and political arsenal but, on the contrary, expanding it, giving scope for creativity and initiative in recognizing and explaining social processes. The CPSU Central Committee February and March Plenums marked a definite breakthrough in this respect. The CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th party congress boldly moves us forward along the broadest front in the ideological and theoretical interpretation of perestroyka and our understanding of the ways to switch from a centralist model of society to humane and democratic socialism. It represents the party's view of socialism, a rule-of-law state, and a civil society. The Central Committee firmly advocates fidelity to the creative spirit of the materialist philosophy and dialectic methodology of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The renewal of socialism and the achievement of new-quality socialism are inconceivable without relying on all the useful points that our history, work practice, and common human values have to offer. Renewed socialism needs a genuine ideology of renewal.

The precongress discussion launched in party organizations and the press shows how vital and topical this problem is. The rejection of imaginary ideals and values is not a painless process everywhere. There have been attempts by certain forces on both the "right" and "left" wings to divert the party from its strategic course. Certain party members have a strong desire to cling to the past, and are unwilling or unable to grasp the need for urgent change. They associate the fall in the party's prestige with what they imagine to be the CPSU leadership's backtracking from the fundamental principles of scientific socialism. Clearly, no revolutionary changes will be achieved in society's life or in raising the party's prestige by sticking to these positions.

Nor can we fail to notice the following paradox: Certain Western Soviet experts whom we had previously criticized wholesale—and the writers based their prosperity on this criticism—have recently been adopting the positions of defenders of Marxism, while some of our homegrown holders of lofty academic degrees and titles and some of our journalists have been giving "short shrift" to Marxism, its founders, and Lenin. In fact there is no paradox: The Soviet experts have not gone "Red" because of their convictions—it is simply that they used to criticize not so much the teaching of creative, living

Marxism but its dogmatic interpretation and clumsy application by us in practice.

Perestroyka, which is associated with breaking with the ideas about what we are building and what frontiers we are headed for, has made us face up to everything that is sober-minded—deleting, incidentally, the concept of "Sovietology" as a term of abuse in our political vocabulary. Some writers for selfish motives have unblushingly rushed to disparage Marxism, Leninist teaching, and the socialist ideal itself, while other writers have done so because of their lack of theoretical knowledge. This criticism is often made at rallies, where ringing phrases and categorical judgments are most easily taken for the last word in truth.

Can we fail to take account of the increasing number of voices claiming that the socialist ideal is an artificial and speculative concoction and, therefore, has no future, and that there is allegedly no justification for the theory of Marxism which reflects and underlies it, since it is responsible for the crisis in our society? Of course not. Life, if we look at it straightforwardly, shows that the founders of Marxism and the theory they created cannot take responsibility for the deformations of socialism during the personality cult and stagnation years or for the mistaken actions of certain politicians.

Perestroyka has raised in all its acuteness the problem of the genuine creative interpretation of Lenin's legacy, and our understanding of Lenin as a theoretician, politician, and man. The more than 50-year dogmatization of Leninism and its adaptation to the needs of the Stalinist model of state socialism have thoroughly deformed the teaching.

The process of freeing Lenin from Stalinist distortion has not been easy—these distortions were too deeply rooted in theoretical and everyday awareness. Obstacles had built up on right and left. But Lenin can only be understood in dialectic development and in the historical context. The thoughts and views which he reached at the end of his life are particularly valuable in this respect. The policy of renewal is virtually inconceivable without turning to Lenin's ideas, thoughts, and views of socialism—views which he had struggled to develop on the basis of his practical experience. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo document marking the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth allows us to place the correct emphasis in our assessment of Lenin and his legacy. It makes us interpret the path we have traveled, and focuses our attention on unresolved tasks.

Needless to say, this will require very intensive thinking from everyone who values the fate of socialism—above all, sociologists. Unfortunately, the state of Soviet sociology and the forms of its relationship with practical work which emerged during the preceding period do not correspond to the nature of the revolutionary and transforming tasks of perestroyka, and require—in the opinion of the academics themselves—resolute and immediate change.

PRAVDA is convinced of this because of the response to the newspaper's articles on the problems of the new vision of socialism. The number of letters has grown particularly since the publication of M.S. Gorbachev's article "The Socialist Ideal and Revolutionary Perestroyka." It is noteworthy that the letter writers speak out on the essence of the problems raised in the article, do not waffle, and want to participate in the discussion. This confirms yet again that theoretical problems are not solely the province of academics—the attention of millions of participants in perestroyka is focused on them.

In the process of cleansing itself the party is restoring its ideological and moral qualities. The claim to a monopoly on the truth and the rejection of compromise and dissidence have been consigned to the archives without further ado. Dialogue, partnership, and constructive cooperation with all social movements, associations, and groups operating on a socialist footing—those are its firm positions.

The ideology of renewal is inconceivable without boldly contrasting various views and approaches during discussions, or without taking a careful attitude to each constructive idea. It is on this basis that a consolidation of healthy forces in the party sincerely interested in ensuring that it arrives at its congress united, strong, and cohesive is possible.

Needless to say, the party cannot permit any compromising attitude to ideological wavering or ideological unscrupulousness. The very logic of political struggle, not apparatus fantasies—as some people think—has showed us the need to resolutely dissociate ourselves from those who are opposed to the socialist path of development for our society, who deny the party's fundamental ideological, theoretical, and organizational foundations, or who undermine CPSU unity.

This was all clearly and unambiguously stated in the CPSU Central Committee's open letter "For Consolidation on a Basis of Principle." Unfortunately, attempts are being made to distort the sense and content of it and to impose the view that the Central Committee is looking to rid itself of people with independent views and convictions. This shows yet again that certain forces in the party are pursuing their own selfish group aims. And it is simply inevitable to split [razmezhevaniye] with them in the interests of the party's future.

The Central Committee's open letter, reflecting the ideology of renewal, not only does not prevent a broad, free, and constructive discussion but, on the contrary, gives new impetus to a businesslike and frank exchange of opinions in the party. A very great deal now depends on party committees and party organizations. We need to clarify the sense and content of the letter and, above all, to consolidate communists on a basis of principle.

In the article "For Consolidation on the Principles of Perestroyka" (16 April) PRAVDA voiced its views on this subject. It will continue to consistently advocate the cohesion of party ranks and the firm unity of all those

who value the aims of perestroyka and the ideals of humane and democratic socialism.

Further Reportage on 21st Komsomol Congress

Resolutions Adopted, Work Ends

PM1904124390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Information Report"]

[Text] At the 17 April evening sitting of the 21st Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress, delegates adopted an address from the 21st Komsomol Congress to the governments of the USSR, the United States, Pakistan, and the Republic of Afghanistan, and a resolution on questions concerning the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station] accident.

On 18 April the congress delegates discussed and adopted the Komsomol Statute.

The congress also adopted the following resolutions:
—On the Komsomol Statute;
—On the Procedure for Electing Members of the Komsomol Central Committee and the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau and Secretaries;
—On the Functions and Powers of the Komsomol Central Committee and of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau, Secretaries, and Apparatus;
—On Funds for Assistance to Komsomol Organizations;
—On Control Within the Komsomol and Regulations on the Komsomol Central Control Commission.

The congress elected the Komsomol Central Committee and the Komsomol Central Control Commission.

Elections were held on a competitive basis; Vladimir Zyukin was elected first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee and Valeriy Parfenov was elected chairman of the Central Control Commission.

The congress thus ended its work.

13, 14 Apr Speakers Listed

PM2004090090 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Information Report"]

[Text] The following spoke at the 13 April evening session of the 21st All-Union Lenin Komsomol [Communist Youth League] Congress: A. Nemchaninov, secretary of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol committee of a troop unit; M. Sotnikov, senior scientific staffer at Moscow State University Scientific Research Institute of Nuclear Physics; M. Tskhvaradze, first secretary of Ordzhonikidzevskiy Georgian Lenin Komsomol Raykom [rayon committee], Tbilisi City; S. Ponomarev, first secretary of the Karelian All-Union Lenin Komsomol Obkom [oblast committee]; N. Gogulan, first secretary of the Estonian Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; Yu. Andrianov, first secretary of Yoshkar-Ola All-Union Lenin Komsomol Gorkom [city committee]; L. Kara-Ool, deputy military commissar of Tes-Khemskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Tuva ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]; and V. Fronin, chief editor of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

At the 14 April morning plenary session of the 21st All-Union Lenin Komsomol Congress, V. Mironenko, first secretary of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; and N. Klykov, chairman of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Auditing Commission, delivered the concluding speeches.

The congress adopted a resolution on the reports of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Committee, the All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Auditing Commission, and the group of USSR peoples' deputies from the All-Union Lenin Komsomol.

The congress delegates then continued their work in discussion centers and delegate clubs.

12, 13 Apr Speakers Listed

PM2004085490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Information Report"]

[Text] At the 12 April evening plenary session of the 21st All-Union Lenin Komsomol Congress, the following spoke in the debates: A. Matviyenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; V. Kichigin, first secretary of Kursk All-Union Lenin Komsomol Obkom [oblast committee]; I. Nikitin, chairman of the All-Union Pioneers' Organization Central Council (secretary of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Committee); A. Balenko, USSR peoples' deputy from the All-Union Lenin Komsomol; V. Sustavov, secretary of Kirovskiy All-Union Lenin Komsomol Raykom [rayon committee], Sverdlovsk City; G. Akopyan, first secretary of the Armenian Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; A. Reshetnikov, assistant chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate and chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations; A. Feduta, teacher at middle school No. 20 in Grodno City; G. Geldyyeva, first secretary of the Turkmen Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; S. Gorbachev, assistant chief of the Black Sea Fleet Political Directorate for Komsomol work; and Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and CPSU Central Committee secretary.

The congress adopted a resolution in connection with the forthcoming examination in the USSR Supreme Soviet of the draft law "On Taxes on State, Lease, Cooperative, Social, and Other Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations."

The discussion continued 13 April at the morning session of the 21st All-Union Lenin Komsomol Congress.

The following spoke in the debates: A. Chukin, secretary of the Kirghiz State University Komsomol Committee; S. Smirnov, secretary of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; K. Litvinov, first secretary of Sverdlovsk Ukrainian Lenin Komsomol Gorkom [city committee], Voroshilovgrad Oblast; S. Alekperov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; Ye. Kelpsh, student at the Kaliningrad Higher Engineering School of Engineer Troops; A. Yakubov, first secretary of the Tajik Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; G. Shakhnazaryan, chief of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Committee staff for the All-Union Shock Labor Project for Construction and Exploitation of the Baykal-Amur Railroad zone; J. Urbanovich, first secretary of the Latvian Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; A. Fomin, senior engineer at the Novosibirsk branch of the Interdisciplinary Scientific Center; T. Tabyldiyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; V. Glukhov, pilot at the Sakhalin Combined Aviation Detachment; V. Ovdiyenko, secretary of the Lithuanian Lenin Komsomol republican center; A. Baturin, senior instructor at the Army and Navy Political Directorate Komsomol Work Department; D. Bragish, first secretary of the Moldavian Lenin Komsomol Central Committee; Yu. Bausov, Moscow State University postgraduate student; A. Akhrarov, first secretary of Zheleznodorozhnyy Uzbek Lenin Komsomol Raykom, Samarkand City; S. Stratonov, design engineer at the "Karat" science and production association in Lvov City; A. Razin, director of the "Laskovyy May" Studio; and Kh. Bugayev—first secretary of Chechen-Ingush All-Union Lenin Komsomol Obkom.

Medvedev Addresses Komsomol

PM1904132790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 pp 3-4

[Unattributed report on 16 April sittings of All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League Congress: "Speeches in Debates at 21st Komsomol Congress"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] **16 April Morning and Evening Sittings**

A. Trachuk [secretary of the Oktyabrskiy Komsomol Rayon Committee in Leningrad]:

Esteemed comrade delegates! I permit myself to recall that the appeal of the 21st Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress to the CPSU Central Committee and the country's communists was adopted 14 April. After the protest submitted by some delegates and also the adoption without a vote of the amendment on the full quotation of part of the CPSU Central Committee letter, it was decided to hold consultations at the conciliation commission.

The commission worked according to the text issued to you today when you registered. The result of the eight hours of consultations held 15 April was the reduction of a multiplicity of opinions to two possible options for the congress decision. I ask you to turn to the text of the document issued to you when you registered.

One option for the congress decision: Make the following changes to the text of the appeal, cite in full the quotation from the CPSU Central Committee in the fourth paragraph. This comment has already been taken into account in the document issued to you.

The second change—remove from the fifth paragraph the excerpt from the word "prove" to the end of the paragraph. And last: Amalgamate the sixth and seventh paragraphs, to read as follows: "The appearance of this letter at the height of the precongress debate could lead to the conservative forces using the open letter of the CPSU Central Committee as grounds for suppressing communists who express different views." The other option for the congress decision is not to review the appeal adopted by the congress 14 April, at the same time confirming the decision taken earlier without a vote on citing in full the quotation from the CPSU Central Committee letter in the fourth paragraph. The proposed text of the definitive document is thus in your hands. The conciliation commission earnestly asks the delegates and the presidium not to submit other options to the congress on this question and not to examine them and not to open debates. Before the vote they will hear two three-minute speeches in support of each decision option, after which the question will be put to individual voting for each option. The commission earnestly asks the delegates to refrain from speeches on procedural issues. Thank you.

Maksim Sotnikov, senior scientific staffer at the M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University Scientific Research Institute of Nuclear Physics:

Comrades, I express myself in favor of the adoption of the appeal of the 21st congress issued when we registered. What grounds do I have? First of all I should like to urge everyone to think about how, if we create a conciliation commission, which does not exist at present in the congress standing orders, for each issue, then we risk never ending our congress.

Second. The introduction of the full quotation is indeed conditioned by the fact that an error was made, but not by a particular person. All authors of this appeal share that responsibility.

Were there compromises on a particular side? In this case I want to say that the majority made compromises.

First, when we were preparing this document we had supporters of various viewpoints, including supporters of factionalism in the party. We have already traveled that path, comrades.

Second. I believe that right now a centralist document has been submitted and, if we adopt it, it can satisfy everyone. Thank you.

V.A. Medvedev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee:

Dear friends, I thank you for the fact that despite the strict framework of the standing orders, you have nonetheless deemed it possible to allow me to express myself on the thrust of the issue under discussion. I must say that I am very glad that the discussion at the congress of questions of the open letter from the party Central Committee to all communists has generated such a stormy reaction. It seems to me that this is evidence that the Komsomol is living not only by its own affairs but also the affairs of the country and that it takes close to heart everything taking place in our party.

It seems to me that in discussing this question we should read the lines of the party Central Committee letter very attentively, even scrupulously, because scarcely had it appeared before interpreters immediately emerged. They interpreted it in the spirit that it was allegedly an attempt to close some people's mouths, that initially they were invited to debate but now attempts are being made to close the debate using administrative-edict methods. That the letter was a signal to open the struggle against dissent and to restrict the socialist pluralism of opinions. That it was an attempt at a purge, an attempt to remove from the party a certain section adhering to different views.

I must say that such interpretations of the letter from my viewpoint—and I know it word for word, having worked on it at all stages—accord with neither the spirit nor the letter of this letter. It is also being said that the letter is one thing and its interpretation locally another. Fears are being voiced that there may be some additional instructions which will enable some conservative or other forces in the party to deal with their ideological adversaries. I should like in this connection to read out the text of the very brief CPSU Central Committee resolution which accompanies the CPSU Central Committee open letter. I think that it will make even clearer the party Central Committee position on this question.

First. Approve the text of the CPSU Central Committee letter to the country's communists "for consolidation on a principled basis" and publish it in the press.

Second. The party committees must determine the expediency of the form of the letter's discussion by communists. Every effort should be made to activate the discussion of the party's precongress documents so that it proceeds in a truly democratic, comradely, creative atmosphere and promotes the consolidation of healthy forces in the party and successful preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress.

Without restricting freedom of discussion, while strengthening its constructive foundation, we should dissociate ourselves from antisocialist, antiparty ideological positions and where necessary also take organizational steps with regard to the leaders of factional splittist trends, right up to their expulsion from the CPSU. We must have an attentive approach toward those communists who have been misled, who have been unable to understand the true aims of the organizers of the factional struggle and to assess correctly the perestroyka taking place in the party.

That is why your document's appeal to the CPSU to renounce organizational measures against party members who share a particular CPSU platform misses the mark and is aimless. It is not a case of taking any organizational measures against people for their ideological positions, for sharing a particular ideological program.

PRAVDA today published one more program, the "Marxist platform in the CPSU," which also contains much that is contentious, much, perhaps, that is unacceptable to many communists, but that does not mean that its supporters should be expelled from the party.

It is a case of putting an end to the factional struggle within the party in order to open the way to the party's consolidation. We are in favor of consolidation. We are against a split which in fact is already a matter of practical activity for some trends, including the "Democratic Platform."

At almost the same time as the publication of the CPSU Central Committee letter, Ilya Chubays, a member of the "Democratic Platform" coordination council, wrote in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. He said that they are now carrying out an all-union action to register the supporters of the Democratic Platform and that both CPSU members and nonparty people are signing up. The results of the campaign will be summed up in early May. Regional coordinators have been elected, as has an all-union coordination council of 57 people. "Democratic Platform" is the name of their newspaper and its circulation is not that small for an independent publication, 50,000 copies. In the second half of May, the author says, a conference or first congress of the "Democratic Platform" will be held. It will evidently decide the question of the schedule and procedure for parting with the conservative section of the CPSU. That is what is at issue.

I want to repeat once again, comrades, that the drama of the CPSU Central Committee letter lies precisely in the struggle for the consolidation of the CPSU, against a split, and for debate to develop on all salients and on all questions. There are no problems which would be closed to discussion.

Indeed, comrades, in discussing the letter, and it has been discussed repeatedly, the CPSU members expressed anxiety that someone might use the letter as a pretext for resolving controversial ideological problems by organizational methods and for dealing with dissent and dissidents and with those party members who are in favor of democratization and perestroyka and the reform of the party.

If this anxiety is expressed by the Komsomol congress, by you, comrades, then it is entirely justified and understandable. But I must draw attention to the fact that the

letter itself and the resolution I read out both contain a clear and unambiguous warning that the open letter should not be used to reject those who express particular views and adhere to particular platforms. Organizational measures will be aimed only at those creators of factional groupings, those who seek to destroy the party, who call for its split, who talk of when to implement this split, before the congress, at the congress, or after it. I venture to assure you that the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee as a whole will do everything to ensure that the line toward the development of democratic principles in precongress debate, the line toward enriching our platform with all the ideas voiced during the nationwide and partywide discussion, that this line is steadily implemented in the future and is not used for any aims other than to enrich our platform and make the 28th congress more substantive, make it such that it answers all the topical problems of our present day.

I want to say that, of course, the adoption of the appeal is your business but it seemed to me necessary to express precisely and clearly my view on this score. I wish you success in completing the congress. (Applause).

Chair:

Thank you, Vadim Andreyevich. Please forgive me, but people want to ask you questions, if you have no objection?

Andrey Tyulyubayev, chairman of the Leningrad Oblast council of the all-union V.I. Lenin Pioneers' Council.

Vadim Andreyevich, when he addressed us Mikhail Sergeyevich said that this letter was being adopted on the basis that it had been issued to CPSU Central Committee members and they had made their proposals to the given text of the letter. Please tell us how it was adopted, at which Plenum this CPSU Central Committee resolution was adopted. (applause)

V.A. Medvedev:

The procedure for the Central Committee's adoption of the decision could be different. The letter could be adopted at the Central Committee Plenum but it could also be adopted by a vote. I must say that the absolute majority reacted to the letter issued to members of the Central Committee, Central Committee candidate members, members of the Central Auditing Commission, and first secretaries of party committees not belonging to the Central Committee. The overwhelming majority of comrades agreed with the orientation of this letter and expressed their remarks, which will be taken into consideration.

Voice from the auditorium:

Did the CPSU Central Committee Politburo envisage the consequences of the publication of this letter locally. Inasmuch as we have many instances in our history of good intentions being interpreted absolutely differently locally and acquiring an absolutely different coloring.

V.A. Medvedev:

I have mentioned this. Such fears were indeed voiced and taken into account so as not to provide an opportunity for any forces to use the letter to derive any advantage to themselves and to take organizational measures with regard to any party members for ideological reasons. These guarantees in the letter are envisaged in the resolution I read out to you. In addition I must say that this is our common concern and it will be necessary to take a careful look at how the matter proceeds locally.

Voice from the auditorium:

We have a very simple question from the Kemerovo delegation. Are the supporters of the Democratic Platform dissidents or not? Please answer the entire auditorium now. (applause).

V.A. Medvedev:

Is that a question for me? I think this question should be addressed to the supporters of the "Democratic Platform." I believe that their viewpoint on the question of party structure, the role of the party, and internal party democracy differs from the CPSU Central Committee line, from the line expressed in the CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform. We are resolute opponents of the party's split into factions. Here by factions I have in mind not simply some sum total of views. That is a natural phenomenon within the framework of party pluralism. By faction I mean the party's disintegration into groups with their own independent discipline, with leading or controlling organs, with press publications, with their own internal structures. There is no need for this kind of faction to exist within the party. That contradicts the party's essence, it contradicts the role which the party should play in society. [passage omitted]

Presidential Decree Announces Victory Day Parade

PM1804134090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

["Decree of the USSR President on the Holding of a Parade of Troops in Red Square, Moscow City, on 9 May 1990"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] To mark the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, a parade of troops is to be held in Red Square, Moscow City, on 9 May 1990.
USSR Defense Minister Comrade D.T. Yazov is to receive the parade.

[Signed]President of the USSR
M. Gorbachev. Moscow, Kremlin, 17 April 1990.

Shatalin on Interior Forces Role of Helping People

LD1904181490 Moscow TASS in English 1527 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—Conflicts in various parts of the country forced the USSR Supreme Soviet to

increase the strength of interior forces by 36,000 people to reach over 350,000, Soviet Interior Forces Commander Yuriy Shatalin said in an interview with the SELSKAYA ZHIZN newspaper published today.

Additional detachments were formed of servicemen who wished to serve in the interior forces after cuts in the Soviet Army, he said.

Shatalin said that, in most cases, interior forces show restraint, although there were situations when they could use arms legally. He stressed that it is in the character of a Soviet citizen not to use arms. "It is unnatural for us to use arms against our own people," Shatalin said.

Commanders have no right to decide on the use of arms during the liquidation of mass disturbances. There are some exceptions from the rule when actions are carried out against terrorists.

In all other situations anyone, having arms, decides personally whether to use them or not. Shatalin noted that there was not one case in the past two years of illegal use of arms in extreme situation by soldiers or officers.

"Interior forces' main tasks are to safeguard their Motherland's interests, citizens' life and personal dignity, their constitutional rights and freedoms from criminal infringements and other anti-social activities, rather than to break up demonstrations and strikes as some people thought not long ago," Shatalin said.

Manayenkov Views Party Democratization

90UN1475A Moscow RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 90 p 1

[Interview with Yuriy Manayenkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, conducted by V. Ostrovskiy: "Letter and Spirit of Democracy"]

[Text] [Ostrovskiy] The new draft CPSU Rules broaden considerably the rights of the primary party organization—this is a step toward party democratization, but is it not limited in scope? If a lower organization disputes a decision of a higher party body, the actual effect of the decision is not halted. What is the point of such a disputation?

[Manayenkov] There is no contradiction here, in my opinion. Note one seemingly inconsequential detail: The outgoing rules ended with provisions concerning the primary party organization, but the new ones open with it. This is by no means an editorial caprice. It is a democratic reality. We are inverting the "pyramid" from the apex to the base, as it were, bringing it into more stable balance, which is indeed based primarily on the primary organizations as the basis of the party.

Figuratively speaking, this postulate has long been on our church calendar, but has arisen indeed and has been operating only in perestroyka. The decentralization of the state and economic structures cannot fail to require the decentralization of social and political life. So it is that the primary party organization has moved front stage. It will now itself be its own housekeeper—from replenishment with fresh forces and determination of their structures through disposal of a significant amount of the finances. It has been accorded here most-favored-nation status, so to speak, to be able to influence the higher party authorities. Further, here also the primary party organization has freedom of maneuver if account is taken of the possibility of it determining the nature, procedures, and aims of such a move "upward" itself and also the fact, entirely new for us, that its minority also now has this right.

In a word, whereas in the past the rules proceeded from dogmatic tenets and speculative outlines, now they are fed by the sap of reality, including from such sources as the experience of foreign communist parties. But we are not retreating from the principle of democratic centralism in its Leninist understanding, an inevitable condition of which is freedom of opinions—unity of action. Argue as much as you like, but as long as a decision is in force, be so kind as to comply with it. It is with good reason that they used to say in Rus: "The mind has its doubts, but the hands will do it." The arbitrary suspension of collective thought multiplied if only by some party organizations could cause a paralysis of collective will. But we need this in the present, extraordinarily crucial transitional period of society more than ever. We cannot, do not have the right to place it on the altar either of misunderstood comradeship or self-seekingly interpreted collectivism. Comradeship and collectivism and will to victory and discipline are, I profoundly believe, two aspects of a single process of the democratization of the party and society. Disturb this balance, and the "pyramid" begins to tilt....

[Ostrovskiy] One frequently hears now the proposal that the party organizations be removed beyond the framework of enterprises and establishments and military units and that a multiparty system lies ahead. The draft rules envisage the creation of primary organizations at the place of work. At what is this proposal aimed, do you think?

[Manayenkov] Only a blind man or political ignoramus fails to see what ends are pursued by those calling for the party to withdraw from the masses. Dazzled by power, attractive from a distance and seductively desirable, they, like the Liberal Democratic Party, for instance, which has only just made its presence known, are sowing the poisonous seeds of society's de-ideologization. Where, which country is free of ideology? To what end? A contaminated seed does not germinate, but hallowed ground does not, as is known, stand empty. The zealots of "de-ideologization" arrive here in good time, but with their ideological basket.

No, we should not be quitting the masses but should be going into the masses even more, even more assertively—at the place of service and at the place of residence and work, through the efforts of the local party

components included—focusing, honing, and stimulating ideological activity as much as possible and confronting the attempts to portray it as a communist "sin" and render it amorphous and nonviable. The party is threatened not by self-realization but self-elimination. This is what dictates the actions of our political opponents. But we have no intention of playing along with them.

[Ostrovskiy] In what way will the activity of the CPSU Central Committee itself be democratized in accordance with the new draft rules?

[Manayenkov] Well, first, the future successor of the Politburo—the CPSU Central Committee Presidium—will be accountable to the plenum. And on a systemic basis, not less than once a year, what is more. It will be empowered to act, as now, on its own behalf, but what has not been the case since the times of V.I. Lenin—it will reach agreement on the most fundamental political issues once again with the broad composition of Central Committee members, who will have the final say.

This is extraordinarily democratic. And it is highly apropos that the Central Committee secretaries will to an ever greater extent rely on a commission as an elective structure.

I make so bold as to maintain that the seemingly not so democratic restrictive "thresholds," such as the obligatory 10 years of party service for bureau members and co-chairmen of the Central Control and Auditing Commission, will also ultimately lead us to a new democratic height. The unchecked leaching from a political organization of the stratum of personnel enriched with traditions would be like washing away its intellectual foundation. Both we and foreign parties have been convinced of this. The critical boundary where, in place of the latter, there is extremism, rash political ambitions and other destructive "material," whose presence causes a counterflow—sluggishness, conservatism, and immunity from being fired for incompetency—is approaching. And the sum total here—instability. It is ruinous for democracy. A particular feature of the draft new rules is that they offer and guarantee an anti-relapse mechanism. The final verdict will be given by practice, but the basis for this, it seems to me, exists.

[Ostrovskiy] What, in your opinion, do the draft CPSU Rules imply by the words "observance of party ethics?"

[Manayenkov] The party ethics concept took shape historically—through theoretical work, practice, moral experience, and the personal example of the revolutionaries and their predecessors. But not only these. If we recall V.I. Lenin's inspired words to the effect that it is only possible to become a revolutionary when one has enriched one's memory with knowledge of all the riches which mankind has produced, it is perfectly obvious that our ethics have roots in the whole people. Those who are vainly attempting to divert their rivulets are acting slyly—like the Volga, the former have imbibed many streams and are of universal value. But the rapids of these ethics are, naturally, the moral past and present of the party itself and its precursor. The altruism of the Decembrists, the "civil punishment" of Chernyshevskiy, the courageous stoicism of Sergey Lazo.... If we are dialecticians, we have to recall other things here also—the Kamenev and Zinovyev "October episode," the treachery of secret service agent Malinovskiy, the Jesuitical many-faced Stalin.... In the struggle between political morality and its direct opposites there is also an answer to your question. Party ethics according to V.I. Lenin is when moral authority is higher than formal authority, it is the responsibility of each party member to the whole party, consciousness of revolutionary duty, discipline, mutual assistance, mutual trust and courage, that is, as it has been expressed, "so that party-mindedness be not only a word but action."

This demand is exceptionally pertinent today also, and it was with good reason that the 27th party congress proclaimed a campaign "for the pure and honest character of the party member." But in the context of our times, when not only the Babel of opinions but of ideas too is swelling, this is evidently more complex. Political degenerates and migrants have emerged who, having found their feet thanks to the party, while exploiting the authority of the party, are tripping it up. Therefore, in this situation party ethics should mean the possibility of the healthy forces not letting them off, grabbing them by the arm when they make the party an object of bargaining and, in certain cases, dissociating from them. The party will gain its second wind and will win new authority when its rules and program have authority and when their letter and spirit are impeccably sustained.

CPSU Said 'Frozen in One-Party Torpor'

PM1804154090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 15 Apr 90 p 3

[Vitally Tretyakov article: "One-Party Stupor"]

[Text] A spectre is haunting the country—the spectre of a multiparty system. A question has been posed on the practical plane of the possibility of the Democratic Platform bcoming an independent structure even before the 28th CPSU Congress. The central newspapers recently reported the establishment in Moscow of two new parties—the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement—describing the events as if they were everyday occurrences.

Not phantoms from dissident dreams, but real seats in a real multiparty system. Why then did I begin with a passage about a spectre? Because reality is seen in this ghostly shape by people and politicians who have been become hardened in a one-party torpor and who have continued living and acting by the principles of the one-party mentality in the sixth year of perestroyka with its radical new face.

The CPSU's internal piolicy has remained a one-party policy, thereby creating problems both for itself and for society as a whole. The most indicative in this sense is

the "Lithuanian knot". If we are to believe a recent opinion poll, the most popular politician in Lithuania is not Landsbergis, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, but Brazauskas, head of the independent Communist Party of Lithuania. In the tone in which the results of this poll were announced by the central mass media one could feel some reproach at the Lithuanian legislators—why did you elect wrong person to the Republic's chief post? But was the reproach properly addressed? At the close of last year, when Brazauskas saw that a multiparty system had become a reality in the Republic and tried to respond to the situation and place an independent Communist Party at the head of perestroika in Lithuania, he was showered with accusations from Moscow. Now Moscow would only be too glad to see the "rebel Communist" Brazauskas at the head of the Republic, but it's too late. Such is the price of self-delusion—moreover, one that is forcibly inculcated in those who take a more sober look at the political situation.

As I see it, it's up to the inhabitants of Lithuania to decide who has the moral and political right to be at the head of the Republic—the leader of Sajudis or the leader of the communists. But those in Moscow who wished the latter, it appears, did all they could to "lose" the game of their own free will.

The one-party mentality is a bureaucratic mentality. When the armed forces are used to help "liberate" disputed buildings, no legal excuses will convince the contending parties (which have no power to control the soldiers) that our army serves society as a whole and not just one party identifying itself with the state. It is but one step to the conclusion that the army is being used as an instrument in an internal political struggle, which mustn't be the case in a democratic state. And the opposite can never be proved.

Now that I listen to many CPSU members arguing in pre-congress discussions what portion of membership dues should be left to local organizations, or whether it is enough to have a City Party Committee instead of the City Party Comnmittee with District Party Committees, thereby cutting down the Party apparat, I feel that the participants in these discussions are still living in a dream-world. Not only have they not heard of what has happened in East and Central European countries, but they don't even know what is happening in their own country, don't understand that a multiparty system is inevitable, whereas the institution of the presidency of the USSR will sooner or later presuppose that whoever holds the post of President should belong to no party. The political conventionalities of the present-day transition period, requiring that some traditional, now even purely ritual gestures and phrases be kept intact, will soon recede into the past, carrying along those who still cling to symbols as the only political reality.

An old maxim: in bag races victory goes not to the one who runs better, but to the one who runs better in a bag. We were better able than the others to run in the bag of a one-party system, but now victory will go to him who can run best not in a bag, but unhindered. The Communist Party can be preserved in a Soviet-presidential political structure not by Communists who are frozen in one-party torpor, but by those who are already prepared to act in the conditions of a multiparty system. And here it's no longer possible to simply reassign Party buildings which used to be on the balance sheets of the Soviets to the balance sheets of the CPSU. The property of the Party is not the most important thing for the Party. Property is the main element only in a party which has fused with the state.

For all of its tragic consequences for perestroika, the Lithuanian problem is a useful signal from the not-too-distant future. The new local, and even republican Soviets, and new parties in the Republics in the USSR as a whole are about to start functioning on the principle of a multiparty sysem. Something new and unusual for those frozen in a one-party torpor is about to be born of the "one-party" CPSU.

It is about time to contrast the talks about the spectre of a multiparty system with a realistic internal policy, taking stock of the multiparty system as the fundamental basis of our new mode of life.

Opinion Poll Shows Growing Criticism of CPSU

PM1804154690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 15, 15 Apr 90 p 7

[Yuriy Levada and Leonid Gudkin report: "The People's Voice. Sociological Poll on the State of Things in the Party"]

[Text] In February 1990 the All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion repeated its last year's public opinion poll dealing with the population's assessment of the CPSU's role and the situation in the Party. Questions were put to 2,500 persons in selected localities all over the Soviet Union.

The decline in the CPSU's prestige was noted by 80.7 per cent of those polled. Mistrust in the Party was likewise growing. Whereas the share of those who fully trusted the CPSU practically didn't change during the year (21-27 per cent), the percentage of those who totally mistrusted the Party was steadily growing—from 23 per cent in March to 35 per cent. Views on the situation in the Party became conspicuously more critical: in the opinion of 40 per cent a split was in the offing, whereas 34 per cent maintained that the CPSU was in the process of disintegration. Nearly half of those polled believed that the Party had lost the initiative and had no appreciable influence on social changes. Aspersion was cast not only on the Party's political capabilities as a whole, but also on its goals and general ideological guide-posts. Fifty-one per cent of those polled said that the CPSU's aims as expressed in its Programme were either unattainable or had lost their topicality and were at variance with the Party's practical activities.

Upwards of 60 per cent fully or partially agreed that the Party had led the country along a wrong path and almost 90 per cent said that its errors had arrested the country's development. There were various views on the responsibility of the leadership and the Party rank-and-file: more than two-thirds of the population put the blame for the country's crisis on the leadership (37 per cent on former leaders, 29 per cent on present-day leaders), 17.4 per cent believed that the blame for present-day difficulties had to be put on the Party as a whole, including its rank-and-file members; 10.9 per cent said that the sources of the present-day impasse stemmed from the ideologues of socialism.

Social memory of the role and prestige of the CPSU is almost exclusively linked to those periods illumined by the aura of state heroism. Sixty-two per cent agree that our country could not have become a great power without the CPSU. More often than not public opinion refers the peak of the Party's prestige to the period of the revolution and the Civil War (39 per cent), the Patriotic War and subsequent years (25 per cent), the Party's role being mentioned less often in the years of the first five-year plans (18 per cent) and before the revolution (13 per cent). But then very few people (2-4 per cent) underscord its prestige in the period of NEP, Khrushchev's thaw, stagnation and perestroyka. The closer mass experience draws to the present day, the lower the score.

Therefore one can hardly be surprised by the attitude towards Party bodies voiced in public opinion: in the opinion of the bulk of those polled (76.3 per cent), Party committees and Party organizations in factories and offices mainly stand up for the interests of the administration and constitute an instrument for implementing the decisions of higher Party officials. A mere 5.8 per cent believe that they reflect the will and opinion of the rank-and-file. Naturally, membership in the Party is often perceived as a career "elevator" ("Communists are more in a position to advance towards higher posts"—33 per cent), as a condition for promotion in the line of service, for getting access to privileges and benefits (26 per cent). Only 3 per cent of those polled believe that Communists work better and are more active in production.

Only 20 per cent accepted the view about the need to disband the Party whereas more than half (52 per cent) disagreed. One-fifth of those polled were sure that the Party was still a real cementing force in our society, another 37 per cent partially agreed with this (34 per cent disagreed.)

Opinions about the need to preserve the Party structures in production and in management bodies were sharply divided: 42 per cent believed that Party bodies were unnecessary and had to be abolished, 38.4 per cent said that they could be preserved provided the Party's activities were considerably reorganized.

Almost a third of those polled believe that the CPSU must fight for political influence on an equal footing with other parties. Relatively few (20 per cent) maintain that the Party must interfere less in social life, and 12.3 per cent feel that trust in the CPSU cannot be re-established.

Strengthening the population's trust in the Party is associated by 37 per cent with the need to purge its ranks, with full publicity at Party Congresses and plenary meetings, with declassifying the Party archives (22 per cent). Only a quarter agree that Party discipline should be taught at institutions of higher learning. The majority (56.2 per cent) maintains that this is necessary only for those who would like to study such disciplines.

What is interesting is public opinion about the position of Communists elected to different bodies by the people. A deputy is primarily answerable not to Party officials, but to his electors (the view of 58.4 per cent) or to his civic conscience and duty (35 per cent). Today there are few who insist on the need to give precedence to the fulfilment of Party decisions - 8.8 per cent.

The public takes a close look at what is happening in the Party and who speaks on its behalf. Among Party leaders the most trusted figure is Mikhail Gorbachev (54 per cent), Nikolay Ryzhkov (38 per cent), Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (12 per cent each). The largest number of negative ratings are received by Yegor Ligachev (30 per cent), Boris Yeltsin (11 per cent) and Mikhail Gorbachev (9 per cent).

Views on Foreign Travel Revealed in Opinion Poll

PM1804164090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 15, 10-16 Apr 90 p 2

[Letter from Liliya Kazakova, Chief of the Sociological and Marketing Research Department, the Ekonovatsiya Center: "Are Our Fears Justified?"]

[Text] The Sociological Association of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and the All-Union Cinema and Television Centre has conducted a nation-wide poll on the draft law "On the right of the Soviet citizens to leave and to enter the U.S.S.R." and on its role in the creation of a truly "open society."

The questions were put to 1,000 people belonging to different sections of the population in the union republics.

93.6 percent of those polled believe that the rule of leaving and entering the U.S.S.R. must fully correspond to international norms and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Only 3.1 percent are of the opinion that these rules can have a specific character in the case of each country.

To the question "Can the freedom of movement trigger off wide-spread emigration feelings?" over half of those surveyed gave a negative answer. The percentage of those who thought otherwise—35.5 percent—was also large.

So what, in the view of Soviet citizens, prevents them from making trips abroad—i.e. hampers their freedom of travel which is stipulated in article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? Here are the most common variants of answers.

Restrictions imposed by the authorities—43.5 percent.
Complexity of document-related formalities—39.7 percent.
Limited financial means coupled with steep prices for tickets and vouchers—60.3 percent.
Limited choice of tourist trips—8.2 percent.
Lack of information on travel possibilities—13.7 percent.

Especially negative was the reaction to the paragraph in the draft law stating that an "exit visa for a private trip may be denied in the interests of the maintenance of public order and the protection of health and morals of the population". The overwhelming majority of those polled are convinced that this paragraph infringes upon human rights.

Opinions are divided over the provision that "permission to leave the U.S.S.R. for permanent residence abroad can be withheld because of unfulfilled obligations before the state." About half of those questioned are in favour of deleting this paragraph, while 36.2 percent support it.

54.5 percent of those surveyed are strongly opposed to the paragraph: "The U.S.S.R. citizens going abroad for permanent residence cannot exchange their personal savings into foreign currency". Only 13.3 percent think it should be retained.

The overwhelming majority—80.7 percent—hold the view that trips abroad to gather material for creative work as well as tourist, business and any other trip must be a norm for everyone. 87.8 percent would like to have open-visa passports and be able to travel abroad at any time. The absolute majority welcome the possibility to study abroad.

KGB Operation Against Moscow 'Racketeers' Cited

LD1904040890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2100 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Presenter Yuriy Rostov] The next report is illustrated by KGB film which we have just received. A gang of Moscow racketeers known as the Horde has been smashed. They controlled Kuntsevo, Sokolniki, Perovo, and Kiev Districts. They also tried to take over the Hippodrome.

[Reporter S. Milyanchikov, identified by screen caption] According to the police log, about 30 people gathered near the Hippodrome's Hotel Bega at 11 pm on 14 January. The burly men were quite well equipped. They had knives, hatchets, axes, [word indistinct], steel rods, crowbars, and CS-gas canisters. The purpose of the gathering was to decide on a new division of spheres of influence at the Moscow Hippodrome. The gang put up fierce resistance before being detained. Citizen (Batynkin) has been charged with illegal possession of a weapon. Seven persons were held in custody for 15 days.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified official] Within three days of being released after those 15 days in custody, they reassembled in exactly the same place in order to examine once again the division of spheres of influence at the races, to decide who would deal with the tote, who would deal directly with race-goers, and who would deal with the jockeys. [end recording]

[Milyanchikov] The downfall of the horde, which fortunately did not become Golden, came quickly. On 20 March, roundups and arrests were carried out. As a result, eight Army walkie-talkies, 20 knives and a large quantity of CS-gas canisters were confiscated. Militia personnel are holding R55,000 in cash and valuables worth over R200,000. Eight persons have been arrested and charged. All those arrested are unemployed. Three hold previous convictions. Those detained include the leader of the gang, (Yusipov).

Investigation of the criminal gang is continuing. When it is completed, the Horde will appear in court. [video shows group of men, one of whom appears to have his hands handcuffed behind his back. A pistol, a knife, an axe, and other objects are on display on a table. A man with his hands in the air is searched; shot of police car with flashing light]

Economic

Presidential Council Member on Economic Reform

PM1904133690 Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Apr 90 p 21

[Interview with Stanislav Shatalin, member of the USSR Presidential Council, by Francoise Lazare—date not given]

[Text] [Lazare] What is the USSR's main economic problem now?

[Shatalin] Here, all problems can be described as the main problem. But, if we try to select one we see that there is the agricultural problem, and hence the problem of land reform, and the food crisis. The level of development in our rural districts is worthy of the Middle Ages. The second problem is what I call gangsterism. Parallel networks are being developed. The situation is very worrying as regards supply, public health, and infrastructures. The exploitation of resources is not efficient and the administrative system has not been changed.

There is also the nationalities question. We need a new contract between the republics, the redefinition of their rights in the sphere of supply for instance. The chauvinist spirit has become very powerful. Russophiles are

struggling for the renewal of Russia, but it is impossible to solve problems at the expense of the other ethnic groups.

[Lazare] What does the "radicalization of the economic reforms" mean?

[Shatalin] We want to strengthen the transition to the market economy—a regulated, carefully controlled, and socially protected economy. In this sphere, we can learn a great deal from the French experience. There is the reform of wholesale prices and the reform of retail prices. In particular we will increase the price of food products. Rents will also have to correspond more closely to market laws, as will the prices of services. Of course, there will be social benefits, but they must only go to those who need them most—students, old people, large families....

We also have a law on private ownership. But it deals badly with the question of private ownership. There are far too many limits, in particular the principle of the nonexploitation of workers' labor. These conclusions are purely demagogic and are likely to hold back the economy. I would like to repeal that law. I want to defend employers, otherwise we will mark time. But I am also opposed to monetary reform. If you plunder the population you do not get radical reform but a "radical grave."

[Lazare] Are there reservations among the population and within the Presidential Council?

[Shatalin] There are many, too many. The population's attitude toward the market is now negative. There is great social paralysis. We must do all we can to prepare public opinion. In the newspapers and on television, we must explain everything to the population, say that poverty awaits us. The president must address the country.

[Lazare] Will there soon be more private enterprises?

[Shatalin] Yes. But over the years we have forgotten how to find entrepreneurs. Instead of criticizing the current participants in the black economy, their energy must be channeled into legal production. There are millionaires here who are intelligent. We must introduce progressive taxation. When there are real employers and a coherent economic system, there must be an adequate tax system. I am in favor of high taxes, because I regard myself as a social democrat.

[Lazare] Can the convertibility of the ruble be achieved quickly?

[Shatalin] Perhaps. We must rely on Western credit, improve financial networks, and increase the quality of production. Only then can we talk about the convertibility of the ruble. We will be able to use our gold and oil reserves to achieve that convertibility. In two or three years' time, we can halt the ruble's fall.

Meaning of Socioeconomic Indicators Viewed

904A0287A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 14, 4 Apr 90 p 10

[Report from LITERATURNAYA GAZETA division of economics and science: "The Economy: Tomorrow's Forecast"]

[Text] **PROFIT**

January 1990 (in percentages of January 1989):

Production of consumer goods—+5.6
Including: food—+3.1
Industrial goods—+6
Alcoholic beverages—+10.9
Monetary incomes of the population—+14.8
Growth of deposits from population in USSR Savings Bank—+16.3
Gross milk yield—+3
Production of animal fat—+6
Production of granulated sugar—+59
Production of soap and detergents—+12-14
Production of galvanic cells—+15
Production of pantyhose—+31
Production of excavators—+21
Production of metal rolling equipment—+42

The current frankness of statistics is stunning. In the times of stagnation we knew that the figures in the reports would tell us only about either successes or achievements or, for variety, about labor victories, and people simply paid no attention to the figures. But not now that the floodgates of the State Committee for Statistics are almost completely open and we are being inundated by information about the number of feed kitchens, rolling mills, rapes, and other components of the turbulent modern existence. So much information is published and its significance differs so much that it seems we have managed to go to the other extreme and now because of a surplus of information (whereas previously it was because of the shortage of it) we still do not have a very good idea of the state of affairs in the economy.

The editors intend to bring at least relative clarity to the relationship of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA readers with statistics. We ourselves will regularly look over economic surveys, reports, and summaries of the State Committee for Statistics, we will select the most important and eloquent information from them, we will familiarize you with them, and together with you we will figure out what they really mean. Is the decline continuing or are things beginning to look up? What problems (or, who knows, maybe improvements) do the dry statistical data promise us for tomorrow?

First about macroeconomic indicators. During the year—from January 1989 through January 1990—such extremely important, key, one might say, parameters of the economy as the national income, productivity of public labor, and volume of production in industry, simultaneously decreased by one percent. This is a

general and indisputable sign of a decline which our economy is now experiencing; it is possible to compare it with a reduction of the output in a living organism of a vitally important substance—say, blood. Moreover, the blood has significantly slowed up its movement through the vessels, for the volume of cargo turnover has decreased.

But some of the "macro" indicators have increased—for example, the production of consumer goods (the statistics honestly add: in retail prices). We have produced a large sum of food and industrial goods, but one is especially struck by the increase in alcoholic beverages, this marking the inglorious end to another campaign. The monetary incomes of the population have jumped much higher. If production had increased that much we would be in first place in the world in terms of the rates of development of our economy, but so far we can count only in a high position with respect to the rates of savings in the Savings Bank; that is, the pent-up demand of the citizens. This debt is no less proof than the waiting lines and the outburst of speculation that the actual production of many goods in pieces, meters, kilograms, and liters could be shifted from the left column to the right.

In general there are interesting things in finance. Last year there were stormy debates about the budget deficit, and it was agreed to reduce it by 60 billion rubles—do you remember that? It did not happen, it was reduced by only 14 billion, and the rest went for investments in rural areas, conversion, "and so forth." There were also large arguments about taxes, do you remember? As a result the tax revenue decreased...from the enterprises. And it increased by almost the same amount...from the population! This means that during all of last year the population was zealously fleeced both by the state (through the excise and other taxes) and by the Savings Bank (through the negative, if you count inflation, interest on their deposits), and by the speculators and bribe takers of all stripes. And deposits in the Savings Bank during January alone increased by R4.3 billion! And all because through the cashiers' windows the flood of freshly printed notes that are not backed up by useful labor continues to flow and even grow, and so far nothing has changed as a result of the speeches of the deputies, the newspaper articles, or even the famous "three-percent" decree.

Things are so-so with the introduction of housing—you can see this both from the figures in the reports and from the movement of the actual waiting list for apartments. Even worse is the fact that this January we constructed about one-seventh of the planned monthly volume of dwelling space and one-tenth to one-twentieth the volume of schools, kindergartens, and polyclinics! Is this not cause for the Committee for Construction to raise a ruckus in the Supreme Soviet? But no, no ruckus is to be heard regarding this...

Our miracles and mysteries with food continue. Again we are investing more money in the agricultural complex than before, but there is less technical equipment in operation there, the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] have also produced less meat than they did the year before last, and even the hens, for some reason, are not laying as well. More milk was produced, but fewer dairy products went to the trade network and this means that it was not consumption that increased as it should have, but the losses, which were enormous to begin with. We produced six percent more butter, but we bought and ate six percent less than the year before! Did it go for export? To whom? Why?

We have not yet found it possible to balance deficits in our planned economy. We have made a sudden start in the production of granulated sugar and progress with soap powder and batteries, but we have reduced the production of motorcycles, for example, and...pencils, not to mention cigarettes. Robbing Peter to pay Paul? Thus we increased excavator production by 21 percent, but they will not be digging anything because we have no large construction projects, and how many more motorcycles could we have produced instead! In brief, another year has confirmed the well-known truth that a centralized, completely state economy in principle operates in DEFICIT.

LOSSES

January 1990 (in percentages of January 1989):

Volume of industrial output—1
National income—1
Productivity of public labor—1
Volume of cargo turnover—4.6
Introduction of housing—2
Number of tractors on the farms—1.9
Meat production on kolkhozes and sovkhozes—2
Egg laying of hens on kolkhozes and sovkhozes—5
Dairy products sent to the trade network—1
(including animal fat)—6
Production of motorcycles—4
Production of pencils—11
Production of cigarettes—3
Production of shaving cream—17

The decline is continuing. Our hope lies in new economic relations established by the new laws on ownership and land and in the presidential power which is the only thing capable of introducing these laws into the gigantic thick layers of our economic life.

And in conclusion—profit, with which nobody is happy (in percentages of January 1989).

Crimes committed while intoxicated—+20
Premeditated murders and murder attempts—+27
Thefts of fire arms—+240

1989 Foreign Trade Data Reported

90UF0067A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 15, Apr 90 Supplement pp 3-4

[Article by V. Seltsovskiy, candidate of economic sciences and chief specialist of the USSR Ministry of

Foreign Economic Relations: "USSR Foreign Trade in 1989: A Statistical Review"]

[Text] The USSR's foreign economic relations in recent years have been developing in conditions of an expansion in the number of ministries, departments, enterprises, and organizations carrying out export-import operations.

Whereas in 1986 these organizations and enterprises accounted for R1.5 billion, or 1.1 percent of the USSR's total foreign trade turnover, in 1987 they accounted for R25.6 billion, or 20 percent of the USSR's total volume of foreign trade, and in 1988, the figure was R47 billion, or 36 percent.

The number of participants in the USSR's foreign economic ties at the end of 1989 was about 12,000. In 1989, the ministries, organizations, and departments accomplishing export-import operations directly accounted for R56.6 billion, or 40.3 percent of the country's total volume of foreign trade, including 30.5 percent of the exports and 49.6 percent of the imports. Up to 77 percent of the USSR's machinery, equipment, and transports were exported to the foreign market by their producers.

In the past year we managed to change the negative trend in the dynamics of USSR exports. Thus, whereas in 1986-1988 exports decreased in value by an average of 2.6 percent, in 1989 they increased by 2.4 percent compared to 1988, amounting to R68.8 billion. The physical volume of exports also increased by 1.1 percent.

Table 1. USSR Foreign Trade Turnover in Current Prices and 1985 Prices (billions of rubles)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
USSR trade turnover					
in prices of corresponding years	142.1	130.9	128.9	132.1	140.9
in 1985 prices	142.1	145.5	147.0	151.9	158.6
Indexes, in percent (1985 is 100 percent)					
cost index (rate of growth in current prices	100	92.1	90.7	93.0	99.1
index of physical volume	100	102.3	103.5	106.9	111.6
average price index	100	90.0	87.6	87.0	88.8
Exports					
in prices of corresponding years	72.7	68.3	68.2	67.1	68.8
in 1985 prices	72.7	79.4	81.5	84.2	84.8
Indexes, in percent (1985 is 100 percent)					
cost index (rate of growth in current prices)	100	94.1	93.8	92.4	94.6
index of physical volume	100	109.3	112.2	115.9	116.7
average price index	100	86.1	83.6	79.7	81.1
Imports					
in prices of corresponding year	69.4	62.6	60.7	65.0	72.1
in 1985 prices	69.4	66.1	65.5	67.7	73.8
Indexes, in percent (1985 is 100 percent)					
cost index (rate of growth in current prices)	100	90.1	87.5	93.7	103.9
index of physical volume	100	95.1	94.4	97.5	106.3
average price index	100	94.7	92.7	96.1	97.7
Indexes of USSR trade conditions in 12th Five-Year Plan, in percent (1985 is 100 percent)[1]	100	90.9	90.2	82.9	83.0

[1]Index of trade conditions is the ratio of the index of average export prices to the index of average import prices.

Following a sharp drop in 1986 and 1987, USSR imports increased by 10.9 percent and reached R72.1 billion. The physical volume of imports increased by 8 percent during this period. The considerably greater increase of imports over exports resulted in the USSR having a negative foreign-trade balance for the first time in 14 years, amounting to R3.4 billion.

Table 2. Distribution of USSR Foreign Trade (billions of rubles)

	1988	1989
Total		
Turnover	132.1	140.9
Exports	67.1	68.8

Imports	65.0	72.1
Socialist countries		
Turnover	86.2	86.9
Exports	42.8	42.3
Imports	43.4	44.6
CEMA member countries		
Turnover	78.9	78.6
Exports	39.1	38.0
Imports	39.8	40.6
Developed capitalist countries		
Turnover	31.0	36.9
Exports	14.7	16.4
Imports	16.3	20.5
Developing countries		
Turnover	14.9	17.1
Exports	9.6	10.1
Imports	5.3	7.0

On the whole, during the 4 years of the current 5-year plan, foreign trade turnover was reduced by 0.9 percent (compared to 1985); exports decreased by 5.4 percent, and imports increased by 3.9 percent. Such movement in trade turnover in the current 5-year plan is caused primarily by a serious worsening of conditions for selling goods on the world market, associated with the decrease in prices for fuel and raw materials and certain other goods, particularly energy resources, and also by the drop in the dollar exchange rate.

In physical volume (in 1985 prices), the USSR's foreign trade turnover in 1989 increased by 11.8 percent compared to 1985, including a 16.7 percent increase in exports, and a 6.3 percent increase in imports.

During the three preceding 5-year plans (1971-1985), the USSR received an additional R67.3 billion as a result of an improvement in trade conditions (export price increases outpacing import price increases). As a result, the import capabilities of Soviet foreign trade increased substantially.

In the 4 years of the current 5-year plan, the USSR's total losses from worsening trade conditions compared to 1985 were R44.8 billion, including R14.3 billion in 1989, which noticeably decreased the country's import capabilities.

In 1989, the Soviet Union traded with more than 140 countries.

The socialist countries accounted for the greatest portion of the USSR's trade turnover—61.7 percent.

The CEMA member-countries' share in the USSR's trade turnover was 55.8 percent in 1989, compared to 59.7 percent in 1988.

Such European CEMA member-countries as the GDR, CSSR, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary are the USSR's largest trading partners. In 1989, these five countries' share was almost half of all the USSR's foreign trade turnover with foreign countries.

Foreign trade turnover with developed capitalist countries increased by 19.1 percent in 1989 compared to 1988 (by 6.6 percent in physical volume). This group of countries accounted for 26 percent of the USSR's foreign trade turnover compared to 23.4 percent the preceding year.

Table 3. USSR Trade Turnover with Socialist Countries (millions of rubles)

Country	1988			1989		
	Turnover	Exports	Imports	Turnover	Exports	Imports
CEMA member-countries						
Bulgaria	12,966.8	6,093.7	6,873.1	13,477.6	6,170.5	7,307.1
Hungary	9,427.5	4,484.3	4,943.2	9,001.0	4,187.7	4,813.3
Vietnam	1,782.2	1,393.6	388.6	1,910.6	1,390.9	519.7
GDR	14,217.6	7,193.2	7,024.4	13,837.9	6,662.5	7,175.4
Cuba	7,563.6	3,726.8	3,836.8	7,700.5	3,833.5	3,867.0
Mongolia	1,537.0	1,130.8	406.2	1,402.5	1,005.2	397.3
Poland	13,407.3	6,298.0	7,109.3	13,180.4	5,770.6	7,409.8
Romania	4,775.3	2,344.1	2,431.2	5,170.0	2,681.3	2,488.7
Czechoslovakia	13,201.9	6,384.6	6,817.3	12,865.2	6,255.4	6,609.8
Other socialist countries						
Yugoslavia	3,841.2	1,693.8	2,147.4	4,331.9	1,926.4	2,405.5
China	1,850.1	1,005.2	844.9	2,412.0	1,328.5	1,083.5
DPRK	1,601.7	1,062.2	539.5	1,502.0	940.5	561.5
Laos	86.0	74.6	11.4	89.3	73.7	15.6

The USSR's main trade partners among developed capitalist countries are: the FRG—4.7 percent of the USSR's total foreign trade turnover; Finland—2.8 percent; Japan—2.5 percent; Italy—2.5 percent; France—1.8 percent; Great Britain—2.3 percent; the United States—2.4 percent; Austria—1.0 percent; Belgium—0.9 percent; Switzerland—1.0 percent; and the Netherlands—1.0 percent. These 11 countries accounted for 87 percent of the USSR's total foreign trade turnover with developed capitalist countries.

Table 4. USSR Trade Turnover with Developed Capitalist Countries (millions of rubles)

Country	1988			1989		
	Turnover	Exports	Imports	Turnover	Exports	Imports
FRG	5,628.5	2,397.2	3,231.3	6,554.7	2,478.3	4,076.4
Finland	3,717.0	1,528.7	2,188.3	3,885.6	1,758.8	2,126.8
Japan	3,135.1	1,184.2	1,950.9	3,481.0	1,343.0	2,138.0
Italy	3,034.3	1,691.2	1,343.1	3,526.4	1,920.1	1,606.3
France	2,768.8	1,578.9	1,189.9	2,567.0	1,348.6	1,218.4
Great Britain	2,417.2	1,794.1	623.1	3,217.8	2,208.7	1,009.1
USA	2,104.1	331.5	1,772.6	3,392.9	527.7	2,865.2
Austria	1,166.6	454.9	711.7	1,434.1	429.6	1,004.5
Belgium	1,147.3	771.3	376.0	1,326.7	817.2	509.5
Switzerland	1,177.5	404.9	772.6	1,404.5	416.4	988.1
Netherlands	934.7	656.8	277.9	1,410.2	971.7	438.5

Trade turnover with developing countries in 1989 increased by 14.7 percent (by 11.6 in physical volume) compared to 1988. The structure of trade with them has not undergone any significant changes. The USSR's exports continue to be primarily in raw materials.

The USSR's largest trading partners among developing countries are (turnover in billions of rubles): India—2.9; Iraq—1.2; Syria—0.9; Turkey—0.8; Argentina—0.7; Afghanistan—0.6; Egypt—0.6; Algeria—0.3; Brazil—0.3; Nicaragua—0.2; and Ethiopia—0.2.

In 1988, machinery and equipment accounted for only 16.4 percent of the USSR's exports; fuel and energy and forestry products accounted for almost half of all exports.

In the USSR's trade with developed capitalist countries, on whose markets our country receives the bulk of its convertible currency, the structure of our exports still remains more unfavorable. Oil, petroleum products, gas, and forestry products account for approximately two-thirds of total exports to capitalist countries. Machinery and equipment accounted for only 3.2 percent (3.3 percent in 1988). For comparison, it should be noted that machine building products account for 30 percent of the world market in recent years.

The pronounced raw material orientation of Soviet exports in the current 5-year plan has intensified even more. The problem is that our country has partially compensated for the losses due to the decline in world prices by further increasing the volume of fuel and raw materials deliveries.

Table 5. Structure of USSR Exports (in percent)

Item	In Current Prices			In Comparable Prices		
	1985	1988	1989	1985	1988	1989
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Machinery, equipment, and transportation equipment	13.9	16.2	16.4	13.9	11.8	12.0
Fuel and electrical power	52.7	42.1	39.9	52.7	57.4	56.0
Ores and concentrates, metals, and metal products	7.5	9.5	10.5	7.5	7.2	7.8
Chemical products, fertilizers, and rubber	3.9	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.8	4.1
Timber and pulp and paper products	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	2.8	2.6
Textile raw materials and semimanufactures	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.2
Food flavoring products and raw material for their production	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.4
Manufactured consumer goods	2.0	2.8	2.6	2.0	2.2	2.0

It should be noted that lately, despite the introduction of a new organization of USSR foreign economic ties and many producers of machine-technology goods entering the foreign market, the export of machinery, equipment, and transportation equipment is developing extremely unfavorably. A continuing decline in the rate of increase of exports of these products is being observed.

Table 6. Exports of Individual Goods (millions of rubles)

Item	Unit of Measure	1988		1989	
		Amount	Sum	Amount	Sum
Machinery, equipment, transportation equipment	millions of tons	-	10,848.1	-	11,303.4
Bituminous coal (including furnace charge) and anthracite	millions of tons	39.4	1,271.6	37.5	1,243.9
Crude oil	millions of tons	144.2	14,511.0	127.3	13,074.7
Petroleum products	millions of tons	61.0	5,197.3	57.4	5,560.1
Natural gas	millions of rubles	-	5,837.3	-	6,127.5
Electrical power	millions of kilowatt-hours	38,920	1,123.6	39,253	1,113.6
Iron ore (including iron ore pellets)	millions of tons	43.1	695.6	40.8	666.1
Pig iron	millions of tons	6.1	474.6	6.5	524.9
Rolled ferrous metals	millions of tons	8.5	1,716.9	9.3	1,951.4
Chemical products	millions of rubles	-	1,219.5	-	1,255.4
Fertilizers and pesticides	millions of rubles	-	902.2	-	982.5
Cement	thousands of tons	2,223	41.7	1,762	36.6
Industrial wood (including wood chips)	millions of cubic meters	20.8	699.2	19.3	673.0
Lumber	millions of cubic meters	8.2	779.8	7.8	818.3
Paper	thousands of tons	695.2	242.9	667.9	237.2
Cardboard	thousands of tons	404.1	115.6	352.5	105.1
Cotton fiber	thousands of tons	731.2	873.3	790.7	920.7
Grain (other than groats)	thousands of tons	1,793	129.2	1,287	133.1
Vegetable oil	thousands of tons	140	51.5	138.7	50.9
Household sewing machines	thousands	135	7.9	82	5.8
Household refrigerators	thousands	1,341	130.4	1,130	109.6
Household clocks, including mechanisms	millions	17.0	99.3	15.7	90.6
Cameras	thousands	832	26.1	797	30.5
Televisions	thousands	1,231	251.2	1,090	242.2
Radio receivers	thousands	1,113	21.6	838	17.6

In the preceding 5-year plan, exports of machine-technology products increased by 26 percent, and the average rate of growth was 4.7 percent. In the 4 years of the current 5-year plan, exports of machinery and equipment have increased by 7.5 percent, and the average rate of growth was only 1.5 percent and by physical volume has not increased at all.

The main reason for this lies both in the imperfection of the existing economic incentives for exports and in the insufficient competitiveness of domestic machine-technology products.

The problem of exporting goods of the processing industry is not limited to the products of machine building. This also involves increasing the degree of industrial processing of natural raw materials.

Table 7. Proportion of Raw Materials and Products of Their Processing in the Value of Commodity Groups (in percent)

	1970	1980	1985	1988	1989
Fuel and products of its refining					
Solid fuel, oil, gas	66.2	70.3	74.1	76.2	74.1
Electrical power, petroleum products, coke by-products, petrochemicals, semifinished products for the aniline dye industry	30.9	28.9	25.1	22.7	24.9
Plastics and materials for their production, dyes and paint and varnish materials, camera film materials	2.9	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.0
Ferrous metals and products of its processing					
Ore, scrap, and ferrous metal waste, pig iron, ferroalloys	43.3	42.0	43.8	46.0	44.5
Rolled ferrous metals	49.1	51.5	48.9	46.9	49.4
Products of further reprocessing and high-grade rolled metal, pipes, cylinders, and hardware	7.6	6.4	7.2	7.1	6.1
Timber and products of its processing					
Round timber and lumber	72.3	68.9	61.5	61.9	61.6
Fiber board and wood particle board, plywood, match sticks, pulp, and products of the wood chemical industry	14.2	17.6	20.8	21.6	22.5
Paper, cardboard, furniture, matches	13.5	13.4	17.7	16.5	15.9
Textile raw materials and goods					
Textile raw materials and semimanufactures	81.9	87.9	85.3	79.7	77.7
All types of fabric (including sacks and burlap), thread	14.4	8.5	11.7	17.9	19.3
Clothing (other than leather and fur), linen, carpeting	3.7	3.6	3.0	2.4	3.0

Today, a large number of sectors of the national economy are deeply involved in producing products for export; in this regard, a number of them have a fairly high export quota. In particular, in 1989 the following (in physical terms in percentage of the total production volume) went to exports: automobiles—30.1; cotton fiber—29.7; potash fertilizers—28.8; cameras—27.9; refrigerators—26.6; oil—21; household clocks—19.4; nitrogen fertilizers—19; diesel fuel—18.6; and fuel gas—12.7. All this also helped bring in currency needed to purchase goods abroad that are very important to the country, but in some cases increased the deficit of exported goods on the domestic market.

As before, machinery, equipment, and transportation equipment accounted for the greatest share in the structure of our imports. Their imports in 1989 amounted to R27.7 billion, or 38.5 of all imports. During the 4 years of the current 5-year plan (1986-1989), imports of machinery and equipment amounted to R104.9 billion.

Table 8. Structure of USSR Imports (in percent)

	In Current Prices			In Comparable Prices		
	1985	1988	1989	1985	1988	1989
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Including:						
Machinery, equipment, and transportation equipment	37.1	40.9	38.5	37.1	37.1	34.5
Fuel and electrical power	5.3	4.4	3.0	5.3	7.2	4.8
Ores and concentrates, metals and products from them	8.3	8.0	7.3	8.3	7.6	6.9
Chemical products, fertilizers, and rubber	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.3

Lumber and pulp and paper products	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.1
Textile raw materials and semimanufactures	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.0	1.0
Food flavoring products and raw materials for their production	21.1	15.8	16.6	21.1	17.6	18.4
Manufactured consumer goods	12.6	12.8	14.4	12.6	12.8	14.7

Imports of machine-technology products have apparently reached the optimal proportion. Now it is extremely important to improve its structure by increasing the proportion of advanced and highly efficient types of machinery and equipment. First and foremost, this should be new equipment intended for the machine building sectors and other progressive sectors. For the time being, the proportion of deliveries of machinery and equipment for machine building in imports of machine building products remains low and in 1989 was only 8 percent.

Imports need to be streamlined, particularly in connection with the reduction of export revenues in recent years. Significant imports of those goods which are produced in large amounts in the USSR cannot be considered justified. As we know, the USSR ranks first in the world in the production of pig iron, steel, and rolled metal. Nevertheless, imports of rolled ferrous metal products and pipe in recent years has been increasing at a fairly high rate.

Table 9. USSR Imports of Individual Goods (millions of rubles)

Item	Unit of Measure	1988		1989	
		Amount	Sum	Amount	Sum
Machinery, equipment, and transportation equipment	millions of rubles	-	26,583.8	-	27,743.0
Rolled ferrous metals	millions of tons	5.3	1,382.5	4.4	1,336.0
Steel pipe	millions of ton	4.7	1,987.8	3.5	1,684.7
Chemical products	millions of rubles	-	1,655.8	-	2,070.6
Fertilizers and pesticides	millions of rubles	-	504.6	-	396.3
Rubber	thousands of tons	147.6	151.0	201.6	207.3
Lumber and pulp and paper products	millions of rubles	-	787.7	-	892.4
Paper	thousands of tons	506.8	321.1	604.8	391.1
Cotton fiber	thousands of tons	89.8	102.9	77.1	84.8
Grain (other than groats)	millions of tons	35.0	2,363.3	37.0	3,131.6
Soybeans	thousands of tons	1,350.0	180.1	872	162.1
Tea	thousands of tons	133.6	179.9	214.9	302.3
Natural coffee	thousands of tons	45.5	85.4	112.9	168.9
Unrefined sugar	millions of tons	4.1	2,751.1	5.0	2,812.6
Meat and meat products	thousands of tons	719.2	732.1	695.6	727.9
Fresh fruits and berries	thousands of tons	969.0	293.1	778	233.0
Fresh vegetables	thousands of tons	202.8	64.2	149.0	46.7

Canned vegetables	thousands of tons	447.0	213.1	349.0	165.0
Vegetable oil	thousands of tons	341.6	106.9	1,065.1	323.3
Butter	thousands of tons	440.5	201.7	247.1	260.9
Fish and fish products	thousands of tons	611.6	109.7	580.1	100.4
Wine and vodka products and nonalcoholic beverages	millions of rubles	-	224.0	-	272.5
Cotton and cotton-type fabrics	millions of meters	227.1	249.1	188.6	246.9
Silk and silk-type fabrics	millions of meters	76.0	125.1	93.5	268.3
Clothing and linen	millions of rubles	-	2,686.2	-	3,170.3
Knitted fabrics	millions of meters	-	715.3	-	847.5
Footwear	millions of pairs	149.0	1,178.4	167.8	1,376.1
Household furniture	millions of rubles	-	586.8	-	539.9
Soap	thousands of tons	7.9	9.9	228.8	150.3
Detergents and cleaning agents	thousands of tons	50.9	31.1	323.1	215.4
Medicines	millions of rubles	-	1,316.9	-	1,847.4

The role of foreign economic ties is considerable in developing the country's agro-industrial complex and in satisfying the Soviet people's need for food products.

In the 4 years of the current 5-year plan, goods amounting to R54.2 billion, including R15.2 billion in 1989 or 21 percent of the USSR's total imports, were purchased for development of the country's agro-industrial complex.

Although grain imports have decreased somewhat in recent years, they are still great; a considerable portion of them go for feed purposes. In this regard, resolving the problem of replacing part of the grain being imported by importing feed additives (vitamins, amino acids, nutrient yeasts, and enzymes) merits attention; it would increase the efficiency of livestock raising.

The percentage of imports in the consumption of individual food products by the population of our country in 1989, as in previous years, was considerable: 69.8 percent for dried fruits and berries; 35 percent for tea; 25.6 percent for vegetable oil; 25.4 percent for sugar; and 15.5 percent for grain.

Imports of manufactured consumer goods increased by R2.1 billion in 1989 compared to 1988 and amounted to R10.4 billion. By physical volume the rate of increase reached 23.2 percent.

The percentage of imports in the USSR's consumption in 1989 was sizable for a number of positions: medicines—28.2 percent; detergent and cleaning agents—22.7 percent; garments—21.6 percent; soap—18.5; furniture—10.7 percent; and footwear—8.3 percent.

Foreign economic ties made a definite contribution to the USSR's national income in 1989—according to preliminary data, about R60 billion, which is 9 percent of all national income used for accumulation and consumption.

Agricultural

Cold Snap Destroys Moldavian Fruit Crop

PM1804093990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Eduard Kondratov report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Minus 1.5 Billion"]

[Text] Kishinev—The state commission set up in connection with the natural disaster has established the scale of the damage done to the republic's agriculture by the cold airstreams which blew off the Carpathians onto Moldavia on the night of 9-10 April.

"A mere two to three degrees of frost, reaching seven to eight degrees in a number of rayons, caused serious damage to orchards and vineyards in bloom or just

finishing blooming," V. Russu, chairman of the state commission, said. "Stone fruits—sour and sweet cherries, apricots, and peaches—perished completely, while 60,000 hectares of vineyards, 63,000 hectares of apple orchards, and thousands of hectares of sugar beet, peas, and alfalfa suffered damage. As a result of the frost Moldavia has lost 1 million tonnes of fruit, that is 70 percent of the total crop. We have also lost one-third of the grapes—400,000 tonnes. The commission has established that the republic's outright losses as a result of the disaster total approximately R1.5 billion."

The commission is now organizing work to save damaged plants from dying—this means more fertilizer and further pruning, which could make it possible to salvage something.

It has been decided to urgently extend the areas under vegetable crops and even under tobacco—there must be something to make good of the damage; people must not be left without wages.

Agricultural Developments for 4-18 Apr Reported

LD1904024990

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow media from 4-18 April. Source and time of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parentheses at the end of each item.

4-11 April:

No significant developments reported.

12 April:

Kishinev April 12 TASS—Severe frosts on Monday night did widespread damage to Moldavian crops, especially orchards. Vineyards, sugar beet, vegetables and leguminous crops as well as lucerne were badly affected. According to preliminary data, approximately two-thirds of the vegetable and fruit harvest, as well as over a third of the grape harvest, perished. An ad hoc governmental commission has been formed to coordinate relief efforts. efforts. (Moscow TASS in English 1110 GMT 12 Apr 90)

13-18 April:

No significant developments reported.

Military

Yazov Expresses Need for Collective Security

LD1904131290 Moscow TASS in English 1120 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS - "The restoration of the complete truth about the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945, and detailed studies of its experience and lessons are of great educational, scientific as well as of practical importance," said Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov.

He was speaking to TASS on the eve of the All-Union Scientific Conference on the Importance of the Soviet People's Victory in the Past War. The conference opened today.

"It has become fashionable abroad and in some Soviet publications to downgrade the importance of the historic feat accomplished by the Soviet people and their Army," he noted.

Some even want to impose on the Soviet Union equal responsibility with Nazi Germany for the outbreak of the Second World War, Yazov continued.

He noted that the Soviet Union waged a gruelling struggle which entailed great losses and privations, stopped the Nazi invasion and brought freedom to many peoples in eastern and south-eastern Europe, and saved the world from Nazi slavery and the threat of complete annihilation.

According to Yazov, the present re-grouping of military and political forces, complicated changes in Eastern Europe, which are diverse in their nature, the contradictory character of the expected consequences of German reunification, a real prospect for the Warsaw Treaty's weakening and NATO's growing might prompt the question of forming a new structure of European and international security.

The minister noted that the situation now is different than in the early 1940s. "At the same time the problem of preventing wars and creating an efficient instrument for collective security remains as acute as ever," Yazov stressed.

Plans for 9 May Victory Day Parade Described

PM1804155990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1, 8

[Interview with Lieutenant General N.V. Kalinin, commander of Moscow Military District and chief of Moscow City Garrison, conducted for PRAVDA by Lieutenant Colonel N. Medvedev of the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center: "This Is What the Parade Will Be Like"; date, place of interview not given]

[Text] A decision has just been adopted to hold a military parade 9 May to mark the 35th anniversary of our victory in the Great Patriotic War.

This is what Lieutenant General N.V. Kalinin, commander of Moscow Order of Lenin Military District and chief of Moscow City Garrison, had to say in this connection:

A military parade, especially on such a day, is not only a vivid jubilee spectacle and demonstration of the state's defense potential. I would say that it is an embodiment

of the unity of the Army and the people, of the unity of various generations of Soviet people and the defenders of the motherland.

I know that there is an opinion, and it is expressed in the press, that parades are outdated and have become an anachronism. I can't agree. In my view, abandoning this year's parade would be tantamount to forgetting those who toiled for 1,418 incredibly difficult days and night at the front and in the rear to forge the victory over the enemy and save the world from the brown plague.

In line with tradition, this year's march-past will be led by students of the Moscow College of Military Music. Behind the young drummers will come the Victory Banner. A company of color-bearers will march solemnly through Red Square. They will be carrying the 150 combat standards of the units and formations which most distinguished themselves during the war years.

The march-past by a consolidated regiment of veterans will be a moving moment in the parade. Its ranks will include front-line soldiers, partisans, people active in the underground, and workers in the rear. They include envoys of all the union republics and representatives of various nationalities. Muscovites and visitors to the city will see in the columns of the parade 109 heroes of the Soviet Union, 51 veterans from among the bearers of the three classes of the Order of Glory, and, of course, participants in the historic Victory Parade.

The final element in this part of the parade will be a consolidated regiment of soldiers dressed in 1945-model field uniforms, with steel helmets, waterproof capes, and Shpagin automatic pistols.

The continuity of the generations of Soviet soldiers will be demonstrated at the parade by military academy students and military college cadets, students from the Nakhimov naval colleges and Suvorov military colleges, paratroopers and marines, border guards, and internal troopers.

Our Armed Forces' equipment will be widely represented: from trucks carrying some of our beloved front-line infantry [frontovava matushka-pekhota na avtomobilyakh], famous T-34 tanks, wartime artillery, and legendary "Katyushas" to various models of modern combat equipment.

In brief, we expect an impressive spectacle worthy of Victory Day, which has always been celebrated in our country as a truly nationwide jubilee.

Army Reform Concepts Critically Analyzed

PM1904142590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 First Edition pp 1, 5

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Nikitin, candidate of economic sciences and senior lecturer: "Statutory Obligation"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The status of USSR People's Deputy obliges a deputy to take a responsible and well informed approach to state problems. Especially when it is the country's defense at issue. Unfortunately, in the opinion of Candidate of Economic Sciences Lt. Col. N. Nikitin, the speeches and interviews by USSR People's Deputy Major V. Lopatin on the draft concept of the military reform prepared by a group of armed forces deputies, do not meet that requirement.

Generally speaking, our deputies' attempt to formulate the concept of the military reform could have been welcomed unreservedly but for one thing. I have been following the development of the discussion of this problem in the mass media because it is part of my academic and professional interests. From the very outset I was alarmed both by the obviously eclectic nature of the content of the proposed concept and the no less obvious a priori attempt to counterpose it to the position of the Defense Ministry leadership. Recently this has been reaffirmed in a whole series of items—in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and IZVESTIYA—and resembles a mass assault on the readers.

I was particularly astounded and, I do not hide the fact, exasperated by a quite impudent article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA entitled "Your Move, Minister." In it the idea is consistently voiced—both by the author himself and by Colonel A. Tsalko, a USSR people's deputy quoted in the article—that the Defense Ministry is "resisting" the military reform and that it should elaborate its own "alternative" project.

I do not know whether it is possible to seriously study a problem without inquiring into everything to do with it. Why try to prove the obvious? It is enough, for example, to look at the USSR Defense Minister's interview in PRAVDA 23 February, 6 weeks before the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA item, to understand how inappropriate are both its headline and the challenge contained in it. I recall that in the interview the defense minister gives a quite detailed account of what has already been done and is being done now to prepare the military reform, sets out the aim, general principles, and main parameters, and reports on the elaboration of its integrated concept, which a specialist commission is producing.

But judging by the comments of Maj. V. Lopatin and Col. A. Tsalko and a number of newspaper and magazine publications, none of this exists. Which is why, I think, this is being made the object of special discussion. I shall only say that, as it seems to me, the status of the deputy imposes many obligations and, in any event, undoubtedly presupposes a high level of responsibility and competence.

Those things, in my view, are precisely what the draft proposed by the deputies' group is acutely lacking. I do not know what specific remarks were made about its content during the recent discussion at the Armed Forces

subcommittee of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security, nor do I know how this draft will be amended for the second discussion. But I am bound to mention the serious methodological defects in this document which are so obvious that one can only wonder how they could have been overlooked by the "representatives of seven institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, three military academies, and four institutes," whose participation, albeit on "social principles," is attested by the deputies themselves and the press. Suffice it to say that in the draft the military reform is identified with the reform of the Armed Forces. But that is far from the case! The military reform includes fundamental transformations in the military political, military economic, military scientific, military technical, and military legal spheres plus the military sphere itself.

The concept's main idea, according to the scheme of the draft's authors, is the phased transition to a professional regular army on a voluntary basis. That is good but are the Soviet Armed Forces today really a nonprofessional, irregular army? It is well known that throughout history and among all peoples, nonprofessional, irregular units have been manned by volunteers and partisans and were always hired on a voluntary basis. As for the Russian Army, since ancient times it has been formed from a combination of professionals (initially members of armed detachments [druzhinnik] then officers and NCO's) and nonprofessionals—ordinary soldiers, drafted for a certain period. Furthermore, neither the professionals nor the nonprofessionals were recruited voluntarily—the armed detachments members and then the officers and NCO's were obliged to perform military service. This combination (which was well understood by the ancient Russian princes) ensured a link between the Army and the people and was the source of its strength, first and foremost its spiritual strength.

The Soviet Armed Forces today are a professional, regular army formed on a mixed basis—voluntary (officers, warrant officers, ensigns, and those on extended military service) and compulsory military service (fixed-term military servicemen). The expediency and effectiveness of this kind of recruitment in present-day political and socioeconomic conditions was justified on numerous occasions and, I think, convincingly by the Armed Forces leadership and military scientists.

The draft proposes implementing a system of measures to reduce the Army and reorient military organizational development primarily according to qualitative parameters. But a unilateral reduction of 500,000 men is already being carried out. The other reductions linked to the results of the talks in Geneva and Vienna are well known. As are the reductions that will be carried out in future solely on the principles of reciprocity, equality, and the equal security of the sides involved. Our defensive military doctrine has been materializing since 1987 as, since 1988, has the principled guideline of the priority of qualitative parameters in defense organizational development formulated by the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. There are radical transformations not only in the composition of the Armed Forces but also their structure at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Military production is being cut back and is undergoing planned conversion. All the legislation relating to the defense sphere is being radically renewed. Finally, there are thorough processes of democratization and the expansion of glasnost under way affecting the very foundations of military life. All these things, obviously, are elements of the military reform and are organically connected with the political, economic, and legal reforms that are being conducted in our society, with the transformations in the spiritual sphere, in brief, with perestroyka. Clearly this should be the basis on which to form the concept of the military reform. The impression that you get, however, is that a different premise—which holds that the reform must start from scratch—is prevailing over the draft put forward by the military deputies' group.

The economic aspect of the concept causes grave doubts. Where are the resources for the practical implementation of the measures envisaged in it supposed to be found? In the first instance by radically reducing the numbers of Armed Forces personnel, the number of military training institutions, and supplies of military hardware. Let us leave aside questions of the size of the Armed Forces, which is determined, as is well known, not by fond wishes but by the need to ensure the adequate and reliable defense of the country's borders—its ground, air, and sea borders. But clearly we should touch on the reduction of the volumes of military production. Given that functional production systems form the basis of the defense industry's production apparatus, reducing production by, say, half will lead to a reduction in labor productivity of a minimum of two-three fold. In the process the cost price of the individual military item rises in proportion, completely "devouring" the resources expected to be "released."

The proposal to unify civilian and military production is essentially without real foundation. The fact is that such a unification has been going on in our country from the very first days of Soviet power. The Soviet tank industry, for instance, was from the start created as a subsector of tractor building. Warplane production is carried on in the framework of the aviation industry. Nor should one forget that there is an objective limit to unification: Scientific and technical progress is increasingly persistently highlighting military production proper as a technologically separate economic sector. For example, according to foreign estimates, 90 percent of the research and development results produced in military aircraft building cannot be used in the production of civil aircraft because of their narrow specialist character.

Will the expanded use of civilian specialists in the Army and Navy achieve an economic effect, as the draft concept believes? There is food for thought here, too. After all, if you compare, for example, the earnings of military construction workers and workers in housing and municipal services and some other spheres of the

Armed Forces' daily activity (and I do not think that the authors of the draft propose entrusting combat duty to civilians), civilian specialists now receive two to three times more than equivalent military specialists. As for the call to "demilitarize" military physicians, that too seems dubious. Our country's entire military history and, furthermore, its present day and indeed foreign practice convincingly demonstrate that the army medical service and military field surgery are the realm of military and not civilian doctors.

I do not hide the alarm and unease with which I and many of my fellow servicemen receive the provisions of the draft concept on the earliest possible development of national formations persistently repeated in interviews, on television and radio, and in publications. I believe that the conflict between them and the constructive approaches of the Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR president to the solution of the present extremely acute problems in the sphere of interethnic relations is obvious. It is no secret to anyone just who are the people in the Baltic, the Transcaucasus, Moldavia, and western oblasts of the Ukraine who are now issuing appeals to create "national formations" and "national armies" and what the aim of this is.

When the draft concept of the military reform prepared by the group of army deputies was being discussed at the Armed Forces subcommittee of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security, Colonel V. Ochirov, a USSR people's deputy and member of the committee, noted that if the draft deserves attention it is solely as a dress rehearsal.

In my view, a perfectly reasonable and just remark.

Baltic Republics

Soldiers Take Over Vilnius Publishing House

LD2004133590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Excerpt] My colleague Vidas [surname indistinct] just now returned from the printing house on Maironio Ulitsa. It has been occupied by 50 armed soldiers. What is the situation there?

[Correspondent] First, what I have seen: I saw behind the gates soldiers dressed in camouflage uniforms. Initially I thought they were paratroopers, but then I thought that they were not paratroopers but militiamen serving in this militia regiment in Vilnius. I spoke to deputies Stasys Kasauskas and Mecys Laurinkus, who described what happened:

At about 1145 this building was attacked by militiamen. The guards with green armbands did not resist, but only closed the doors and put up rolls of paper to prevent entry into the building. Then the beatings by the militiamen started. They have also beaten those who were protecting the guards and journalists. I am preparing a report which will be broadcast later. I met a journalist from the magazine MOTERIS, a woman, who was also beaten.

The most important thing is that we all speak about a law-abiding state. The Soviet Union says this, too, and in spite of this they have beaten deputy Zigmantas Vaisvila.

At present there are many people at the gate but I think that we must be calm, because there may be various people in the crowd and some provocations are possible. A more detailed report will be given in Lithuanian on the first radio program. [passage omitted]

[Paris AFP in English at 1328 GMT on 20 Apr 90 reports the following:

"Some 30 Soviet soldiers Friday smashed their way into printing works belonging to the independent Communist Party in Vilnius, slightly injuring two people, including a member of the Lithuanian parliament, local sources said.

"Zigmas Vaiscvila, an MP [member of parliament] from Sajudis, the pro-independence organization, was hit by the truncheon-wielding soldiers as he tried to prevent them taking over the works, which prints mostly local magazines, the sources said.

"Earlier this month, Soviet soldiers occupied the main printing works in Vilnius."]

More on Occupation

LD2004150690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1300 GMT on 20 April carries an eight-minute report by Benas Rupeika on the occupation by troops of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee printing house in Vilnius. Rupeika says that he saw a crowd of people at the building and then he converses with an unidentified correspondent who had made a recording of the incident in which he says: "Soldiers armed with rubber truncheons are standing behind the gate. An ambulance is standing at the building." He asks a Lithuanian militia captain what has happened. The captain says: "The printing house was occupied; they started chasing away all the workers; there are many injured." "They refer to the same Ryzhkov decision of the Council of Ministers which enabled them earlier to occupy all the buildings of the Central Committee. This building's turn has come."

The unidentified correspondent continues: "This event differs in its special insolence in that previously there were no injured people. And here ambulances have taken the injured away." Deputy Mecys Laurinkus tells the correspondent: "This is a crime. The most terrible thing is that Zigmas Vaisvila has been beaten up. He is a people's deputy."

Benas Rupeika then continues his report: "I have heard from my colleagues and people's deputies that the USSR badly needs a precedent of resistance by force." "Let us bear this in mind. Hitherto, our weapon has been calmness. We must not change these tactics."

Another unidentified correspondent reports: "These soldiers said they had come from Fergana. They said that there is no order in Fergana, but also there is no order here."

Then the first correspondent continues: "I just wanted to say that soldiers arrive from Fergana. Two weeks ago I spoke to one leader of the press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. He came from Baku. And here is the association: People who organize such actions and such occupation plans of various buildings expect to be able to provoke unrest like in Fergana or Baku."

Benas Rupeika concludes the report by saying: "Yesterday, I stated that each mutual squabble, political or professional, harms Lithuania. The precedence of resisting by force must not be our weapon."

Lithuanian Offer To Suspend Independence Reported

PM2004110890 London BBC Television Network in English 2130 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Recorded interview with CPSU Central Committee Ideology Department Deputy Chief Aleksandr Lebedev and live telephone interview with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas by Donald MacCormick on the BBC 2 "Newsnight" program following a report on energy sanctions adopted against Lithuania by Moscow and the background to recent events]

[Text] [MacCormick] There are signs tonight that there may be room for compromise. A Lithuanian delegation is in Moscow hoping to have informal talks with the Soviet Government. And "Newsnight" has learned from

Lithuanian sources that an offer to suspend the independence declaration might be made to Moscow in return for a definite fixed timescale for independence of up to two years.

Earlier this evening I discussed the Soviet view with Alex Lebedev, the deputy head of ideology on the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee. I began by asking him whether it was really necessary for Moscow to bully and intimidate Lithuania.

[Lebedev] You see it's not a matter of intimidation or bullying, as you put it. I would call it really a serious political warning. And there are reasons for that, believe me. If you take, if you just analyze, the whole period since March 10th or 11th and the policy of the Vilnius leadership, mainly of the Sajudis leadership, to put it bluntly, and of Mr. Landsbergis to a great extent, you will see that the whole policy was.... at times I am asking myself whether it was really aimed at obtaining the independence—because Lithuania will get independence, no doubts about that—but mainly or rather humiliating Moscow and embarrassing President Gorbachev. Unfortunately it looks so.

[MacCormick] It sounds as though you regard Mr. Landsbergis and his colleagues as troublemakers rather than genuine patriots.

[Lebedev] Frankly speaking, they remind me at times some leaders of the IRA in Britain. I am sorry for putting it perhaps in so strong terms, but they are ambitious—and it's OK—but they should not really put at stake so much.

[MacCormick] But, Mr. Lebedev, Mr. Landsbergis and his colleagues are democratically elected politicians and they are not planning to shoot or to bomb anyone. Surely the comparison with the IRA here is quite false.

[Lebedev] Well, you see, I wouldn't like to develop the comparisons between IRA or whatever, though I can use another comparison. If tomorrow the Scottish government, let's say, whatever, democratically elected, announces an independence of Scotland just overnight.... I have all sympathies to the freedom feelings and sentiments of both the Scots and Lithuanians, but those things cannot be done overnight. And a democratically elected and responsible—politically—government should act also in a very responsible political way. That is unfortunately not happening in the case of Mr. Landsbergis and his team.

[MacCormick] What concessions would you like to see the Lithuanians making in any attempt to continue negotiations and solve this peacefully?

[Lebedev] Just the suspension—the freezing, if you wish—to the decisions, to the laws they have already adopted. That would open the door to proper talks.

[MacCormick] And what concession could, or would, Moscow offer to Lithuania?

[Lebedev] You think it's a little concession for Moscow, for the Soviet Union, to agree on discussing the conditions of secession of Lithuania with an obvious acceptance of the eventual secession of a very important republic that had been part of Russia, as a matter of fact, not just for 50 years, but for a longer period of time, where we have tremendous national and strategic interests? You should not forget about that.

[MacCormick] But would Moscow be willing to countenance a shorter transition time to independence than five years?

[Lebedev] Well, I am sure that can be negotiated. No doubt about that. I am sure of that.

[MacCormick] Well, now, to get the Lithuanian reaction to that I'm joined from Oslo by the Lithuanian foreign minister, Algirdas Saudargas. Good evening, foreign minister.

[Saudargas] Good evening to you.

[MacCormick] What do you think of the cutting-off finally by Moscow of, really, in effect, most of your oil and gas supplies?

[Saudargas] It is a matter of Moscow to cut off our supply of oil and a matter of ours is to survive.

[MacCormick] But the president, Mr. Landsbergis, said tonight that Lithuania could survive if need be for a hundred years without oil and gas. Isn't that really incredibly optimistic of him?

[Saudargas] You know, our ancestors in Siberia survived in much worse conditions.

[MacCormick] Aren't you disappointed, though, that the Norwegians, for example, on your mission to Oslo at present have not been able, felt able, to offer you oil form them at cheap prices—cheaper than the international rate?

[Saudargas] It is not aim of our arrival at Norway to negotiate on the oil supply. We arrived on the invitation of three Norwegian parties and it is... we must distinguish the oil as politics, and oil as economics.

[MacCormick] Finally Mr. Saudargas, you may have heard Mr. Lebedev of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee say that he remained an optimist about—even at this time, at this late hour—a peaceful resolution of the conflict between yourselves and Moscow. Are you optimistic as well?

[Saudargas] Yes, I am.

[MacCormick] For what reason?

[Saudargas] Because the economical means give more space for negotiation than military means. And Moscow changed their military intimidation for economical blockade. I consider this as optimistical.

[MacCormick] All right, Mr. Saudargas, thank you very much indeed for joining us.

Lithuanian Official Denies Reports

LD2004104190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] We have just received the news that the head of the Secretariat of the Lithuanian legislature has denied the information from BBC Television that Vilnius, at negotiations to be conducted with Moscow, would be willing to suspend its independence for two years. The official of the Lithuanian legislature said that he had met President Landsbergis who reaffirmed the denial.

Lithuanian Deputy Premier Calls for 'Compromise'

AU2004101490 Paris AFP in English 1010 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 20 (AFP)—Lithuanian deputy premier Algirdas Brazauskas Friday urged parliament to "compromise" with Moscow as the Soviet energy blockade began to bite, parliamentary sources in Vilnius said.

Drawing a dark picture of the republic's prospects, Mr. Brazauskas, who also heads the local breakaway Communist Party, told parliament: "We have to find a way out of the crisis, otherwise we won't last more than a month".

"Compromises are necessary as we don't have enough money to buy from abroad," he also said. Lithuania would need to spend around five million dollars on imports, he said.

Mr. Brazauskas urged parliament to compromise with Moscow on its demands that Lithuania annul its decision to introduce republican identity cards and boycott military service in the Soviet army. He also urged deputies to reaffirm that the republic would respect all contracts concluded by Soviet firms on its territory.

Lithuania's deputy Energy Minister Alguirdas Laukonis told AFP that the republic had enough reserves to last for a maximum of two to three weeks, but "if the blockade continues the country will be asphyxiated".

Meanwhile, the energy blockade began to bite in Lithuania where heating was turned off, petrol rationed and factories began to close.

This followed Moscow's decision to reduce gas supplies by 85 per cent and cut off all deliveries of crude oil to the secessionist Baltic republic.

A factory in Jonava, which produces fertilizers, closed Thursday laying off 3,000 workers for a month, the parliamentary press office in Vilnius said.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Discusses Blockade

LD2004140390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1300 GMT 20 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius, 20 April [TASS]—The situation in Lithuania's national economy is approaching the critical point. In a few words, this is the essence of the report by Algirdas Brazauskas, deputy prime minister of the republic, at the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania session which resumed work today.

He reported that due to the discontinuance of oil deliveries to Lithuania, and also the sharp reduction in the pumping of natural gas and other material resources, some industrial enterprises will already be forced to cease work within a few days. The deputy prime minister reported on measures taken by the commission of the government of Lithuania to coordinate questions of providing the republic's economy with gas and other energy resources, and expressed the opinion that "only through political solutions can a way out of the deadlock be found."

After this, sharp discussion developed. The majority of those who spoke said "the organizers of the blockade will not succeed in bringing Lithuania to its knees." The proposal to create a "Lithuania blockade fund" was put forward. Individual deputies expressed an opinion on the "need to seek compromises." The Supreme Soviet session is continuing work.

Correspondent Reports on Session

LD2004122490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the "Lithuania Today" Program]

[Excerpts] The session of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania continues its work today in Vilnius. A plenary sitting started at 1000.

My colleague correspondent Janina [surname indistinct] has just now returned from the session. She describes the session:

[Correspondent] The session started with a report by Algirdas Brazauskas, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, about the measures taken in the conditions of economic blockade. He is the chairman of the commission on coordinating the provision of the Lithuanian economy with energy resources.

Algirdas Brazauskas stated that the commission has already decided how the gasoline requirements of various branches of the economy will be satisfied. Public transport requirements will be met by 70 percent, transportation of food products by 90 percent, internal affairs, communications, and health services by 100 percent, and the requirements of agriculture by 70 percent. [passage omitted] The situation in various branches of the national economy was also explained. The state of

affairs of diesel fuel is similiar. The supply of other oil products has also been stopped, for instance, lubricants. It may happen that we will have gasoline but will not be able to use means of transport. At present information is being collected on what quantities of lubricants and diesel fuel there are in various gasoline stations.

Then Algirdas Brazauskas dwelt on the problems of power generation. As you know, both blocks at the nuclear power station are not working. One block could start generating power in a few days' time, but there is no guarantee that the overhaul will be completed on time. Practice shows, Algirdas Brazauskas stated, that this happens frequently.

I can remind you that the electricity requirements per day in Lithuania amount to 2,300,000 kilowatts. We are already short of this quantity. If the Elektrenai station ceases working, Algirdas Brazauskas noted it will be difficult to imagine how to supply the northwestern part of Lithuania with electricity.

Then there is the problem of [natural] gas. At present 16 percent of the former norm is being supplied. Gas is being supplied first of all to those branches of the economy which cannot be stopped. [passage omitted] The problem of liquified gas is urgent. Today we receive 60 percent of the required norm, and the majority of the rural population, as well as the population in towns use this type of gas. Although there are stocks of coal, they cannot replace fuel oil or gas in power stations (?because technological process is regulated differently).

Algirdas Brazauskas also spoke about the supply of other raw materials. [passage omitted] The supply of [word indistinct] to the Alytus refrigerator factory has been stopped. This enterprise's stocks will only last several days. Bearings are not being supplied. Because of this, the production of building finishing machines may stop. [passage omitted] There are difficulties with the supply of agriculture with machines. Only about 40 percent of applications in this field can be satisfied. Belorussia is refusing to fulfill contracts in this sphere. [passage omitted]

Vilkas stated: Neither the president [Gorbachev] nor the chairman of the Council of Ministers have the right to change a plan adopted by the Soviet Supreme Soviet. These actions are illegal and I would urge all economic workers to seriously count all losses which will be inflicted on us. This may be necessary for our people who, maybe, will be urged to go to the streets, so that they know what to demand from the addressees. I do not think that the blockade will bring Lithuania to its knees. It is also essential to explain to the Russian people that this adventure will cost them dearly. Let us imagine that we have losses amounting to one billion, then the Soviet Union will have some ten billions, because these losses multiply. [passage omitted] It is not important whether the Soviet Union will accept these accounts. I do not think that we will ever demand anything from them. Let them leave us in peace.

Further on Gas Supply Cut to Lithuania

OW1904132090 Tokyo KYODO in English 1300 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 19 KYODO—The Soviet Union slapped another economic sanction on Lithuania Thursday, cutting the supply of natural gas to the maverick republic by 85 percent, a chief technician for a Lithuanian gas company told KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

The natural gas cutback, coming on the heels of Wednesday's halt of crude oil to the republic, was the second punitive action by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev aimed at forcing Lithuania to rescind its March 11 declaration of independence.

According to the chief technician, a Soviet gas transport company informed the Lithuanian gas firm that "by an order of the Soviet Government" the supply of gas to Lithuania would be cut from 18.5 million cubic meters to 3.5 million cubic meters each day beginning at noon (6 P.M. Japan Time) Thursday.

"This amount would be enough to fulfill the needs of the citizens' daily life," the technician quoted the Soviet directive.

The cutback in natural gas will force most Lithuanian companies to halt work, the technician speculated.

Meanwhile, in response to the halt of crude oil to the republic, the Lithuanian government has instituted a system of gasoline rationing, limiting automobile drivers to 10 liters per day.

In the meantime, the Lithuanian Supreme Council has refused to comply with Gorbachev's demands that it rescind its laws aimed at establishing its independence.

Instead, the Lithuanians have offered to halt passing further measures if Moscow will open negotiations with them by May 1.

Reaction, Comments to USSR Blockade Reported

Ministries Comment

LD1904162290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Oil supplies to Lithuania have been suspended. This is how various ministries and departments have commented on this fact: The USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Industry: By instruction of the government, yesterday at 2230 Moscow time, the pumping of oil to the Mazeikiai oil refinery was halted. Until then oil had been supplied regularly: 35-40,000 tonnes every 24 hours. A 2,000 tonne daily growth of this flow was even noted. Now the oil is moving to special stores. In the very near future, it will start to be redistributed to pipelines heading in other directions.

The USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry and Petroleum Refining: The Mazeikiai oil refinery is the only enterprise in the Baltic region which is producing petrochemical products. From here they are sent not only to Lithuania but also to Estonia, Latvia and Kaliningrad oblast, Belorussia, and a number of other regions in the country.

A proportion of diesel fuel is exported. Today the director of the Mazeikiai plant told the ministry that the enterprise equipment is working at half its capacity. By this morning fuel reserves amounted only to 72,000 tonnes. This will be sufficient for four or five days. Then the operation of the works will have to be halted.

The USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply: Despite the suspension of oil supplies to the Mazeikiai refinery, the supply of petrochemical products to consumers in neighboring regions will not change. Oil will be redistributed to the nearest enterprises of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. Their capacity will be fully sufficient to refine additional amounts of oil which will be sent to them in connection with the suspension of oil supplies to Lithuania. The petrochemical products produced from it will be sent to the enterprises and organizations which used to be attached to the Mazeikiai refinery.

Power Minister on Effects

LD1904225690 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Today at 1900 a news conference was held in Vilnius at the Council of Ministers with Minister of Power Engineering Leonas Asmonatas and three minor officials of his team taking part. The main topic was the absolute cut off of oil and the reduction of natural gas supply to Lithuania from the Soviet Union. According to the minister the situation in Lithuania is complex and unstable concerning these resources. If we are going to limit their use we can survive about three weeks, stated Leonas Asmonatas. Certainly rationing will be introduced.

Lithuania previously got from the Soviet Union 18.5 million cubic meters [cu] of gas per day. Today Lithuania is getting 3.5 million cu of gas. This amount can meet the essential needs of the population here. Natural gas supply to Kaliningrad region is not limited. It is about 0.6 million cu per day. The situation of energy supply is rather inconvenient, as two units of the Ignalina nuclear power plant are shut down for repair work.

It was also mentioned that the Lithuanian government has worked out a package of measures so that Lithuania could survive. The shortage is also felt on other oil products. Although it was not mentioned in particular, the supply of other materials was also cut down, as minister of power engineering put it: total restrictions are now being put on Lithuanian Republic. The Lithuanian government is closely following the embargo situation, which might change within every two-three hours.

In order to survive more or less normally under the present conditions, exclusive rights will be imposed on special governmental commissions. On Friday Deputy Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas is going to make a specific statement during Lithuanian parliamentary sittings on this issue, as well as all the matters concerning the embargo.

Although Lithuania has 98 plants of all-Union jurisdiction on its territory, so far the Lithuanian government is not cutting off the supply of the reduced natural gas to them. The supply of natural gas to these enterprises is so far only reduced, having in mind the whole situation in Lithuania. Naturally the possibility of cutting the supplies of natural gas to the Soviet plants here seem to be necessary. Today the imposed limit of gas to Lithuanian amounts to 141,000 cu per hour. Before the restriction this number was 772,000 cu.

According to Minister of Power Engineering Leonas Asmonatas, the losses of the Soviet side will reach 100,000 dollars per day, as it used to export its oil via the port city of Klaipeda in Lithuania. Due to oil and gas embargo, the damage done to Lithuania's economy will reach R600,000 per day. The Soviet Union will also be forced to pay fines for violating international oil exportation contracts. Strange as it might seem, the minister pointed out, there exist certain technical possibilities to receive safe supply of oil to Lithuania from Western countries, although the Lithuanian borders are guarded by the Soviet Army troops. Naturally the details of such possibilities were not yet disclosed to journalists.

Deputy on Results of Blockade

LD1904184190 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Interview with Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Deputy Amatanas Karobli, identified by caption, by unidentified reporter; date and place not given; Karobli's replies in Lithuanian fading to Polish translation—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Reporter] What are the practical consequences of the blockade?

[Karobli] So far the electricity has not been cut off. This will probably not happen in the coming days either. But it is not known what the future will bring. Certain enterprises have stopped production.

[Reporter] How do you assess the Moscow move?

[Karobli] Pressure has been exerted on us. We think that this should evoke a reaction from other states, the Western countries. It should not last long. Certainly it is not a positive step of the USSR. Naturally, we cannot react in a similar way. We do not have such possibilities.

We can only give a moral answer. We issued a statement, and yesterday we sent the documents. Our delegation will go to Moscow.

[Reporter] Does Lithuania rely on foreign aid?

[Karobli] Even if some aid is provided by the Western countries, it is not known whether it will reach Lithuania. We are surrounded by an iron curtain.

Gas Pipeline Official on Moscow Telegram

LD1904112690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Summary] G. Salciute speaks with Yevgeniy Vorobyev, head of the administration of the Vilnius production trunk gas pipeline at Zapadtransgaz, and asks him about the contents of the telegram he received concerning gas supplies.

[Vorobyev] "The telegram came from Moscow to Minsk, which is according to our regulations; from Minsk it was sent directly to the Lithuanian Gas production amalgamation and to me as well. I can read the text: By order of the USSR Council of Ministers, 18 April 1990, as well as telegram No. 880D from the Gosgaz [gas industry concern] of 19 April 1990, supplies of gas for the consumers of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic have been fixed on the level of 3.5 million cubic meters per 24-hour period."

[G. Salciute] "And what will the percentage be, if compared with..."

[Vorobyev, interrupting] "This means that only 15.7 percent of the former planned supply level per 24-hour period will be supplied."

[G. Salciute] "And what else does the telegram say?"

[Vorobyev] "Which ensures regular gas supply for the population and public and domestic consumption in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. Full stop. The reduction of supplies will begin from 0900 GMT 19 April 1990."

Vorobyev goes on to say that the telegram was signed by Acting Director General Machernyuk.

G. Salciute then asks Vorobyev to explain what the telegram means in real terms. Vorobyev replies that "in practical terms, this quantity of gas should be sufficient for the use of gas by the population and for domestic and communal services." Vorobyev says that the Lithuanian gas enterprise is currently examining the situation and a decision will be made as to whom will get how much gas and which enterprises will have to do without gas supplies.

Lithuanian Engineer Confident on Power Supply

LD1904114690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1005 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] [Presenter] I had a telephone conversation with the chief engineer at the Elektrenai power station, and wanted to hear an assurance that we could have confidence in Elektrenai. Thus Viktoras Nakas in Elektrenai:

[Begin recording] [Nakas] You see, if we do not get gas, we will work for some time, but then we will ask that our load be reduced.

[Presenter] Today your power is being generated and supplied to the neighboring republics?

[Nakas] We are working in the joint system and so far there have been no changes. Here are some figures. At present the republic's requirements amount to 2.12 million kilowatts. The Lithuanian hydroelectric power station could supply 1.65 million kilowatts, but in order to save fuel our load is being reduced to 1.85 million kilowatts, and all the power stations in Lithuania generate 1.8 million. At present we use 300,000 kilowatts of power from the system, from outside. Power to Belorussia and Kaliningrad flows through our republic, but this is not included in our balance. At present we generate less than we use. We have gas; so far its supply has not been reduced. We endeavour to use as much of it as possible to save fuel oil.

[Presenter] But if Lithuania will have only 3.5 million cubic metres of gas per day?

[Nakas] We will not be able to act willfully. The republican leadership will have to distribute this quantity of gas. On the whole, we are not downhearted. It seems that we will get away with it and no one will stop the supply of power.

[Presenter] Could you give more reasons for your enthusiasm?

[Nakas] The supply of power will have to go to other republics; there is a joint balance. As you see, today no one harmed us, and we are receiving those 300,000 kilowatts from the system. We also have stocks of fuel for a prolonged period of time. [end recording]

Lithuanian Official on Norwegian Oil Prospects

LD1904144290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Presenter Benas Rupieka interviewed Emanuelis Zingeris, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, about his visit to Oslo as chairman of the Council of Foreign Affairs commission. Answering the question by Rupeika about the possible supply of oil from Norway, Zingeris stated:

[Begin recording] The day before yesterday both of the largest Norwegian oil companies, responding to inquiries by Norwegian citizens about oil supplies to Lithuania,

were rather reserved. I know this from my sources, so I phoned Norway. Those companies said they would not like to get involved in politics. But this could be one of those statements that are often changed, and I think the meeting between the two leaders—the leader of the Norwegian Government and Prunskiene—should yield very clear results. We must not forget that this is a Western democratic society which is pressed by public opinion and public opinion is on our side. [passage omitted] All people in the West are on our side. The time has come when this opinion will compel these governments to take clear actions concerning Lithuania. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Official TASS Report on Oil Cut Decision

LD1904185290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1726 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)—An official TASS report was disseminated here today, in which it is stated:

"In connection with the situation which has taken shape in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov, as is well-known, were compelled on 13 April of this year to send a message to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers about the inevitability under these conditions of a change in the nature of economic relations with the Republic. Unfortunately, Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairperson of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, did not give a constructive response to any of the proposals contained in the message in her telegram of 16 April.

Taking into account the fact that the Lithuanian SSR leadership has not taken any measures toward revoking the unlawful acts concerning the introduction of discriminatory identity cards, the property of the Soviet Union, and also the validity of the USSR law on universal military service, instructions have been given for the cessation of deliveries of oil and also for the reduction of the supply of natural gas to the Republic to the volumes needed for guaranteeing social and municipal needs.

The USSR Government expects a specific reply to the issues raised in the message of the USSR president and chairman of the USSR Council Ministers as these, in the most direct and immediate fashion, touch upon the rights and interests of the Soviet people."

Arrangements for Fuel Shortage Discussed

LD1904224990 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Yesterday late evening the Soviet Union cut off crude oil supplies to Lithuania and today noon natural gas was also cut off. [passage omitted]

Today the Lithuanian government discussed the present situation and set up a commission on coordinating the provision of the Lithuanian economy with energetic [as heard] resources. The commission is headed by Deputy Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas and its decisions are obligatory to all ministries, departments, and organizations. Today the first sitting of the commission was held in Vilnius.

Preliminary distribution of fuel resources was discussed. Natural gas supplies were divided among the main fertilizer amalgamation in [word indistinct], the Lithuanian system of energetics, and the everyday needs of the people. [passage omitted] From today on, apartment heating is cut off. Interior affairs, health care, communications, and funeral services are going to be provided with enough petrol for normal functioning.

Today individual drivers could buy 10 liters each. However, starting from tomorrow the monthly petrol limit is going to be only 30 liters. Fuel resources for the Lithuanian energetics system will end in 10 or 14 days, with the exception of Ignalina nuclear power plant. The cement amalgamation in [word indistinct] is going to cut its production by half. Street lights have also been dimmed by half, which we can clearly see from our editorial office windows.

Landsbergis Discusses Blockade, Support From West

LD1904203390 Paris Antenne 2 Television in French 1809 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] [Herve Claude] Now in a linkup with Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, here is the Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis with our special correspondent Gilles Rabin at his side. Good evening, Mr Landsbergis.

[Landsbergis, in Lithuanian fading into superimposed French translation] Good evening. Good evening. [video shows Landsbergis seated, facing camera]

[Claude] We learned this morning the supplies of gas, for example, were going to be reduced by 85 percent. Have the Soviets really, concretely begun to put their threat into action? Do you have proof of that?

[Landsbergis] It is certain, we have much less of it and we are only receiving one-sixth of our supplies.

[Claude] One-sixth. Well, if the Soviet embargo is extended, how long will your country in fact be able to hold out?

[Landsbergis] Lithuania can hold out for 100 years without any gas or oil. Until 1944 Lithuania lived under a very stable economy on its own products and it also had a very strong currency. Lithuania can live; it is a land where the people work.

[Claude] Could you yourselves in turn envision taking sanctions, by taking sanctions I mean blocking the export of your products to Moscow, for example?

[Landsbergis] We do not see the need for that. It was Moscow that first froze the entry of currency. [Words indistinct] export across Lithuania. It is causing losses to

itself; its economy is at the brink of a crisis and it is still giving itself blows on the head. We are doing strictly nothing special to make things worse for others, certainly not. We will only concern ourselves with our land and with our men, with how we can live and settle our own affairs.

[Claude] Yesterday France proposed to its European partners to help Lithuania. Well, that is certainly a good initiative. In your opinion what form could that aid take, what form would you like it to take?

[Landsbergis] France knows very well how it can help Lithuania. It can help by forming relations with the Republic of Lithuania; it could propose economic agreements; it could look at the problem of supplies. We have a very great interest in having commercial relations with the West and the countries of the West, France in particular.

[Rabin] Mr President, do you feel yourself to be receiving moral support today from the Western countries, moral or political support or both?

[Landsbergis] Yes, we feel that this aid...[changes thought] before this aid was clearly expressed at the moral level with very fine words but we are now receiving news of more concrete proposals to help us.

[Claude] Do you consider today that the break with Moscow seems final or are you still hoping for negotiations?

[Landsbergis] I think negotiations are necessary and they will take place at all events; but today we are in a situation where Moscow has withdrawn all contacts with Lithuania; we are waiting for those contacts to resume.

[Claude] That is to say that Mikhail Gorbachev is asking you to go back on your declaration of independence and that is final, it is irremediable, you will not go back on it?

[Landsbergis] We cannot do that. That is why we are united and why we are always driven further and further away from the USSR. The USSR has a very great military force [or strength] and that military force is in Lithuania: We cannot oppose it as we do not have any force ourselves except our moral force. But the USSR can do nothing more if it does not succeed in breaking this unanimity of the Lithuanian people, their desire to be independent.

[Claude] Thank you, Mr. President, thank you Mr. President Landsbergis.

Lithuania Sets Up Produce Rationing Commission

LD1904191790 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius April 19 TASS—By TASS correspondent: The USSR has made the first step to independent Lithuania's economic blockade, Lithuania's Minister of the Power Industry Leonas Asmontas told a news conference here today.

The Lithuanian Council of Ministers has set up a commission to regulate the national economy's functioning. The commission will be responsible for the distribution and rationing of products, supplies of which to the republic have been reduced.

Spokesman Urges Lithuanians To Conserve Energy

LD1904102190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Lithuanian government spokesman Ceslovas Jursenas has made the following statement:

I must apologize that I am instructed to speak about very unpleasant matters. I think you already know from our radio broadcasts that the threats of the USSR Government have been carried out. Thus, oil is being limited—or to be more precise, is being stopped completely. Natural gas is being sharply limited and is sufficient, as you already heard, for the purposes of the population and for communal needs.

Of course, this limit, which is being applied to us from 1100, will be supplied to power engineering, the baking of bread, and the food industry. Anyway, one may say we are being put on a starvation diet as far as fuel and power generating resources are concerned.

These problems are at this moment being examined at a meeting of the republican Council of Ministers. This meeting is being chaired by Vice Premier Algirdas Brazauskas; and corresponding ministers, heads of departments, and experts, as well as Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council Ceslovas Stankevicius and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Romualdas Ozolas, are in attendance.

The main problem is how to more rationally distribute those starvation limits allocated to us, how better to survive under these conditions. I think that in the afternoon, in the evening news, you will be given more information on these matters. So far I am instructed, and I sincerely appeal to you all personally, to be as thrifty as possible with those resources that we do have—in industry, in agriculture, and in everyday life. Of course, where it is necessary, where it is essential to work, limits must be adhered to completely—let us say in sowing, baking and delivery of bread, and other matters. But where we can refrain from using natural gas, gasoline, any heating or lighting fuel, let us do so. Then we will be able to survive longer and, perhaps, will not be intimidated by these sanctions. Anyway, this is a sad affair and, as we expected it would, it has occurred. Therefore, let us be cautious, thrifty, and careful.

5-Hour Lines Reported at Lithuanian Gas Stations

AU1904135090 Paris AFP in English 1322 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 19 (AFP)—Long lines formed outside petrol (gasoline) stations Thursday in Lithuania where private motorists were only being sold a few litres (gallons) at a time, following imposition of a Soviet energy blockade, local residents said.

In Kaunas, the old capital, five-hour queues were reported to have formed at filling stations, with sales of petrol limited to 15 or 20 litres (3 to 5 U.S. gallons) per car, an employee at the city council said.

"There's no panic. People don't think such a state of affairs can last for long," she told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE by telephone.

Local radio had announced that all heating would be cut as of Friday, she added.

The measures follow Moscow's decision to cut off all supplies of crude oil and sharply reduce those of natural gas to the breakaway Baltic republic.

Alexander Yakovlev, an official reached at the city council in Sovetsk, a Russian town on Lithuania's western border, said the situation was normal there Thursday, with Lithuanians freely crossing the bridge which marks the border.

Petrol stations were operating normally and Lithuanians were allowed to tank up, he said.

Meanwhile, Radio Vilnius reported that the Lithuanian Government had met Thursday morning under the chairmanship of deputy minister Algirdas Brazauskas to discuss the energy crisis.

Mr. Brauzaskas was reported as saying priority would be given to the power industry, food-processing plants and bakeries.

"Where we can give up the use of gas, petrol, any heating and lighting, let us do this, and then we will be able to survive longer and, maybe, we will not be intimidated by these sanctions," government spokesman Ceslovas Jursenas said on local radio.

All supplies of crude oil to the Baltic republic's only refinery were stopped as of Wednesday evening, and three out of four gas pipelines were closed down Thursday morning.

Only one gas pipeline, linking Vilnius to Slonim in neighbouring Belorussia, remained open with supplies fixed at 3.5 million cubic metres per day, Lithuanian Government officials said. This represented only 15 per cent of normal supplies, they said.

The only Lithuanian nuclear power plant at Ignalina was closed down "for repairs" and electricity supplies for the region were being provided from plants in Estonia by way of Latvia, officials also said.

Soviet officials were reported to have guaranteed supplies of gas for the Elektrenai power plant—fueled by both gas and oil—which provides electricity for both Lithuania and the Russian federation enclave of Kaliningrad.

No Victor Predicted in Lithuanian 'Crisis'

PM1904163590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Leonid Kapelyushnyy report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Difficult Step Toward Compromise"]

[Text] Vilnius—At 2130 on 18 April oil stopped flowing through the pipeline to the Mazheykyay Petrochemical Plant. This enterprise is the main supplier of gasoline and diesel fuel for Lithuania and the Baltic states.

The press has already reported that the Council of Ministers envisaged this situation. As Romualdas Ozolas, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, stated in a report on the economic situation, existing gasoline stocks, provided they were carefully used, would allow the economy to function for around a month, and there would be enough fuel for farmers to carry out the spring sowing.

There is a side in this situation which, unfortunately, has days and even hours rather than a month or weeks to normalize the situation. This is the workers collective at the Mazheykyay Petrochemical Plant. Around 3,000 people work at it. Currently half of the processing lines [tekhnologicheskiye niti] have already been taken out of operation. And although specialists are trying to shut them down in accordance with all the regulations, their future startup will nonetheless involve large losses and be very complicated. The plant's existing stocks of raw material are enough for two or three days. What then?

Bronislovas Vaynora, chief engineer at the plant, told me that the workers are dispirited. They want to know how their interests will be protected in the political struggle. Telegrams have been sent to USSR Minister Lemayev and Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Chairman Landsbergis asking them to find a solution which would prevent innocent people suffering.

The 38 sessions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet have been marked by unanimity, if not like-mindedness.

The parliament took the position of "not a step backward" and, it seemed, was sacrificing not only itself but the freedom and independence of Lithuania for the sake of remaining unmovable on the adopted decisions. But a previously little noticed tone was heard at the Easter week session—an appeal to seek a compromise and move from romantic positions to pragmatic positions.

"We should learn to step back in order to move forward. The internal position in the republic is becoming increasingly destabilized. By constantly declaring the immovability of our principles, we are forcing the opposing side to adopt an opposing position."

"We should be firmly aware of the target we are aiming for and which wind will help us to move forward. In our discussions with Moscow goodwill gestures are needed on both sides. Let the empire see that we want to oblige it..."

"Politicians should be able to model and visualize the future. Currently cars are running, there is enough gas, and we can please hotheads by sticking firmly to our guns. But what will happen in two months' time? Won't the difficulties over gasoline or gas sweep away the very idea of independence?"

In its report on the work of the Supreme Soviet session the parliamentary newspaper EKHO LITVY defined the emergent breakthrough in the parliamentarians' sentiments as a move from political boldness toward political wisdom. That is clearly wishful thinking.

A number of deputies submitted a whole package of proposals whose discussion will take parliament into a qualitatively different spiral of work. For instance, Deputy A. Zhalis proposed discussing the issue of guarantees for normal conditions for the USSR Armed Forces on Lithuanian territory for a specific period and for a future Lithuanian Army to be subordinate to the interests of the Warsaw Pact countries.

E. Bichkauskas, the Lithuanian Council of Ministers' permanent representative in Moscow, gave a new thrust to the discussion in parliament. Interpreting the foreign reaction to the "Lithuanian situation," he spoke of the great responsibility incumbent on the republic's parliament to ensure a stable situation not only in the country but in international politics. He proposed that the act on the restoration of Lithuanian independence be suspended during consulations on the conditions for talks with the USSR, and that no political decisions concerning either side be made during this period.

The journalist Ch. Yurshenas, who is well known in the republic, analyzed a number of parliamentary decisions, calling some of them hasty and mistaken—specifically, the Law on Ending the Powers of USSR People's Deputies.

Parliament worked in a balanced way on its reply to USSR President M. Gorbachev. By the end of 18 April the final text had not been adopted—the mass media had received a report only that it had been officially endorsed [soobshcheniye tolko o yego aprobatsii].

All Lithuania is awaiting the reply to the president with understandable concern.

Feelings are running high about the statement issued by the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee that a number of publications which have made malicious attacks on the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform will not be accredited at the party congress. V. Kvetkauskal, editor of Lithuanian TV's news program, called the statement a blatant violation of the Lithuanian republic's press law and called on journalists to boycott coverage of the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.

Quite frankly, the newspapers RESPUBLIKA, ATGIMIMAS, and LIETUVOS RYTAS could quite easily win a special prize for their anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. Some readers praise them for this, others fiercely hate them for it. But banning their accreditation will hardly promote mutual understanding between the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and journalists on these publications. There is no other way to force opponents to face up to their problems than to conduct a dialogue with them.

The month and a half of the "war of nerves and ultimatums"—as we have seen for ourselves—has successfully turned the Lithuanian situation into a crisis in which neither side can hope to win...

Brazauskas Questioned on Moscow Contacts, Blockade

LD1904151390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Telephone interview with Algirdas Brazauskas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Council of Ministers, by correspondent B. Rupeika in Vilnius—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

[Rupeika] "Well, so this was gas and oil. What else is on the list?

[Brazauskas] There are other things on the list. At the moment I am collecting information. Many facts were discovered when the supply of various raw materials was refused, especially high-quality metal which is imported by the Soviet Union in a centralized way and which is used by our enterprises. Supplies of these have been cut off.

[Rupeika] So, you no longer believe that all this was done on the initiative of enterprises alone.

[Brazauskas] Oh, no. Everything is done in an organized way. This was done in an organized way. We are not supplied with packaging material, the food industry is in jeopardy, there is nothing to pack food with, there is no way groats, noodles, and flour can be packaged. These are perhaps everyday difficulties which are not too interesting. However, these decide a lot.

[Rupeika] What is your opinion at the moment? Do you think that the list of cut off supplies and raw materials will grow?

[Brazauskas] We simply do not know a lot yet. For example, today I instructed my staff to collect information about this and tonight I will have it and I will know

what the situation is at specific branches of economic activity and at individual enterprises so that I can inform our Supreme Council and the public at large.

[Rupeika] The listeners and my colleagues ask me if there has been any contacts with Moscow.

[Brazauskas] No, there hasn't been any contacts with Moscow because everything is done on orders from the Council of Ministers, on strict orders from the Council of Ministers. I think that the contacts concerning supplies at the moment are absolutely not effective. [passage omitted] I am dealing with these matters and I will be dealing with them. This is my job at the Council of Ministers. We will try to urgently solve the problems which can be solved here in this republic, at least to put the resources which are available to us to their best use, so that people will suffer least of all. [passage omitted] We must start looking for other possible solutions, to receive raw materials and fuel from other sources if we manage to do that. Anyway, we must try to do this.

Briefly speaking, we consume various types of fuel every day worth 4.5-5 million dollars. You can imagine what scope this is and how much this fuel costs. I am talking in international prices. [passage omitted]

Lithuania Establishes Independence Fund

LD2004105190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Excerpts] On the instructions of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, the Council of Ministers has established the Fund of Lithuania's Independence.[passage omitted]

In the near future similiar accounts will be opened in the United States, Ganada, Australia, Sweden, and other countries. This fund is now especially essential for Lithuania, and not just because of the economic blockade. It can provide important support for consolidating Lithuania's statehood. The Lithuanian parliament and government appeal to people of goodwill in Lithuania and other countries, to enterprises, offices, firms and organizations, asking for their support in this, the independence of Lithuania.

Landsbergis Invites Pope to Lithuania

LD1904131390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis has invited Pope John Paul II to visit Lithuania. The invitation was conveyed through the Lithuanian representative in the United States and the Vatican, Lozoraitis, who reported that the Pope's visit to Lithuania would be unlikely to take place earlier than 1992.

Broadcasting of Lithuanian Parliament Sessions

LD2004083690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] A plenary meeting of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session is opening in the Supreme Council building.

Deputies will examine problems of the functioning of the state and procedural questions of the Supreme Council. A statement on economic measures concerning the protection of the republic is to be made by Vice Premier Algirdas Brazauskas.

The work of the session will be reported by our correspondents in their reports and in news bulletins. For a long time previously we have carried live relays of the session; now that the Supreme Council has started its everyday parliamentary work and has decided not to pass important political acts before 1 May, our radio will report on the resolutions and work of the parliament in the form of reportage and summaries.

Especially important meetings, as hitherto, will be relayed live.

Red Army Conscription Difficulties Detailed

LD1904133290 Moscow TASS in English 1301 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius April 19 TASS—By TASS correspondent:

Spring conscription, which has begun in Lithuania as in other Soviet constituent republics, is proceeding in a difficult atmosphere this time.

"Induction boards began working on April 16," Major-General Visotskis, Lithuania's chief induction officer, told TASS. "The Soviet Defence Ministry, the Baltic Military District and the republican conscription office provided all local induction centres with the required assistance. But local authorities dissociated themselves from this important work."

"Moreover, government members and Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies regularly speak on the radio and television, urging reservists to turn in their military service record books en masse and draftees to boycott conscription, ignore summons to induction centres and even flee," he said.

According to the general, rallies and pickets were staged outside induction centres and their staff insulted and threatened.

Visotskis explained that in line with a Soviet Government resolution, local authorities are responsible for conscription. Induction commissions include local party and government leaders, police officers and medical personnel as well as military officers. These people have now received categorical orders not to serve on these commissions, he added.

Nonetheless, induction commissions are operating everywhere and the Lithuanian induction service will do everything necessary to complete the conscription in an organized manner as scheduled.

Officer Recounts Security Tasks in Lithuania

LD2004123990 Moscow Domstic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Report by TASS correspondent in Lithuania]

[Text] In accordance with the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers, personnel of interior ministry troop formations have mounted guard at buildings, structures, and property which belongs to the CPSU in the Lithuanian SSR. Lieutenant-Colonel (Malinin), chief of the Political Department, tells how the set tasks are being implemented. Servicemen are carrying out their duty guarding the Lithuanian Publishing House of the CPSU Central Committee, the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the republic, the party Institute of History and party archives, the House of Political Education, and the complex of buildings of the higher party school.

There have been no attacks on the watch sentries at the building of the Central Committee, although from time to time, in the night, some people approach the building and behave rather provocatively. But, the sentries guarding the Lithuanian Publishing House of the CPSU Central Committee, known in the city as the House of the Press, detained 11 people who had penetrated the building through the windows.

There was also an attempt by a group of four people to penetrate the building of the party Institute of History without passes. Such provocations lead to the stepping up of tension. The personnel of the formations are doing everything possible to avoid clashes, particularly with the use of force. The inhabitants of Vilnius, in the main, correctly assess the situation and are themselves striving to avert hooligan outbursts. Both the people of the city and the servicemen relaize that it is essential to resolve politically the problems which have arisen.

KGB Officer on Lithuanian Border Measures

90UN1460A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 14, Apr 90 pp 1, 9

[Interview with the chief of staff of the USSR KGB Border Guard Troops, Lieutenant General V. Shlyakhtin, by PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK correspondent V. Yurteyev; date and place not specified: "Situation on the Border"]

[Text] The ukase of the USSR president dated 21 March 1990 "On Additional Measures for Ensuring the Rights of Soviet Citizens and the Protection of USSR Sovereignty on the Territory of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]" sets additional tasks for the border guards associated with reinforcing the protection of the segment of the USSR state border running along the territory of Lithuania. What has caused these tasks and what has already been done specifically in order to carry out the presidential ukase?

This is what the chief of staff of the Border Guard Troops of the USSR Committee for State Security, Lieutenant General V. Shlyakhtin, told our correspondent:

[Shlyakhtin] The Soviet-Polish segment of the USSR state border on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR caused no special concern until recently. It was guarded in close cooperation with the Polish border guards. The local soviet and party organs and the workers of Lithuania vigorously helped us maintain order in the Soviet border area in the spirit of good past traditions. There the practice of simplified border-crossing procedures for relatives residing on both sides of the border existed. Fishing and some other vessels were processed in the ports for putting out to sea on the basis of crew lists, on the responsibility of their captains...

Measures aimed at reinforcing the protection of the USSR state border on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR which have been taken pursuant to the ukase of the USSR president have been brought about only by the exceptionally anticonstitutional legislative acts of the current leadership of the Lithuanian SSR which violate the rights of Soviet citizens and the sovereignty of the USSR.

Now let us talk about the specific work done. The units and subunits of the Red Banner Baltic Border District guarding the state border on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR were put on an intensified duty regime. This means that passes, days off, leaves for the officer cadres, warrant officers, and compulsory-service personnel have been canceled in them. Combat training classes have been cut back.

Due to the reassignment of personnel and resources, the border guard posts of the Lithuanian sector have been reinforced with personnel and materiel. The state border is guarded by reinforced details; the guard of the deployment locations of the military units and subunits has been reinforced.

Together with the customs facilities, the border-crossing checkpoints of the border guard troops have stepped up control of the movement of freight and all modes of transportation on international communications routes. Along with vessels sailing on foreign routes, vessels which engage in fishing in coastal waters are also subject to comprehensive inspection by the details of the border guard.

Within the limits of territorial waters and the USSR economic zone, the vessels of the border guard troops take measures aimed at detecting and bringing to an end possible contacts between Soviet and foreign fishing vessels. All of this is done with a view to preventing the delivery of weapons and ammunition to our country.

Pursuant to the ukase of the USSR president, the movement of foreign citizens across the USSR border within the confines of Lithuania has also been restricted.

The population of the republic has been informed extensively about the measures aimed at reinforcing the protection of the border. Despite these measures being a certain inconvenience for the people, an absolute majority of the citizens residing in the border area are aware of their necessity and their forced nature, and treat them with understanding. We cannot say that about some Sajudis activists who exaggerate and vigorously spread fantasies about "the closing of the border" and mass raids and searches.

I would like to stress that the personnel of the troops act strictly within the framework of the "Law on the USSR State Border" and the ukase of the USSR president. The documents of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies which has made a political assessment of the events in Lithuania have been thoroughly explained to the border guards. They receive real-time information on the dynamics of changes in the sociopolitical situation in the republic, probable trends of its development, and the measures taken by the president of the USSR and the Soviet Government with a view to stabilizing the situation in the region.

[Yurteyev] Do the border guards take part in political work among the local populace?

[Shlyakhtin] To the degree that resources and circumstances allow. The efforts of the troops are aimed at detecting and eliminating in a timely manner and by political means the premises for mounting interethnic conflicts, mass disturbances, and antisocial incidents, including those affecting the USSR state border and the border troops. We work in close cooperation with the political organs of large units and units of the Baltic Military District, the Baltic Fleet, the USSR KGB, and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs, party and soviet organs, and public organizations which stand on the CPSU platform.

Agitation and propaganda groups have been formed in the border detachments which consist of the best trained officers and warrant officers. Their task is to explain to the populace the content and essence of the ukase of the USSR president, the forced and temporary nature of additional regimen measures introduced in the border area, the pernicious consequences of possible unlawful actions on the border, and the insolvency of territorial claims by the extremist forces of Lithuania against union republics. At the same time, the need to turn in firearms for temporary storage is explained to the people, as well as the dangerous consequences of recruiting for the so-called "organizations of the protection of the land."

The potential of radio broadcasting, the press, and the district newspaper NA SOVETSKIKH RUBEZHAKH is used for political work among the populace.

A group of officers from the Main and Political Directorates of the USSR KGB Border Guard Troops is assisting the units and subunits of the Lithuanian sector in the course of carrying out the envisaged measures.

[Yurteyev] Have conflict situations developed along the border recently?

[Shlyakhtin] The situation on the Soviet-Polish segment of the USSR border on the territory of Lithuania and in the border area is normal. No serious incidents or occurrences have been registered since the presidential ukase took effect.

Ministry Urges Lithuanian Women To Support Draft

PM1704090390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[USSR Defense Ministry Press Center report: "Firebrands Not Abating"]

[Text] One day recently a report of "extraordinary" importance was carried on Lithuanian radio: A smoke bomb was thrown from an infantry combat vehicle at a passing car. Neither the number of the infantry vehicle nor that of the car was given. So just let anyone try to verify it or, say, do anything about the incident, if it really did take place.

Maybe this question will occur to someone: Was it worth drawing attention to that radio broadcast? But the point is that this is a characteristic feature, albeit a small one, of the anti-Army campaign being conducted in the republic. Incidentally, Lithuanian radio's youth channel interrupts ordinary programs to promptly inform people of any movements by Army subunits. As is known, combat training is impossible without movements—without marches during an exercise, moves to target ranges, etc. But whereas previously all this remained outside people's field of vision, now measures within the framework of planned combat training are presented as the intrigues of "aggressors" and "occupiers."

Anti-Army notes are heard in speeches by certain republic Supreme Soviet deputies. The Vilnius Garrison Commandant's Office receives anonymous threats and insults by telephone every day. Written threats are also sent to military commissariat officers.

In some places people have already begun making the transition from words to actions. In the city of Telshyay during the night of 7-8 April an inflammable liquid was poured over the doors of more than 20 apartments in a block housing officers and ensigns' families, and three of them were set alight. The fire was extinguished. But who will extinguish the fire of nationalism so zealously fanned by separatists sowing seeds of enmity and strife among people who have lived in peace and friendship for decades?

In all three Baltic republics "instruction documents" are being actively distributed, with detailed directions for draftees to evade military service, together with pro

formas for making statements rejecting it. Unfortunately, the majority of local law-enforcement organs are failing to stop the firebrands' actions.

A meeting has taken place at one of the directorates of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff with representatives of a delegation of women members of Lithuanian public organizations which had come to Moscow. Here it was emphasized that this meeting was not in the nature of a negotiation but had the purpose of providing answers to questions connected with the draft, as well as with the performance of service in the Soviet Armed Forces by citizens of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was emphasized once again that the anti-Army campaign mounted by the republic's separatist forces for the purpose of wrecking the spring draft and provoking servicemen to desert is unconstitutional and illegal. Pursuing purposes of ambitious political intrigue, the inspirers and organizers of this campaign are, in point of fact, playing with young people's destinies and pushing them into crime. And if anyone, particularly among the female public, has any questions in this connection, they should be addressed first and foremost to the instigators, including those among the present Lithuanian leadership.

How should our sons act? The following answer was given to this question raised by the women: Following the example of thousands of their older comrades who worthily passed through the school of Army service, draftees should join the Army as commanded by duty and the law. And those who have yielded to the provocative calls and gone AWOL from their units should at once return to their place of service. This will be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance when determining the degree of liability.

The USSR Ministry of Defense expressed readiness to hold further contacts of this kind with representatives of the Lithuanian public in the future to explain questions connected with the performance of service in the USSR Armed Forces.

Perfiliyev on Lithuanians' Independence Drive

LD1904201390 Paris Antenne 2 Television in French 1800 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Interview with Vadim Perfiliyev, spokesman of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Special Correspondent Stephane Manier; date and place of interview not specified—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] We shall now hear the Moscow point of view on the [Lithuanian] crisis. Our special correspondent Stephane Manier has met one of the spokesmen of the Soviet Government. As you will see, he is minimizing the crisis but keeps very firm on the essential.

[Perfiliyev] If we had, if you like, only one federated or associated republic to the Soviet Union beside ours, then we would have a two-sided discussion; perhaps it would have been even simpler. But we are living in a federated country with 15 different republics. Through the development of the situation, one sees better the balance of rights and obligations, if you like. The two are found in every institution, whether be it the family, the union, or the federation.

[Manier] But how would you react if a country like Norway or another agrees to supply gas to the Soviet Union?

[Perfiliyev] I don't think that we should internationalize this issue, that we should seek solutions outside the Soviet Union. The solution of the whole problem rests within the Soviet Union, in the dialogue between the Lithuanian authorities with their central partners. In fact, there are various partners; they are the industries, the suppliers, etc. We hope that all the republics will be wise enough to consider that it is in their interests to follow the path of these changes in the whole union and in the framework of this new legislation, and to look for the better conditions to achieve the wishes of their electorate regarding, for instance, sovereignty or even independence.

Lithuanian CP Secretary on Upcoming Congress

LD1904193890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1758 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius, 19 Apr (TASS)—On the eve of the 21st congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania [CPL] on the CPSU Platform which opens in Vilnius on 21 April, Vladislav Shved, second secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the CPL, gave an interview to TASS correspondents. He said, among other things:

"Four months have passed since a split occurred in the ranks of the communists of Lithuania. Some have remained loyal to the Marxist-Leninists in the composition of the CPSU, others have risen under the banner of an independent CPL.

"In the CPL (on the CPSU Platform) there are now some 40,000 communists. Evidently the congress will gather not 900 delegates, as was previously supposed, but some 800. Unfortunately, not all district party organizations of the republic have elected their delegates. But it cannot be said that this was a consequence of a reduction in the authority of our party. It is simply that the very complex sociopolitical situation which has taken shape in Lithuania could not help affecting people's mood.

"The unconstitutional course taken by the Landsbergis administration of withdrawing Lithuania from the composition of the USSR has created unprecedented instability in the republic, a mood of uncertainty regarding the future.

"The situation that has formed in the party on the eve of its congress is very difficult. Certain political forces which want to tear Lithuania from the USSR are continually exerting pressure, there is a veritable hounding of our party in a number of republican mass media. In

order to prevent dirty attacks and slanderous accusations against the CPL (on the CPSU Platform) and its congress representatives of a number of the newspapers most hostile toward us have not been accredited to the congress.

It is planned to hold the congress in three stages. At the first, which will take place on 21 April, delegates will discuss the political situation in the republic and elect the leading bodies of the party. At the second one proposals will be drafted for the coming 28th congress of the CPSU and delegates will be elected to that forum. The third stage will be held after the 28th CPSU congress.

"As secretary of the provisional Central Committee, I very much hope that the congress will be able to work out the precise position of our party, its attutude to the most complicated political processes which are taking place in the republic. On many questions the views of communists adhering to the CPSU Platform coincide with the position of the independent CPL. But we have diverged on the main thing. In contrast to a number of other political forces in the republic our CPL sees no future for Lithuania outside the USSR, it advocates a Lithuania within the composition of a Soviet Federation undergoing renewal."

Army Paper Views Lithuanian Developments

PM1904232190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Dispatch by Captain Second Rank V. Gromak (via telephone): "Lithuania: Witch-hunt?"]

[Text] Vilnius, 19 Apr—The 21st Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform opens Saturday, 21 April. The preparations for the communists' forum are taking place in rather difficult conditions. The faster the party recovers from the blow it sustained following the split of the Lithuanian Communist Party at the 20th Congress, the stronger the opposition to it on the part of the former opposition and current leadership of the republic.

The leadership of the Communist Party on the CPSU platform is experiencing difficulties in the simplest matters, or so it would seem at first glance. For instance, where is the congress to be held? The provisional Central Committee had barely managed to announce the date of the congress when, one week later, "Sajudis" decided to hold its forum on the very same day. A coincidence? Maybe so. However, for the Lithuanian Communist Party it turned into an unexpected problem. It has proved impossible to find suitable premises. The communists will have to hold their congress in the inappropriate premises of the Vilnius party school, whose hall holds only 600 people. The remaining delegates and guests will have to follow the congress proceedings on television screens in adjoining premises. Meanwhile the city authorities have allocated the vast and well-equipped Sports Palace to "Sajudis."

The city authorities are also creating certain difficulties as regards the accommodation of communist delegates...

These are purely organizational difficulties, so to speak. But what is the explanation for incidents which can only be described as common extremism? I was told about the following incident by Galina Antonovna Komarova. It happened at the "Leliya" Vilnius clothing association.

On 13 April several men burst into the office of the plant's party committee, of which Komarova is a secretary. Party documents and books were hurled into the corridor, and when four women members of the committee refused to leave the room the pogromists tried to wrench the chairs from under them.

B. Dzedavichyus, the plant's director general (incidentally, a holder of an order of Lenin) explained the actions of his subordinates as motivated by... official necessity.

"There have been similar incidents also at other enterprises whose leaders are 'Sajudis' supporters," I was told by I. Butrimovich, first secretary of Sovetskiy party raykom [rayon committee] of the Latvian Communist Party on the CPSU platform. "For instance at the 'ELFA' Production Association in Vilnius. There communists are under constant moral pressure from the administration."

That is democracy for you. Incidentally, democracy is only invoked in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet when "Moscow's dictatorship" or the "occupation regime" are being discussed. When the rights of party organizations on the CPSU platform are infringed, this is perceived as a completely natural phenomenon.

At a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists held 17 April V. Shved, second secretary of the provisional Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party on the CPSU platform cited the following figure—47,000. This is the current membership of the Communist Party. And its ranks are swelling during these difficult days for the republic. "I request admission to the ranks of the CPSU. My views and convictions are in line with the policy of our party. In connection with the exacerbation of the political situation in the republic I regard it as my duty to support the ranks of the CPSU," Tatyana Nikolayevna Shpitalenko writes in her application to the party organization. Similar applications have also been received from A. Bobylev, a Russian; I. Ananyev, a Belorussian; V. Titas, a Lithuanian; and N. Popova and R. Urbonene, two Ukrainian women...

Nowadays no one in Lithuania regards pickets as something unusual. Incidentally, this also applies to the anti-Army slogans which "Sajudis"-inspired people parade in the streets. And although the government cable signed by K. Prunskiene and addressed to the USSR president talks about a prudent approach to the problems connected with the spring draft, the anti-Army passions in Lithuania are not subsiding.

They are being further inflamed by the statements of individual deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. So for instance, A. Vayshvila, chairman of the standing commission on territorial protection and internal affairs, has declared in an interview to a Lithuanian newspaper: "During a meeting with my voters I was approached by an executive committee staffer... She told me that she had received a pile of draft papers from the Mezheykskiy military commissariat. What was she to do with them? I compiled and signed a letter to the military commissariat accepting responsibility for the draft papers not being dispatched to their adressees... But we are particularly concerned about the fate of those who have fled from their military service posts. How can we solve this problem? A proposal has been received to dispatch them temporarily to Western countries. Some states are prepared to provide refuge for these guys..."

What is the upshot of verbal attacks on the military and of thoughtless remarks by so-called statesmen? The answer is perfectly simple: They create trouble for the young men themselves, and for their near and dear ones. I was given the following statistics at the Vilnius Leninskiy Rayon military commissariat: Over three days, 103 people were summoned to the draft commission; 29 failed to turn up.

The spring draft is on everyone's lips in the republic at the moment. It is being discussed in labor collectives, in the streets, at newspaper kiosks, Supreme Soviet sessions, and news conferences. The question of the fate of the young men with which the republic government is playing so irresponsibly remains a topical issue.

Victims of Stalinism Urge Lithuanian Statehood

LD1904230490 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Over 7,000 people, most of them victims of Stalinist repressions, gathered outside the parliament building in Vilnius today. Invited by the Lithuanian Deportees' Union and the Lithuanian Freedom League, they came to declare: We have survived the deportations, slavish work and famine, we will also endure the blockade. The demonstrators urged the authorities not to sell freedom for petrol and to respond to Moscow's wrath by Lithuanian dignity and self control. The former deportees, political prisoners and members of the postwar resistance movement against the Soviet invaders expressed their total support of the independence declaration act of 11 March. Many of the speakers called upon the MPs not to make any essential compromises which would put an end to Lithuania's restored statehood. [passage omitted]

Radio Director on Coverage of Sajudis Meeting

LD1904123190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1005 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Dora Petkauskaite spoke with Kazimiera Magdeliene, director of programming at Lithuanian Radio, on how the work of the Sajudis congress will be covered.

[Begin K. Magdeliene recording] [passage omitted] The political situation at the moment is greatly influencing our work, as well as the work of the Supreme Council. [passage omitted] Because the Supreme Council left it for us to decide how much of the work of the Supreme Council sessions should be relayed live, at the same time we are now to decide if the micropohones should be switched on all the time at the Supreme Council. Many listeners are not happy with our programs anymore. On the other hand, journalists are out of work because there is no time left for their programs. [passage omitted] I must say, that even if the work of Supreme Soviet sessions is not relayed live in full, there will be no shortage of information about the work of the parliament. [passage omitted]

On Saturday and Sunday all the main sittings of the Sajudis congress will be relayed live.

On Saturday the first news bulletin will be at 0700 GMT which will give information on the agenda of the congress and other important issues.

At 0900 GMT the relay will start. It will continue until about 1230 GMT. A political report will be made at this point. The program in Russian on this day will be broadcast at 1100 GMT; and at 1200 GMT the live relay from the congress will be resumed. AT this point the Sajudis rules will be discussed. The relay will continue until 1330 GMT.

On Sunday only one live relay is planned, which will start at 0900 GMT; at this point the program of the Lithuanian restructuring movement Sajudis will be presented. The relay will last until 1200 GMT.

I would also like to inform those of our listeners who want to follow the work of the congress in the Russian language. Exhaustive information will be broadcast, as I have already mentioned at 1100 GMT on Saturday in the program in Russian and in special news bulletins at 1500 GMT and 1920 GMT and on Sunday in programs broadcast at a usual time: 1200 GMT, 1500 GMT, and 1920 GMT. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Weekly Contradicts Sajudis View of 'Poverty'

LD2004115890 Moscow TASS in English 1109 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—The Soviet PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK (Government Herald) weekly says that living standards in Lithuania are far from the "poverty and vegetation" level Lithuanian Sajudis

movement leaders complain of. At the same time, they forecast virtually an economic boom after Lithuania's secession from the Soviet Union.

Speaking about the meeting of people's requirements for housing, the newspaper points out that the 1988 figure for Lithuanian rural areas was 22.5 square meters per capita.

This, the weekly says, exceeds the figures for Russia (17.6 square meters) and even Belorussia (21.2) which is known for its high construction rates.

In 1988, Lithuania built about 80 flats per 10,000 people, while in Norway, Finland and Sweden the figure was 67.

Speaking about the republic's agro-industrial sector, the weekly says the capital investments in this sector of Lithuania for decades exceeded those in other regions of the country by several times.

In 1970, 36 per cent of Lithuania's arable land was ameliorated, while now the figure exceeds 70 per cent. In the Soviet Union, the degree of land amelioration now is not more than 10 per cent.

"Lithuanians are justly proud of their highly-developed agriculture, and consumption rates there are also high," the newspaper says. "Per capita consumption of meat, butter and eggs in Lithuania is higher than in Scandinavia.

"One can lament the 'poverty and vegetation' of the Lithuanian people only if one closes one's eyes to these facts and figures."

New Lithuanian Identity Card Law Deplored

90UN1504B Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by A. Petrov under the rubric "Timely Topic": "And Is This Democracy?"]

[Text] Vilnius—No one pays much attention to a new law in Lithuania—the republic's parliament passes them almost every day. But one of the most recent ones adopted by the Supreme Council has nonetheless drawn the attention of the entire population and has evoked severe dissatisfaction from its Russian-speaking portion. I am speaking of a law introducing an identity card for citizens of the Republic of Lithuania. It will be in effect until the new passports are received.

In order to receive the new identity card each resident of Lithuania must make a pledge as follows: To observe the laws of the republic and respect its independence and territorial integrity.... There is a great implication behind each word of the pledge. Take the republic's laws, for instance. As you know, the Supreme Council made a unilateral decision to withdraw Lithuania from the USSR and abolished the country's Constitution on its territory. In its place it hastily passed dozens of new laws which elicit a negative reaction from a significant part of the Russian-speaking population.

"We still live on the territory of the USSR," T. Zaykovskaya, veteran of labor, told me. "And I do not wish to hear about any other laws but Soviet laws."

In the republic there are thousands like Zaykovskaya. They also have their own approach to the problem of independence. There is no dispute that any people has the right to full sovereignty, including the Lithuanian people. But the majority of the deputies of the republic's Supreme Council, and for the most part they are made up of "Sajudis" members, received less than half the votes of the adult population. The whole people has not had its say. For Lithuania to belong to the USSR or to secede from it—that can only be decided with the help of a referendum. But the leaders of today's Lithuania do not want to conduct one, wishing the meanwhile to pass for democrats and pluralists. But a referendum is stipulated by the Law on the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR, which was passed recently by the country's Supreme Soviet.

"By signing under the words about 'respect for the independence' of Lithuania, we virtually acknowledge the unilateral declaration of secession from the union." This is the opinion of F. Daskal, department chairman of the Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania, which was created at the Vilnius radio-measuring-instrument factory. "I am sure that the majority of our labor collective does not agree with this 'course.'"

And now we will see what is hiding behind the words on territorial integrity which the citizens of the republic must respect if they wish to receive an identity card. This question is also not as simple as the leaders of "Sajudis" present it. It is known, for instance, that after 1939 several regions that had not previously been part of Lithuania were handed over to the republic. But the leaders of "Sajudis" apparently wish to settle "territorial integrity" through the pledge of their citizens alone, without consideration for the historical conditions of past and present days.

A year ago the members of "Sajudis," joining the former parliament, tried to separate the residents of Lithuania into "pure" and "impure," proposing to insert various limitations on the non-native population into draft bills on citizenship. And now behind the appearance of democracy (after all, identity cards will be distributed to all the adult inhabitants of the republic—just sign the pledge) is that same goal, the same former political calculation. If such a pledge is made by the residents of Lithuania under the pressure of "Sajudis," it will be an opportunity to demonstrate to the whole world "approval" for the unilaterally declared secession from the USSR and the "legality" of many other steps hastily completed by the parliament. And the Soviet Union will once again be declared an "occupier" trampling on "democracy."

Most of all, it is believed that the majority of the Russian-speaking population will never make any pledge. It is clear that all this exacerbates an already complex situation in the republic. In this situation, the warning to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Council and Council of Ministers just made public seems quite timely and realistic...

Lithuanian Deputy Threatens Hunger Strike

LD1904144990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Excerpt] At first I laughed at a phrase uttered by Zita Slicyte but later, I stopped smiling. Her phrase was as follows: She is going to eat a lot and prepare for an action.

[Slicyte] I told esteemed colleague Rupeika that when things become very difficult for Lithuania; former USSR deputies, not less than 50 people and not including those who are ill, will go to the Lenin Mausoleum on Red Square, will write on their chests how many electors voted for us, for instance, 140,000 voted for me, and proclaim a hunger strike.

[Rupeika] Will you be allowed to enter the square?

[Slicyte] The immunity of the USSR people's deputies is guaranteed by law and I think that militia workers would not dare prevent us from entering the square or remove us by force, unless we faint from hunger and ambulances take us away. [passage omitted]

TASS Summarizes 18 Apr Vilnius Hijacking

LD1904111690 Moscow TASS in English 1048 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—The Soviet Transport Prosecutor's Office has begun criminal proceedings against the man who hijacked an Tupolev 134 plane to Lithuania on Wednesday [18 April].

The man, Igor Kalugin, boarded Flight 2443, scheduled to fly from Moscow to Leningrad. On take off, Kalugin, through a stewardess, demanded that the pilots change course for Kaunas.

He warned crew members that he had a biological weapon.

After talks with the hijacker, the crew landed in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius.

Kalugin then demanded a meeting with Lithuanian leader Vytautas Landsbergis. Vilnius airport security officials said.

A check of the terrorist's luggage showed that he had no weapon.

Officials found out that he worked as a firefighter in Moscow's Sovremennik Theatre.

The man said he wanted to draw the world's attention to developments in Lithuania, find out Landsbergis's view on the situation and stage a press conference for foreign reporters.

It was discovered that Kalugin was registered at a psychiatric clinic in a town on the outskirts of Moscow.

After Kalugin's arrest, officials checked the plane and three hours later it left for Leningrad.

Landsbergis Letter of Thanks to Havel Published

90UN1487A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 1

[Letter to President of Czechoslovakia V. Havel from V. Landsbergis, chairman of republic of Lithuania Supreme Council]

[Text] Czechoslovakia, City of Prague
To President Vaclav Havel

Mr. President,

Your words of support for the Lithuanian aspiration to independence are quite significant. I accept with joy and gratitude your offer to hold talks between the USSR and the republic of Lithuania in the beautiful and hospitable land of Czechoslovakia. You were the first head of state to suggest this, which Lithuania will not forget.
[Signed] Yours Vytautas Landsbergis
Vilnius, 31 March 1990

Danish Leader's Telegram to Landsbergis Published

90UN1487C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 1

[Telegram from Danish Prime Minister Poul Schlueter: "The Position of Denmark"]

[Text] A telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark was received by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the republic of Lithuania Supreme Council. The telegram reads:

I received your letter of 24 March 1990 from a delegation of the republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, which visited Denmark on 29 March 1990.

I would like to thank you for officially informing me of your attitude toward the political situation in Lithuania and for forwarding to me the documents associated with it.

The Government of Denmark greets with great satisfaction the process of democratization that has occurred in the Baltic republics and provided an opportunity for free elections in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.

We received with deep satisfaction the declaration of your newly elected parliament dated 11 March 1990 which restored the sovereignty of Lithuania. We also

noted that your government had appealed to the Government of the Soviet Union to start negotiations on practical issues.

As you undoubtedly know, Denmark recognized Lithuania as an independent state as early as 1921. Denmark has never recognized de jure the 1940 incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union.

Denmark supports the efforts of Lithuania to come to an agreement on negotiations with the Soviet Union that will fully implement the formal independent status of Lithuania. At the same, Denmark has insistently asked the leaders of the Soviet Union to refrain from all threats and actions aimed at intimidating the newly elected parliament and Government of Lithuania, and to embark immediately on serious negotiations with the authorities of Lithuania. During their visit to Copenhagen, Mr. Zingeris and Mr. Bogdanas met, among others, with the minister of foreign affairs, the speaker of the parliament of Denmark, and many of its members. The minister of foreign affairs explained in detail the Government of Denmark's position with regard to Lithuania. Mr. Zingeris and Mr. Bogdanas will undoubtedly give you a complete report on these presentations. Notably, the minister of foreign affairs and the delegation of Lithuania discussed a number of opportunities for establishing contacts between Denmark and Lithuania in the future. These documents will be transmitted through the appropriate channels.

On behalf of the Government and people of Denmark I would like to cordially congratulate you and the entire Lithuanian people, and offer our best wishes for success in your endeavors.

We hope to begin and expand fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation between Denmark and Lithuania.

Sincerely yours,
[Signed] Poul Schlueter, prime minister of Denmark

Council Names New Supreme Court Chairman

90UN1487E Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 1

[Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council resolution]

[Text] The republic of Lithuania Supreme Council **resolves:**

1. To elect Mindaugas Loshis chairman of the republic of Lithuania Supreme Court.

2. To instruct Chairman of the republic of Lithuania Supreme Court Mindaugas **Loshis** to present the composition of the republic of Lithuania Supreme Court to the republic of Lithuania Supreme Council before 16 April of this year.
[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council
Vilnius, 2 April 1990

Moscow Deputies Support Lithuanian Moves

90UN1449A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 1

[Message "to V.V. Landsbergis, Chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania"]

[Text] We, the people's deputies of the Moscow Soviet of the 21st convocation, support the desire of the Lithuania people for independence and self-determination. We consider the forcible suppression of your people and your state within the framework of the USSR intolerable. Recognizing that a people cannot be free when oppressing other peoples, we condemn the interference of the president of the USSR and the Government of the USSR in the internal affairs of your republic. We hope for prudence on the part of our leadership and for a quick settlement of all contentious issues between Lithuania and the USSR through negotiations.

We wish you and the entire Lithuanian people success in the rebirth of your country.
[Signed] People's deputies of the Moscow Soviet—73 signatures.

Lithuanian Collaboration With KGB Banned

90UN1449G Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 2

["Announcement of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania"]

[Text] As a result of various circumstances, some people in Lithuania have had to cooperate with organs of the USSR KGB. Such people probably have not always been able or dared to make a free choice and express their will and views.

In the name of accord and peace, the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania addresses itself to such people and announces that previous cooperation with the organs of the USSR KGB does not obligate them either legally or morally. It is declared that promises made to the aforementioned service or any other obligations are no longer in force. In this regard the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania calls upon each person who is a former collaborator-informer of the USSR KGB to make a decision by 28 March of this year to stop rendering aid to the organs of the USSR KGB. We guarantee that any person who has not committed a serious crime against the residents of Lithuania and who has renounced the maintenance of further contacts with the USSR KGB will not be subjected to moral, legal, or any other persecution on the part of the authority of the republic. Their last names, where found on lists of secret informers, will never be officially published, nor will they be confirmed in the event that they are made public by other means. On the contrary, confession and repentance would be evaluated as a moral purification of the citizenry and the society.

Further collaboration by residents of Lithuania with institutions and workers of the USSR KGB after 28 March of this year will be viewed as an activity that is ruinous to the interests of the restored republic of Lithuania and will be subject to punishment in the manner established by law.

Estonian Minister on Gorbachev Terms for Talks

LD2004131190 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1200 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Estonia considers it impossible to agree to the conditions of the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, for continuing talks with the central leadership. Gorbachev demanded that the Estonian parliament cancel its decision that the Soviet Constitution does not apply in Estonia during the transition period and that Estonia is an occupied state. The Estonian foreign minister, Lennart Meri, said in an interview to Radio News in Helsinki that Gorbachev's demand is surprising, for it demands that a democratically elected parliamentary institution should cancel its decision. In Meri's view, Gorbachev should understand that the cancellation of the decision of parliament is impossible on the basis of the idea of democracy. In the view of the Estonian foreign minister, talks on Estonia's position can be continued only after the central Soviet leadership clearly recognizes Estonia's position as an occupied state.

Estonian Premier Recalls Talks With Ryzhkov

LD2004134290 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Summary] Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar discussed army service with Nikolay Ryzhkov yesterday and this morning in Moscow.

[Begin Savisaar recording] "Meanwhile Prime Minister Ryzhkov discussed matters with his defense minister, and evidently this had a bearing on his opinions today, which were not to our advantage. But on the whole, an agreement was reached that we will continue next week with the Estonian side—that is, we will be elaborating on what we have in mind: How many people do we need in militia schools and militia service, how many do we need in the civil defense service, in the civil defense regiment. Labor service was viewed suspiciously but who knows, maybe there are developments to be expected in that direction too. And in that case, how many should be from among those who join the Soviet Army voluntarily—we suggested around 500-600 people which the military commissariat could ensure. Once we have these specific figures for the militia and civil defense, then next week we will continue the discussion." [end recording]

Estonia Committee Demands End to KGB Activity

LD1904175590 Tallinn MAALEHT in Estonian 12 Apr 90 p1

[Article entitled: "KGB-Liquidation Group at the Estonian Committee Starts Work"]

[Text] The Estonian Congress demands in its resolution "on USSR occupation forces": "put an end to the activity of USSR repressive bodies—State Security Committee (KGB), internal forces, and others—in Estonia, and remove them from the territory of the republic of Estonia." The KGB has been the cruelest tool of USSR politics and of Soviet power, having for 50 years spread its tentacles into all spheres of life.

At the Estonian Committee, a group to deal with the KGB has started work. In the present transition period it is necessary first and foremost to bring the activity of the KGB out into the public eye and to throw light, with the help of the people, upon what hitherto has been hidden.

The group addresses the KGB with an appeal to make public the KGB's fundamental resolution and its structure via the press. Thereafter one can begin to neutralize the activity of the KGB hitherto, and to subject it to the control of the Estonian Committee. The group relies in this respect on the personal participation of Rein Sillar, the new KGB chief, in this activity.

The Estonian Committee demands that KGB archives are made accessible. Files established on citizens of the republic of Estonia must be handed over to them. The removal from Estonia of KGB archive documents or their destruction must be barred. The archive documents which have already been removed must be returned. All this must be done immediately, subject to the Estonian Committee's control.

The Estonian Committee proposes to the KGB chairman that he issues an order to stop KGB activity in enterprises and establishments.

The Estonian Committee approaches the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet with a proposal to set up a special commission for investigating, neutralizing, and liquidating the activity of the KGB in a lawful way. The Estonian Committee's group which deals with the KGB will in its turn get in touch with the corresponding Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet comission and will share its sphere of activity.

The Estonian Committee appeals to the chairman of the KGB to contact the Estonian Committee and to take part in the process of ending the unlawful KGB activity on the territory of the republic of Estonia, whilst it must take place in the way of peaceful talks.

Tallinn, 2 April 1990

[Signed] KGB-liquidating group of the Estonian Committee

Estonia Faces Opposition to Independence

LD1904164290 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Tallinn April 19 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko:

The independence-minded Estonian parliament has encountered strong resistance to its bid for eventual secession from the Soviet Union, put up by the republic's industrial northeast.

Nikolay Zakharov, a pro-Union MP [member of parliament] and Communist Party chief in the miners' city of Kokhtla-Yarve, said the city council has declared several recent Estonian legislative acts contradicting the Soviet Constitution null and void, and has decided to disregard them in its catchment area.

This includes the bills on labour service and on the state status of Estonia.

"We were compelled to take counter-measures to protect our constitutional rights," Zakharov explained.

According to him, the urban population of the entire northeast insists on ensuring Estonia's sovereignty in the long term, by "consolidating its economic and political independence within an updated Soviet Federation".

The Estonian northeast, which includes the cities of Kokhtla- Yarve, Sillamae, and Narva, is an industrial centre with robust potential, including a shale oil industry created in the post-war years due to an increased demand for energy.

The extensive mine-building scheme involved former troops of the Estonian Rifle Corps and resettlers from all over the Soviet Union. Over the years, the local community has grown particularly heterogeneous, two-third being Russian-speakers. This largely determines the local position on Estonian sovereignty and status.

Zakharov described the state status bill as conflicting with the national Constitution because the Estonian parliament declared the federal power illegal, leaving people to violate either the Soviet Constitution or Estonian laws.

The Kokhtla-Yarve city council made the choice in favour of federal laws.

The majority in the parliament, reflecting the sentiments mostly of southern and south-western areas, however, sees events 50 years ago as "Estonia's occupation by the Soviet Union".

When deputies from the northeast last December tabled a number of documents refuting the "annexation and occupation" claims, they were ignored by the majority.

Gorbachev Meets With Latvian, Estonian Leaders

LD1904172990 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0900 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] A group of representatives from Latvia and Estonia are currently meeting in Moscow with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. The group from Latvia, includes Anatolijs Gorbunovs, Vilnis Bresis, Ilmars Bisers, and Dainis Ivans. The Estonian side is represented by Arnold Ryuytel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia; Edgar Savisaar, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; and member of the Estonian government Endel Lippmaa, minister without portfolio. The duties of this minister include further talks with the USSR Government.

Before the meeting with Gorbachev the representatives of the Estonian government described it as a consultation and dialogue before a meeting of experts which would discuss further items of the talks between Estonia and the Soviet Union.

Offers 'Special Status'

AU1904182090 Paris AFP in English 1751 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 19 (AFP)—President Mikhail Gorbachev told the Baltic republics of Latvia and Estonia on Thursday that they might have special status within the Soviet Union if they refrained from secession, various sources said. Mr. Gorbachev held separate meetings here with delegations led by the Latvian and Estonian presidents, the sources said.

Just hours before, the Soviet authorities carried out Mr. Gorbachev's threat to cut off oil and natural gas supplies to the third Baltic republic, Lithuania, which proclaimed its independence on March 11.

Nationalist sources in the Latvian capital, Riga, said that Mr. Gorbachev had offered the republic "special status" within the Soviet Union, but they did not specify exactly what he meant.

In talks with Latvian President Anatoliy Gorbunov, Mr. Gorbachev emphasised at length the political and economic advantages which would accrue to Latvia if it refrained from breaking with the Soviet Union, the sources said.

According to the Radio Moscow publication INTERFAX, Mr. Gorbachev held a subsequent meeting with Estonian President Arnold Ryuytel and insisted that Estonia retract its decision of March 30 to suspend the Soviet Constitution on its territory.

INTERFAX quoted Mr. Gorbachev as saying that dialogue with Estonia was impossible so long as such anti-constitutional measures remained in force.

If Estonia complied with his wishes, however, a confederal status for the republic could be envisaged.

INTERFAX said that this was the first time that Mr. Gorbachev had made such a proposal to any of the 15 constituent Soviet republics.

The Estonian Prime Minister, Edgaar Savisaar, and another member of the government, Endel Lippmaa, attended the meeting, INTERFAX said.

On March 30, the parliament in Tallinn adopted a declaration saying that Estonia was under foreign occupation and illegal Soviet control, but it vowed to maintain links with the Soviet Union for a "transitory period" while it moved towards full independence.

A week ago, the Estonian parliament appealed to Mr. Gorbachev to begin immediate negotiations on restoring the republic's independence.

The question of military service by young Estonians was also discussed at Thursday's Moscow meeting, INTERFAX said.

The Estonian parliament, dominated by pro-independence Popular Front deputies, has declared it "illegal" for young people to accept conscription into the Soviet Army.

In addition to Mr. Gorbunov, the President of the Latvian Popular Front, Dainis Ivans, attended the meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, which came two weeks before the first session of the newly elected Latvian parliament.

Nationalist sources in Riga said that Mr. Gorbachev insisted that if Latvia went ahead with moves towards full independence, it must do so with respect for Soviet law.

Since the victories of nationalist movements in elections in the Baltic republics earlier this year, the Supreme Soviet in Moscow has passed a law defining the procedures for a republic to secede.

Nationalists have said the law makes it very difficult for a republic to succeed in doing so.

Cautions Leaders

LD1904203490 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Excerpts] In the Kremlin today USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev received a group of representatives from Latvia in order to define more exactly the positions for starting talks between the Governments of the Soviet Union and Latvia.

After the meeting with Gorbachev the chairman of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Anatolijs Gorbunovs, telephoned us at the radio studio in order to inform us about this talk.

[Begin recording] [Gorbunovs] [passage omitted] Presidential Council member Ryzhkov, Yakovlev, and Revenko participated in the talk.

We informed them once more of the firm stand by a majority of the deputies in the elected Latvian Supreme Soviet about restoring state independence to Latvia.

In this connection the USSR president told us that he regards this meeting as very symbolic. It must, however, be said that he did not further clarify what he meant by this word, but he particularly stressed it.

He said that the task of this meeting is to begin discussion between groups of experts on future relations between the USSR and Latvia.

It must also be said that a sharp and very principled discussion took place on future ways to develop Latvia's statehood.

We defended the standpoint of the majority of Latvian people on the necessity of restoring state independence to Latvia.

Concerning this the USSR president stated that he sees two principal ways for a further development of the relations between the USSR and Latvia. Namely, if Latvia wishes to gain independence outside the USSR framework, then it must accurately fulfill the USSR law on the procedure according to which questions in connection with union republics leaving the USSR are to be decided. Second, if Latvia were willing to remain within the USSR framework, the USSR leadership would be willing to conduct talks about a considerable (?extension) of its political and economic independence.

In replying, it could be said, to our objections that such a solution would not be supported by the people of Latvia, the USSR president allowed the possibility that within the USSR framework Latvia could be granted a special status. It could be understood in such a way—and it was emphasized—as endowing the relations between the USSR and Latvia with a confederative character.

[Interviewer] Did you also point out, or did any member of our delegation also point out, the historical nuances connected with the incorporation of Latvia into the composition of the Soviet Union in 1940?

[Gorbunovs] Of course, we began with that.

[Interviewer] And what was the reaction?

[Gorbunovs] The reaction was that one must be guided by the realities of today. Well, this is an opinion which has already been expressed in several meetings.

I would like to relate, what we agreed on then, and what we shall do in future.

[Interviewer] Yes, of course.

[Gorbunovs] The standpoints are different, and on some questions even diametrically opposed, and especially on the most important question.

We agreed that experts must draw up and discuss both versions for further development of Latvia's statehood.

But the people of Latvia must then make a choice between them.

In conclusion the USSR president once more expressed a warning that no kind of talks would be continued if the Latvian Supreme Soviet unilaterally proclaims independence.

Well, we took cognizance of this, and then our meeting was concluded. [end recording]

[Announcer] You have heard an excerpt from a telephone conversation with Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Second announcer] Today, after the meeting with Latvia's representatives USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev also had an exchange of opinions with members of the Estonian Government, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Arnold Ryuytel; Chairman of the Council of Ministers Edgar Savisaar; and Minister of the Estonian Government Endel Lippmaa who has been appointed precisely for talks with the Soviet Union.

During the meeting Gorbachev expressed the opinion that if the Government of Estonia did not restore on its territory the power of the USSR Constitution, which at the present moment has been cancelled, then economic sanctions will be used against Estonia and presidential rule will be introduced. This is part of the conditions set by the USSR Government which Estonia should observe so that the USSR will continue the mutual talks.

Latvian Official Cited on Talks With Gorbachev

LD2004132590 Riga International Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Talks by a Latvian delegation with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev on the restoration of Latvia's economic and political sovereignty began today in Moscow. [passage omitted] During the talks Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the view that if, at the first session of the Supreme Soviet on 3 May, the Supreme Soviet of Latvia adopts similar decisions to those in Lithuania and Estonia, these talks would be discontinued. [passage omitted]

Yesterday in a television interview Ilmars Bisers, who at present is in Latvia, said that the talks would certainly concern the relations between all three Baltic republics and the center, including the entire range of relations betwen the USSR and Lithuania. [passage omitted] Ilmars Bisers said that continuous pressure is being exerted upon USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev by Army representatives and by conservative USSR people's deputies with their appeals for intensifying sanctions against Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Latvian Leader Interviewed on Independence

PM1904104490 Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS in French 14-15 Apr 90 p 10

[Interview with Latvian Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs by Georges Dupoy in Lugano—date not given]

[Text] [Dupoy] A few days ago you announced that the Riga Supreme Soviet was going to declare Latvia's independence on 2 May. Do you not think that the tension in Lithuania is likely to delay that decision?

[Gorbunovs] Why? The situation in Latvia has not changed. The composition of the parliamentary majority means that the deputies are prepared to make this decision. Moreover, the voters expect them to make it.

So this date cannot be postponed. The only event which could postpone it would be if Gorbachev took a decisive step in the same direction in the meantime.

[Dupoy] Is it possible to talk of a common strategy among the three Baltic republics?

[Gorbunovs] The three countries have the same objective. This strategy is based on a common history which ended in the same way in 1940 with their annexation by the USSR. They intend to regain the sovereignty they had 50 years ago. In addition, we have relatively similar political situations.

[Dupoy] Did the Lithuanians inform the Latvians of their decision to proclaim their independence on 11 March?

[Gorbunovs] They did not do so officially. But it was an open secret. Mr. Gorbachev knew that himself. He had been warned about it when he visited Vilnius on 10 January.

[Dupoy] Do you think that Gorbachev is satisfied with this state of affairs?

[Gorbunovs] Gorbachev's main idea was to grant state sovereignty to the republics while keeping them within the Union by a joint constitution. However, that model has still not been formulated. How can a state be sovereign if it does not have articles in the Constitution which establish that sovereignty?

[Dupoy] Has Gorbachev been overtaken by events?

[Gorbunovs] I think so. He has never been master of events: He has suffered them, followed them, and sometimes exploited them.

[Dupoy] Can the collapse of the Soviet empire be compared with the Western countries' decolonization, with the risks of military intervention which that implies?

[Gorbunovs] There is certainly a parallel. But the situation in the Soviet Union is much more complicated. According to the conventional analysis, the colonial metropolis grows rich at the colonies' expense. That is

the reverse of what is happening in the USSR where Russia is poorer than some peripheral republics. And there are now even movements in Russia demanding sovereignty for the Russian Republic. But military intervention is something that is entirely possible. We have recently seen great tension in the army because of specifically military problems, but also because of the political situation. Indeed, some officers think that the army's malaise is not linked to the economic situation but to what they call the democratization process. We see a strong reaction among them, a real hatred for democratization.

[Dupoy] What do they mean by that? Do they mean nationalist demands?

[Gorbunovs] It is something more general than the nationalities problem. But it is true that the Baltic republics are in the vanguard of demands for democratization and, because of that, the Army is focusing on our three countries.

[Dupoy] You are chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet and also a member of the Latvian Communist Party. However, during your absence, there was a split in the Communist Party forming a national minority and a pro-Soviet majority. What grouping will you join when you return to Riga?

[Gorbunovs] As chairman of the Supreme Soviet, I am forced to adopt a centrist position. But I do not support the pro-Soviet grouping and I am waiting for the new Latvian party to draw up its rules to see whether they are acceptable. At all events, the session of the new parliament must elect a new hierarchy and I will then be free to make my choice. As regards the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet, I will only be a candidate if the Latvian People's Front asks me to stand, but I will not put myself forward as a candidate.

All-Latvian Deputies' Assembly Slated for 21 Apr

PM1904151990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Irina Litvinova report from Riga under "Direct Line" rubric: "All-Latvian Assembly Convened"]

[Text] Riga—The Presidium of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has backed the initiative of the Latvian People's Front Duma to convene an All-Latvian Assembly of people's deputies.

A special resolution has been adopted. It notes that this measure will make it possible "to obtain a clearer picture of the will of Latvia's people and take it into account during the adoption of political and legal documents on measures to restore the state sovereignty of the Lativan Republic at the first session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet." Presidiums and executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies are instructed to assist people's deputies in organizing meetings with voters, and also to ensure that they are able to attend the All-Latvian Assembly which will be held in Riga 21 April.

At the same time the press carries an appeal from a group of people's deputies about the necessity to set up a united republican deputies' group—"Soyuz." The draft platform of the "Soyuz" Association of Latvian SSR Deputy Groups notes that the restructuring of the economic and political foundations of the Soviet society is accompanied by a destabilization of state structures. This has been exploited by nationalist and separatist forces which have succeeded in disorientating a section of the population which is politically inexperienced and has lost faith in the traditional forms of power. "The People's Front of Latvia, established with the direct participation of the republic's party and state leadership, has managed, making skillful use of the rebirth of the people's national consciousness and taking charge of the mass media, to gain control over the law-making activities of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet. This has ensured the victory of the Latvian People's Front in the elections. In virtually all the soviets the majority of deputies are implementing the program of the Latvian People's Front whose main objective is Latvia's secession from the USSR."

In the opinion of the organizers of the "Soyuz" group, the disruption of ties with the USSR will result in a sharp deterioration of the living standards of the republic population, an exacerbation of interethnic conflicts, and a restriction of human rights and freedoms.

The constituent congress of the "Soyuz" Association of deputy groups will take place in Riga 22 April.

RSFSR

Candidate Deputies Seek New RSFSR Elections

90UN1404 Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 12, 23 Mar 90 p 15

[Letter from B.I. Iskakov, et al, under the rubric "Tracking the Elections to the Soviets: The Grimaces of Democracy": "Letter From Candidates for People's Deputy"]

[Text] **The editorial board of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA received a copy of this letter to V.I. Kazakov, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Central Electoral Commission, and to the Moscow City Electoral Commission and the district and precinct electoral commissions of the city of Moscow. Copies were also sent to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev; V.I. Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; A.V. Vlasov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; M.F. Nenashev, chairman of USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]; ministries and departments of the USSR and RSFSR; and the editorial boards of newspapers and journals.**

The letter says, in part:

"We, candidates for people's deputy of the RSFSR and the Moscow soviet, register a strong protest against the mass, gross violations of the RSFSR Law on Elections tolerated by supporters of the so-called 'Democratic Russia' bloc, the Interregional Group of Deputies, the Moscow Association of Voters, and the 'Democratic Union' and others on election day, 4 March 1990. These violations took the form of instances of gross agitation and pressure on the voters on election day at the electoral precincts, control over how the voters expressed their will, manipulation of the ballots on the part of several members of the commissions of the electoral precincts, and the distribution of leaflets with slanderous fabrications in reference to political opponents.

"Among the leaders of the aforementioned movements, there are supporters of a plutocracy, the black market, the mafia, and of other destructive forces which have entered into a political union in a frenzied struggle to seize power in order to wrest it from the bureaucracy (the administrative and command system) and not allow the laboring masses, workers, peasants, and the working intelligentsia, that is, supporters of a genuine socialist democracy, access to it.

"Because of great inadequacies in their work, the electoral commissions of Moscow did not provide for sufficient glasnost in the conduct of the electoral campaign and of the elections themselves. Tens of thousands of refugees from the Transcaucasus were not admitted to the elections. Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, and 31 of the RSFSR Law on Elections were violated."

The letter contains demands:

"—To annul the falsified results of the 4 March 1990 elections and consider them as not having taken place.

"—To designate and hold new, objective elections with exact observation of the RSFSR Law on Elections.

"—To replace the staff of the precinct electoral commissions (UIK), which have compromised themselves.

"—To introduce ballot numbering in order to rule out or at least render more difficult the potential opportunity to manipulate them at the precinct electoral commissions (each voter has the right to know the number of the ballots given to him in order to have the opportunity later to see whether his choice of candidate was misrepresented or whether his ballots were replaced during the evening and night count of the votes at the precinct electoral commissions).

"—cto distribute the ballots on election day according to a list of voters, not by a formal check-off procedure, in order to rule out the potential opportunity to manipulate the votes of absent voters on election day or during the night count of ballots.

"—When the votes are being counted at the precinct electoral commissions, to make up a list of the numbers of ballots handed out indicating which candidates were chosen for each genuine ballot that was used in order to rule out the potential opportunity to replace ballots when they are being counted (each voter should have the right and the opportunity to later verify his number and the candidates he has chosen by precinct electoral commissions lists)."

Later in the letter it says:

"We ask the organs of the Procuracy of the USSR and the RSFSR to examine the issue of violations on 4 March 1990 of the Russian Law on Elections as part of their system of prosecutorial oversight.

"We, Soviet patriots, feel great concern and alarm at this latest step for the fate of the homeland, socialism, and the Soviet working people in connection with the debauch of destructive mafia forces in the USSR blatantly defying all human laws in the struggle to seize power under the conditions of confusion and the helplessness of the Soviet leadership in the face of the possible treachery of some of its members...

"The mass of instances proves that the 4 March 1990 elections took place outside democratic guidelines... To uphold our demands is to uphold the health of perestroyka, the Constitution of our country, the interests of the Soviet people, and socialist law."

The letter was signed by candidates for people's deputy of the RSFSR and the Moscow Soviet: B.I. Iskakov, doctor of economic sciences; G.I. Litvinova, doctor of legal sciences; V.G. Bryusova, doctor of art criticism; R.I. Kosolapov, doctor of philosophical sciences; A.A. Sergeyev, doctor of economic sciences; S.A. Chibiryayev, doctor of legal sciences; V.L. Chepurenko, candidate of economic sciences; V.I. Novikov, director of the "Sovetskaya Rossiya" publishing house; A.I. Kazintsev, assistant chief editor of the journal NASH SOVREMENNIK; the writers T.A. Ponomareva, S.Yu. Rybas, and S.A. Lykoshin; and 24 more candidates for people's deputy of the RSFSR and the Moscow Soviet.

Tatar Supreme Soviet Chairman Elected

PM1704100390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "On Alternative Basis"]

[Text] Kazan, 11 Apr—The first session of the Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet of the new convocation began work today with the election of the chairman of the autonomous republic's Supreme Soviet.

The ballot slip for secret voting included the names of M. Shaymiyev, first secretary of the Tatar CPSU Obkom [oblast committee], university lecturer M. Mulyukov, and nonparty writer F. Bayramova.

By an overwhelming number of votes the deputies, 90 percent of whom are communists, elected M. Shaymiyev chairman of the Tatar ASSR Supreme Soviet.

RSFSR Christian Democrats Hold First Meeting

LD0904110490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 8 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by correspondent Dmitry Kiselev]

[Excerpts] [Presenter Sergey Medvedev] The spectrum of political life in the country is becoming more and more varied and colorful. The Supreme Soviet still is only preparing to discuss the draft law on public organizations, including parties, but others are taking the bull by the horns, as they say, rather than waiting for the law-makers.

[Correspondent Dmitriy Kiselev] The inaugural conference of yet another party in our country is to open in a few minutes here at the capital's Krasnaya Presnya Palace of Culture. It calls itself the Russian Christian Democratic Movement [Rossiyskoye Khristianskoye Demokraticheskoye Dvizheniye] Here are a few lines from the party's declaration:

The development of society is determined by spiritual principles because to deny the spirit leads inevitably to the abomination of desolations, since it denies the basis on which mankind stands and which supports him.

Delegates from a dozen towns of our country, foreign guests, and the international press are represented here. While registration and sales of literature are under way, we talk to the organizers of the party, as these people call themselves.

[V. Polosov, people's deputy of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR)] Our aim is to create a political bastion in society which would be a repository of democratic values, the Christian view of the world, and the values of the human person, which are higher than social and economic theories and the interests of society as a whole. We are merely in favor of the preservation of human rights, no matter what the type of state system, be it a democracy, a monarchy, a republic, etc..

[Kiselev] The charter of the Russian Democratic Movement, as your party is called, says that any Russian [rossiyanin] 16 or older who shares the movement's program and meets the requirements of (?your) charter may become a participant in your movement. A Russian, what do you understand by this?

[RSFSR People's Deputy V. Aksyushits] Our organization is an organization of the Russian Republic, which is why we have said, "Russian," i.e. citizens of the Russian Republic.

[Kiselev] I see. So it is not nationality that is intended here?

[Aksyushits] No, definitely not.

[Kiselev] In addition, the party is against there being any official dialogue in society and is in favor of parliamentary democracy and a state based on law, independence for the mass media, a professional army, trial by jury, the restoration of the historical names of towns and streets, as well as of the restoration of Russian symbols, to include the flag, coat of arms, and national anthem. [Aksyushits wears a lapel badge of the red, white, and blue flag of pre-1917 Russia] [passage omitted containing visiting Bishop Vasiliy Rodzyanko, of the American Orthodox Church, and grandson of the last chairman of the Russian State Duma, voices his agreement with the charter and his conviction that Christians must be "in this world but not of it" and therefore have a duty to bring all that is positive in Christianity to the world]

[Kiselev] Tomorrow, the meeting at the Krasnaya Presnya Palace of Culture plans to continue its work and to elect the party's leading body, the Duma.

[Video shows Kiselev in a busy auditorium with a red, black, and white flag draped over the lecturn on the stage; delegates shown registering; close-ups of those interviewed; close-up of the Russian-flag lapel badge; those attending the congress taking their seats and crossing themselves as they do so; interview with Rodzyanko; close-up of seated delegate with a lapel badge reading "Russian People's Front" with a white flag bearing a blue diagonal cross in the center]

Leningrad Obkom, Gorkom Hold Joint Meeting

LD1904223990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Topical issues of perestroyka, the renewal of the party, and finding the way out of the social and economic crisis were raised in the report-back of the joint oblast and city conference of the Leningrad CPSU organization. Its draft was ratified at a joint CPSU plenum of the Leningrad Obkom [oblast party committee] and Gorkom [city party committee] that took place today.

Gidaspov, first secretary of the obkom and gorkom stressed in his speech that in the complex situation the country and its second biggest and most important city are in, the party has no right to withdraw from solving the most pressing social and economic problems. Nevertheless, the Leningrad party organization intends to not duplicate the work of other soviet bodies but to cooperate with them for the sake of achieving the common goal. Medvedev, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, spoke at the plenum.

Election Malpractice Reported in Moscow City

PM2003090090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[USSR Journalists' Union member V. Tiksin article under the rubric "Before the Second Round of Elections": "A Candidate's Honor"]

[Text] Moscow—A complaint about violation of electoral legislation has been received by the prosecutor's office for Moscow's Lyublinskiy Rayon. Opponents of V. Movchan, candidate RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy, distributed thousands of leaflets accusing him of "chauvinism" and sympathizing with "Jewish pogroms." The accusations, as it turned out, were patently false and libelous. Nowadays this is a common occurrence—who among the deputy candidates not liked by the "Democratic Russia" bloc has not been accused of this! But what is not exactly common is that S. Zybenkov, who was arrested in possession of several hundred of these leaflets, turned out to be... the uncontested candidate for deputy to the local rayon soviet.

As those who voted for him found out by chance, A. Polyakov, another contender for a deputy's seat, on this occasion on the Moscow city soviet no less, was neither a worker, nor an Afghan war veteran, nor the recipient of any state awards. All this information about him, published by the okrug electoral commission, proved to be a sheer "forgery," which nevertheless helped A. Polyakov, listed merely as a staffer on the samizdat newspaper KHRONIKA, to progress to the second round.

Such incidents from the completed first stage of the election campaign are, unfortunately, far from isolated. Here it is pertinent to report that candidate RSFSR People's Deputy L. Shimayev, who has a previous conviction for murder, on which SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reported, has also progressed to the second round. You will agree that there is something here over which to ponder, and moreover, to sound the alarm.

Here is another example. Last year RSFSR Prosecutor's Office investigators spoke out very strongly against the intention of V. Oleynik, deputy chief of the investigation department, to run for USSR people's deputy, since in their opinion the candidate was not fitted for this either in moral or professional terms. Almost a year has passed, and from support groups' "samizdat" leaflets about the candidate RSFSR people's deputy, the investigators learned with indignation that their former colleague—V. Oleynik now works in the legal department of the Soviet Childrens' Foundation—is, it turns out, a "well-known" lawyer and supposedly a lone crusader against organized crime. To put it bluntly, others' merits have been ascribed to him.

Was it not the result of such frankly brazen propaganda that V. Oleynik progressed to the second round of voting in the 4 March elections? In his program he pronounced himself a crusader against lawlessness. But here are the facts. At a recent meeting of the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office Investigation Department collective, V. Oleynik was called a falsifier of criminal cases and a specialist with extremely low professional standards. Around 40 people have been released in cases conducted by this legal zealot, 20 of them having been arrested although completely innocent.

There can be no denying that sometimes in the past people became deputies to soviets of various levels on the basis of information in formal questionnaires, which at times did not take account of people's professional qualities or the activeness of their stance as citizens. But are we not today going to the other, equally dangerous extreme, by ignoring these objective facts and not paying due attention to the ethical and moral makeup of those who will have to decide matters in the reformed organs of socialist people's power? And is anyone in the okrug commissions responsible for the true facts, for truthfully informing the population about candidates? These are by no means idle questions.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has already reported on gross violations of electoral legislation in Leningrad, where informal organizations acted as though no established procedure or rules existed. As an eyewitness to, and participant in, the Moscow elections, I can confirm that almost exactly the same thing went on in the capital. Helped by exactly the same passivity on the part of the authorities and the total lack of any check on blatant blackmail and pressure on voters. The distributing of leaflets and appeals on election day, the placing of "their" people at polling stations, who openly urged people to vote for certain candidates and slandered others, intimidation, threats, graft of various types and forms—all the stops were pulled out to "insinuate" the "right people" into the organs of power.

I do not know about other cities but in Moscow, as I learned at first hand, leaflets and preelection appeals from a host of informal organizations were distributed at a fully fixed tariff. For example, the going rate for sticking up one leaflet was 50 kopeks at first, and the rate for "dropping" it into a mailbox was 15-20 kopeks. Later, true, prices fell by almost a half—evidently there proved to be more than enough people wanting to make a fast buck, though competition in the "free" market was always beating prices down. Be that as it may, a fact remains a fact—the services of those who pushed "free" and "democratic" candidates were paid for extremely generously. And by no means from official, "legitimate" sources, which are ludicrously inadequate for this. It is more logical to look in the other direction....

According to Ministry of Internal Affairs data, in 1989 alone various enterprises and organizations transferred to cooperatives' bank accounts in the country R20.6 billion, which was then received in cash by cooperative members. Only R1.7 billion was returned in cash. Obviously there was no shortage of money to continue such robbery from the state, which means from the vast

majority of Soviet people. Your "own" people in the organs of power can legalize and even extend such robbery.

One can understand the interests of the burgeoning class of "socialist" entrepreneurs (and it already has, according to official data, some R300 billion in "shady" capital). But does the honest majority, ordinary workers, peasants, and employees, not recognize its own interests? Are they not letting themselves be deceived by vociferous and cunning demagogues who skillfully exploit to their own advantage the people's growing dissatisfaction with the numerous and ever deepening economic and social disorders in our lives?

And there is something else that is worrying. Among those reaching the second round there is a disproportionately large number of representatives of the so-called nonproduction sphere, particularly the creative intelligentsia, while workers and peasants are almost nowhere in sight. There are many people "getting on in years" who are burdened with all kinds of posts and professions, but few young people or women. There is a clear lack of competent academics and specialists and an obvious excess of little-known scientific staffers, who have made their names only in the field of political, often highly dubious, activity. Also far from beneficial to our democracy, I am convinced, is the huge number of candidates for one seat, which confuses people rather than providing a really diverse choice. I myself observed, and many times at that, how people simply got lost in a pile of voting papers and a string of names with programs little distinguished from each other, and how their choice was influenced to a far greater extent by arbitrary factors than by conscious preference.

However, the second round lies ahead. We will hope for something better. Especially as our people are not short of common sense, quick-wittedness, and love for their country. Only these things must not be forgotten on election day.

Further on Stroyev Visit to Orel Oblast

PM1904142990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Visit to Orel"]

[Text] Orel, 18 Apr—The consolidation of forces around the CPSU platform and the draft new CPSU Statutes, the extensive use of a mixed economy in the agrarian sector, and the need for radical social reorganization in rural areas—these and other issues were raised at the meetings between inhabitants of Orel Oblast and Ye.S. Stroyev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR people's deputy.

The oblast is one of few regions in Russia's Non-Chernozem Zone where the agrarian sector is developing dynamically and the population's food supply is improving on this basis. However, it was noted at the meetings, we must not stop at what has been achieved so far. Orel Oblast possesses substantial reserves for increasing the output of livestock products and improving the yield of grain and other crops. The experience of the Orel peasantry must serve as an example for many regions of the country where, unfortunately, villages and hamlets are still dying.

It was stressed at the meetings that the implementation of radical economic reform must be a subject of constant concern for the party and for soviets of people's deputies. The question of assimilating and improving new production relations in both urban and rural areas is at the forefront. It was noted that the measures outlined as part of the economic reform for the period 1991-1993 will be implemented this year.

It was said during the conversations with peasants, workers, and the party and soviet aktiv that communists' organizational and political work, which must center on the individual, with his needs and interests, must be stepped up. The party's status as political vanguard cannot be guaranteed by any decrees or legal directives. This status must be reaffirmed daily, in free competition with other social forces, proving in practice that the party's approaches to solving the key problems of the life of the country and the people are tried and tested and scientifically valid.

The participants in the meetings expressed their support for party policy and in the main approved the Central Committee platform and the draft CPSU Statutes.

Ye.S. Stroyev took part in a meeting of the oblast's party aktiv. The USSR people's deputy met with his voters, answered their numerous questions, and received citizens.

Court Sentences Former Khorezm Secretary

LD1904164390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Today, a panel of criminal case judges of the Russian Federation Supreme Court found Khudaybergenov, former first secretary of the Khorezm Obkom [oblast party committee] of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, guilty of receiving and offering bribes on more than one occasion. The sentence was six years deprivation of liberty with confiscation of property.

Moscow Panics Over Civil Defense Exercise

PM1904132590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 1

[V. Prokopenko report: "'Weirdos' in Gas Masks. Half of Moscow on Alarm Footing"]

[Text] It all began with a telephone call to the editorial office: "There has been a major accident in Strogino, something has blown up over there." The next call produced some more specific information: "There was an explosion at the Khoroshevskiy Rayon chemical

plant, a chlorine cloud is spreading through the streets of Moscow." And finally, there was a "big bang" at the Kurchatov Institute. A reactor almost blew up....

We dropped everything else, rushed to the telephones, and managed to establish the following.

At about 1100 hours, several dry goods stores in Khoroshevskiy Rayon received directives to rehearse their defense against a chemical attack by the enemy. This is how the sales personnel's subsequent actions were described to us by a member of the No. 48 department store staff:

"We immediately put on gas masks, shut off all power in the store, and evacuated the customers. Everything was done quickly and without any unnecessary fuss. Our staff members then picked up their personal protection means and sat down on the second floor: After all, chlorine is heavier than air. We spent the next three hours there, by which time the civil defense exercise was over."

But while the "Promtovary" Production Association was conducting its exercise, the customers—terrified at the sight of people in white gowns and gas masks—raised the alarm. Naturally!

To start with, a spontaneous evacuation of children began at the rayon's schools. Children whose parents could not take them away were kept at school, but all windows and doors were tightly closed. Those who got home told their parents about the "explosion," and they told their friends.

The rumor about the extent of the disaster snowballed. At about 1500 hours, the director of No. 98 school told a newspaper correspondent in a depressed voice: "Haven't you heard about it yet? The radio announced the evacuation of all of Moscow." As a matter of fact, there were even eyewitnesses who "distinctly smelled chlorine in the air."

Alarming reports were still arriving at the editorial office, when we managed to get through to Khoroshevskiy Rayon Sanitary Epidemiological Station and the Rayon Internal Affairs Administration. The ecologists assured us that there were no atmospheric deviations from the norm, and Yuriy Alenin, chief of the Rayon Internal Affairs Administration, told us:

"All officers from our administration are now explaining matters at schools, bus stops, and lines outside stores."

The mass panic was caused by ill-considered actions by the "Promtovary" Production Association leadership. Neither we nor the rayon civil defense staff knew anything about the exercises. I am reluctant to draw hasty conclusions but, once the investigation into this situation is over, the culprits ought to be properly punished, even dismissed from office.

This is perhaps the only thing that is clear in this totally stupid situation. There can be no argument—civil defense exercises may not be superfluous even today. There must be, however, no civil defense **games** in the age of Chernobyl and of ecological disasters.

Gen. Govorov Responds to Rumors

PM2004082590 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 3

[A. Sashin report under the rubric "Rumor and Fact": "There Was No Explosion"]

[Text] All day yesterday the telephones in our editorial office were buzzing—Muscovites were calling one after another to report roughly the same "news": A nuclear explosion has occurred at the Kurchatov Institute, a poisonous cloud is moving toward the city, the evacuation of children from the Strogino neighborhood has begun.

We approached USSR Civil Defense Chief Army General V. Govorov for explanations.

"The alarming rumors are completely groundless," Vladimir Leonidovich said. "People mistook ordinary civil defense exercises which took place 17-18 April at certain Moscow trade enterprises for actual danger. The exercises concerned only the leaders of major industrial goods stores. But at one of them, having received the purely hypothetical alert about the 'explosion' of a chlorine tank at a waterworks, for some reason people announced this over the public address system. They actually became the unintentional source of the panic. Generally speaking, civil defense exercises are necessary. When they are carried out correctly, the number of victims in natural disasters will never be great."

Ufa's Water Poisoned; Chemical Plant To Close

PM1904092990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by TASS correspondent R. Tukhvatullin: "Because Without Water..."]

[Text] Ufa—The government commission's ultimatum was announced by the joint committee for the ecological rescue of Ufa, set up as a result of the disaster. Of the 26 main points the two most important are: Ufa is to be declared an ecological disaster area and the source of all the trouble—the "Khimprom" Production Association—is to be closed immediately.

The committee decided that "Khimprom" should exist no longer. Unless it stops by 20 April it will be sealed. Unfortunately, it appears that phenol is not the only poison affecting our water sources. Experts are now seriously concerned and are saying that one must expect further chemical disasters as a result of chlorine production.

The incident is an ideal "litmus paper" enabling the inhabitants of Ufa to rigorously assess the party apparatus. "They are insured against all contingencies. They even have their own spring," say people waiting in line

for water that has been transported in. "Would they drink water of dubious quality?" Facts are facts. Whether by accident or design, there actually is a spring of the purest water a few steps away from the oblast committee apartment blocks, situated in a prestigious part of the city, so the tankers do not call at them.

Can one be sure that the contamination will not be a threat to people living in settlements in the lower reaches of the Belaya River, where all the city's waste water ends up? No one should be complacent about the ecological disaster, after all, many parts of the country are affected by ecological disasters.

Ecological services have reported that apartments have started to receive uncontaminated water. But it is recommended that it should be used yet for cooking and drinking purposes.

Western Republics

Lvov Rally Speakers Attack Soviet Army

PM1704155490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by special correspondents Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy, Colonel V. Gavrilenko under the rubric "Political Situation": "The 'Lvov Echo' Sounds the Alarm..."]

[Text] Lvov, Moscow—Ancient Lvov has seen much in its long history. So the rallies of recent months are probably not the stormiest events it has ever known. But this is the surprising thing: At each of these rallies there have without fail been attacks on the Soviet Army.

Virtually every speaker considers it his duty to deal with the topic of the Army. Some people have emerged as the holders of the records on this topic. S. Khmara, now a Ukrainian people's deputy, will never leave the platform without having said something malicious about the Army. He is rivaled by a certain O. Vitovich of the "Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth." Others who will not bypass this topic are O. Vlokh, also a Ukrainian people's deputy and one of the leaders of the local "Rukh" [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka], and the brothers Ye. and M. Goryn...

Arrows aimed at the Soviet Army fly amid the general torrent of anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments, which have recently flourished particularly in western oblasts of the Ukraine. This large and diverse chorus makes it easy to conceal lies, to pass off half-truths as truths, and to present deliberately one-sided interpretations of historical facts with a view to creating the desired effect.

And it gets worse as it goes on, as the saying goes. Provocative and insulting pamphlets have begun to appear on the territory of military units, as well as graffiti on the gates of control points. Acts of hooliganism against servicemen have become more frequent. Behind the slogans on peace and the condemnation of the Army as armed force in general there is a very specific purpose—to deepen the hostility toward and rejection of the Soviet Army.

It is a pity, but as yet the local party and soviet organs have failed to rebuff these provocative sentiments. The soviet organs, incidentally, are themselves whipping up the passions. Look at the recent story of the hoisting of the yellow and blue flag over the Lvov City Soviet building. To the singing of the well-known song "The Ukraine Still Lives," to the firing of cannons brought out of the museum. And this was not a theatrical show put on by the informals, but an event held on the city soviet's decision. By 143 votes to six, the newly formed city soviet resolved to hoist the yellow and blue flag over the Lvov town hall. It does not worry the people's elected representatives that these actions are unlawful, that the Ukraine has a state flag. As for the yellow and blue combination of colors... People argue that it goes back to ancient Slavic times and carries very specific historical meaning. But when you remember that for the people, this combination of colors is associated with the innocent blood shed by the nationalists, it is infuriating.

And this is not the only instance. Recently, for instance, a meeting with Ukrainian people's deputies was held at the Carpathian Military District Political Directorate. Among the deputies were: the aforementioned O. Vlokh; V. Chernovol, chairman of the local organization of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union; Ye. Griniv, chairman of the oblast "Memorial" society, and others. And what theories rang out in the speeches by the people's representatives? The problem of setting up national armed forces was raised seriously. The question of service by draftees from the republic exclusively within Ukrainian territory was broached. There was talk of the Ukrainianization of military units, and the Lvov Higher Military Political School was mentioned as the first. Demands were made for restrictions on military activity, up to and including the elimination of certain types of activity and the reduction of troop numbers on the territory of western oblasts of the Ukraine. And so forth.

Those are the deputies' views. Far from concealing these views, they actively propagandize them, sometimes even overstepping the laws of the USSR. Not for nothing have the prosecutors of a number of Ukrainian oblasts, including Lvov Oblast, recently submitted applications to the relevant soviets requesting consent to the bringing of proceedings stipulated by the law against certain people's deputies for organizing and holding unauthorized rallies. M. Goryn of Lvov is among them. But if they are people's deputies!... What remains for the "true patriots" to do?

At one rally the presenter solemnly announced a speech by a certain Yuriy Shukhevich, son of the commander in chief of the "Ukrainian Insurgents Army [UPA]." Shukhevich, Shukhevich... The name seems familiar... Ah yes, Hauptsturmfuehrer Roman Shukhevich, a fierce nationalist, commander of the "Nachtigall" battalion set

up by the fascists, and later, indeed, "commander in chief" of Bandera's UPA... In the Ukraine, this battalion's tracks can be traced in Soviet people's blood. The people of Lvov should not forget that in the first weeks of the Hitlerite occupation of the city alone, the SS men from "Nachtigall" killed and tortured 5,000 civilians...

So that is the man whose offspring was on the platform at the rally... He returned to the motherland only last year. What did the unknown son of the famous father talk about? Here is an extract from his speech: "...Some so-called politicians say: We should secure our autonomy by peaceful, democratic means. Look at human history. Has there ever been an autonomous republic without armed forces? We lost our liberation struggles of 1918-1920 not in 1918, not in 1919, but in 1917, when we renounced a national army. Can we not learn from history? Are we really going to be so limited that we will not start reviving the state armed forces?" And finally, incidentally, he observed: "Our students should not refuse to study at military faculties. We will need educated warrant officers." That is, commanding officers.

Commentary is surely superfluous. It is clear that those who call for an "independent Ukraine" need armed forces. Not, of course, for the sake of parades. The rallies, the pickets outside military commissariats and military units, the various marches using the symbols and insignia of Bandera's UPA—all these are well rehearsed forms of rallying, publicity, and organization. Now a structure for the expropriation of power is needed, in the shape of national armed subunits. A familiar scenario. This cannot but put us on the alert and make us abandon our illusions about the true intentions of the informals, in particular the Rukh radicals.

And here it is hard to refrain from quoting something else. This time, the extracts are from the [historical] documents of the Seventh OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] Congress: "The liberation of the Ukraine demands the mobilization of all the people's forces now, and, at a time of armed struggle, also great human sacrifices in the battlefield"... Now we are hearing not nostalgic laments for the brave warriors and Bandera's men of the OUN-UPA, but demands for their dreadful experience to be utilized. It has doubtless been forgotten that in the war years alone and in the western oblasts of the Ukraine alone, more than 1.5 million civilians died at the hands of these fighters for "independence." And in the postwar years, more than 30,000. Plus 20,000 servicemen: soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army, internal troops, border guards, and state security and militia staffers.

Yet today we see young men in the gray caps of the OUN, portraits of Stepan Bandera above the demonstrators...

Meanwhile, a so-called "committee for the restoration of the armed forces" already exits in Lvov. An announcement inviting volunteers to sign up has been posted in the city center. And for some months now this enlistment has been in progress at No. 8, Market Square, under the Rukh flag and sign. The spacious room is thronged with young men attracted by the "committee's" provocative promise to stand up for their rights to serve only in the Ukraine.

Listening to the rally slogans and proposals, thinking about the statements of Rukh representatives, and analyzing the hooliganist attacks on servicemen, you find yourself thinking: All this is familiar, very familiar! Suffice it to recall the resolution of the Seventh OUN Congress on military matters. These were the tasks set by the nationalists:

—the formation of Ukrainian subunits attached to Western armies and on Ukrainian territory;

—Ukrainianization of military units of the Soviet Army;

—bringing over Ukrainians from among command personnel to the side of the Ukrainian insurgent forces;

—moral corruption of Soviet Army personnel.

Are these not the very same ideas that the echo of the Lvov rallies brings to us now?

Lvov Meetings Discuss Concerns About Military

PM2303121590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Dispatch by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy: "Lvov: Quest for Compromise"]

[Text] Carpathian Military District—Hundreds of people gather daily in downtown Lvov. What do they talk about? The topics of their conversation are wide-ranging. They include economic, social, interreligious, ecological, and other problems. Frequently it is also possible to witness discussions on military themes. In this context questions connected with Western Ukraine's joining the USSR in 1939, the withdrawal of troops from Lvov and other garrisons, the discharge of military service by the inhabitants of the city and oblast only on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], abolition of the discharge of military service by inhabitants of other republics on the territory of the city and the oblast, the "need" to Ukrainianize the higher military political school, and the establishment of national Ukrainian armed forces are being discussed more and more heatedly.

As a result, all kinds of unhealthy rumors and fabrications are arising, which has led to a negative atittude on the part of individual inhabitants of the region to people in military uniform. In the city and in a number of the oblast's rayons young people have picketed military commissariats and speeches insulting the military have been heard.

With a view to preventing possible conflicts and settling the many questions that are arising, Lieutenant General Yu. Pankratov, member of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Carpathian Military District; Colonel of Jurisprudence F. Shepetov, district military prosecutor; and Political Directorate officers held a meeting at the district Officers Club with recently elected Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies O. Vloch, Ye. Griniv, S. Khmara, V. Chernovol, B. Goryn, M. Batig, and I. Derkach, USSR People's Deputy Yu. Sorochik, and others.

A useful discussion ensued. Mutual understanding was achieved on a number of questions. Republic People's Deputies Griniv and Batig expressed themselves in favor of rendering practical assistance to servicemen in completing the construction of the new building of the okrug Officers Club and in dealing with questions connected with the spring draft. The meeting participants came to the conclusion that similar consultations between representatives of the District Staff and the Political Directorate and the republic's people's deputies should be continued. A quest for compromises, and a considered approach to tackling any problems rather than resorting to confrontation are only to be welcomed.

Ukraine Orthodox Believers Send Protest To Rukh

LD1503235790 Kiev in English to Europe 1900 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] A protest appeal has been made public today to the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroyka [Rukh] by Ukrainian Orthodox believers.

Encouraged by the representatives of the Lvov branch of this movement, reads the appeal, extremist Catholics of Eastern [word indistinct] illegally seize Orthodox churches. A call is contained in the document to the members of the Rukh to raise their voice against the actions committed by the extremists [word indistinct] to protect the Orthodox Ukrainians of Halych and their cathedral.

Economist Becomes Odessa City Soviet Chairman

PM1904092690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[IZVESTIYA correspondent Aleksandr Knop report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Chairman of the City Soviet—a Doctor of Sciences"]

[Text] Odessa—Doctor of Economic Sciences B. Burkinskiy, a 48-year-old leader of the Odessa Department of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences Economics Institute, has become chairman of the city soviet of peoples' deputies.

At the session which has just taken place, the deputies chose him for a post that is very important to this city of a million inhabitants, from among five candidates, amongst whom were V. Khmelnyuk, first secretary of the Odessa Ukrainian Communist Party City Committee, B. Derevyanko, editor of the newspaper VECHERNYAYA ODESSA, and other contenders.

In his program speech the new city soviet leader spoke of his intention to work toward the creation in Odessa of a free enterprise zone, versions of which have already been drafted and are now being examined in the union organs. The citizens of Odessa, who know well from their history the merits of a "free town," are pinning great hopes on a special economic zone.

Belorussians Urged To Cope With Chernobyl

LD1904111790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0800 GMT on 19 April carries a six-minute report by correspondent Yevgeniy Kozyukhin on the need for Belorussia to cope with the after effects of Chernobyl. He has conversations with (Vasily Borisovich Nesterenko), a corresponding member of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Academy of Sciences, and (Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Lyudsko), head of the nuclear physics department of the Belorussian state university, and draws the following conclusions:

"At the beginning of this year, the attention of many Belorussian residents were drawn to the document titled "Instructions of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers." It contains a further list of settlements whose residents will receive financial help amounting to R15 per month for each family member. In these villages, towns and settlements, the consumption of milk and other foodstuffs produced locally is restricted, including those from household smallholdings. The document is 22 pages; on each of them 60-80 settlements are named which have been touched by the breath of Chernobyl and the residents have, until now, not known that they have been struck by trouble. They have drunk milk from their cows, grown gerkins and tomatoes, walked barefoot, swum and sunbathed. Who is to blame for this? Who has been hiding the truth? Is it something to talk about another time? What is on the agenda now is one issue, and it is being discussed at the session of the Supreme Soviet—how to help those who have been afflicted and where to find the funds for their resettlement. It is no small amount of money that is needed. Some put their heads in their hands when they found out how much. But one must be be frightened. There are no situations with no ways out."

(Nesterenko) suggests that more money could be contributed by all- Union enterprises sited in Belorussia, and says that material assistance is needed for the construction of new housing in particular. He is concerned that the radiation norms, especially for children, are set too high.

(Lyudsko) says that he cannot understand why people are still living in the contaminated zones. It was recommended that they be moved out in 1986. "It is a disgrace, because people must be resettled as far as possible. And perhaps we should not wait until these construction

organizations build up their capabilities, until we get all these programs together and then (?implement) them. When will that be? People have already been living there for three and a half years, and if we are still to build new settlements, then I don't understand when it is going to happen." (Lyudsko) suggests that people should have permission to leave and be given a little help to build new homes for themselves. In due time, the state should pay full compensation for their losses. "People would leave, even on these conditions, especially from the areas which are contaminated beyond all measure, and those who have children. They will definitely go."

(Lyudsko) speaks about contaminated food products. "These areas are distributors of contaminated produce. In the countries of Western Europe, they managed in the course of a few months to make the doses of internal radiation from foods and the external radiation equal. But that is thanks to the extremely energetic measures that were adopted there right after the accident, a ban on the sale of contaminated produce. But in our country none of this was done, absolutely nothing, and has not been done even now. Studies have been done in Minsk and Vitebsk, what we call clean areas. And the radioactivity content, for caesium alone—it is true, they don't measure anything else—for caesium, the radiation contained in the human organism is already the same in Minsk, in Vitebsk, in Gomel and in contaminated areas. That goes to show that the radiation is spreading together with the food products. Everything must be done to halt this spread. We have already spoken about the first measure—urgently moving out people and halting all economic activity in that territory."

(Nesterenko) says that the situation merits convening a special Congress of People's Deputies, and that the Ministry of Power Engineering should pay the compensation. "The R18 billion that the program costs will naturally come as a blow against the economic well being of the republic, if everything is done at the republic's expense. Of course this should come out of the Union budget."

New Belorussian Sport Chairman Appointed

LD1904135390 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belorussian 6 Apr 90, p. 1

[Summary] Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

1. To release comrade V.P. Sazanovich from the post of chairman of the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Physical Culture and Sports in connection with his retirement on pension.

2. To appoint comrade Vladimir Nikolayevich Ryzhenkov as chairman of the same committee. V.N. Ryzhenkov is Belorussian and was born in 1945.

Bendery City Worker Discusses Nationalism

PM1904101990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy N. Kostishin by V. Litvin; date and place of interview not stated; under the rubric "Stance": "More Terrible Than a Fire"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] As can be seen from recent reports, the situation in Moldavia remains complex and contradictory. The tension in relations between the indigenous and Russian-speaking population continues unabated here. I think it will be of some interest for readers to acquaint themselves with the thoughts on this subject expressed by Nikolay Anatolyevich Kostishin, a USSR people's deputy, nonparty person, and assemblyman-fitter at the "Pribor" plant in Bendery City. Those who followed the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet session may have noticed the keenness and principledness of his arguments and his firm defense of the working person's interests.

[Litvin] Your speeches at the sessions voiced open concern at the growth of nationalist sentiments which can be observed today in virtually all the union republics. Here responsibility for the aggravation of economic, ecological, social, and other problems in them is increasingly frequently being pinned on people of Russian nationality. The motif is so widespread and popular that you cannot help recalling the saying "there's no smoke without a fire..."

[Kostishin] Smoke nonetheless predominates. As regards the fire, or to be more precise the tiny sparks which people are now trying with all their might to make out are a fire, the Russians also have complaints to make in return against the indigenous population in our republic of Moldavia, in the Baltic republics, and in the Transcaucasus. We should not reopen old grievances—this "explanation of attitudes" will lead to no good. Indeed ordinary people, those through whose labor our land stands firm, do not need this. Quite recently we lived in peace and harmony. And we would continue to do so had people not been found who have decided to exploit the aggravation of economic and social problems for their own selfish purposes.

[Litvin] In brief, a narrow group of nationalist extremists... Are you not oversimplifying the situation?

[Kostishin] To build a house many months or even years of persistent labor are needed but you only need a box of matches to burn it down... Nationalism is the matches by striking which in the atmosphere electrified by general dissatisfaction it is possible to cause not only a fire but even an explosion. Particularly when, together with representatives of the nationalist intelligentsia, it is prepared surreptitiously and then absolutely openly by businessmen from the shadow economy, mafia groups, and the corrupt section of the party and state apparatus closely connected with them. These antipopular groups

in the full sense of the word do not like real perestroyka, whose aim is to return real power and strength to the working man, and they are doing everything to undermine and wreck it. Stultifying people with bellicose nationalism and then with anti-Sovietism with the aid of newspapers, radio, and television either bought or seized by deception [sentence as published]. In Azerbaijan and Armenia this is taking place in the most obvious form. In other republics, including our own Moldavia, the process is more covert but there is no doubt that it is under way. Some R250 billion rubles is not an economic but a political force. Perhaps only in your republic, in Russia, where people in their basic mass are purer and not so touched by antisocialist phenomena, is the danger not so great. Hence the hatred and malice which influential circles in a number of union republics are pouring on the Russian people through the mass media. Repaying the Russian people, incidentally, with the blackest ingratitude.

[Litvin] What do you have in mind specifically?

[Kostishin] The nobility and genuine internationalism which the Russian people have displayed and continue to display with regard to the other peoples of our great country. They did without, they went short of food and sleep and sent the additional forces and funds to accelerate the development of the Baltic republics, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and our own Moldavia. Indeed the national intelligentsia of the Union republics was largely trained in Russian educational establishments. The doctors, professors, and candidates who received their education and diplomas in Moscow and Leningrad are seriously arguing about the "Russian empire" and "Soviet expansionism."

Of course, I have in mind the intellectualizing philistines in the grips of nationalism and not the ordinary working people who, I am convinced, have only been temporarily confused and will ultimately understand what is at issue. Incidentally, the sobering up is already beginning in our republic of Moldavia. People are being convinced in practice of the nature of all these loudmouths who have raised a din all over the place about the "defense of national interests."

[Litvin] Here we have come to one of the main slogans of the people's fronts. Of course, it is possible to disagree with their other demands but this at least at first glance looks attractive.

[Kostishin] That's it, at first glance. The Union republics, as is well known, are entirely sovereign states which even have the constitutionally enshrined right to leave the federation. Against whom, one asks, should "national interests" be defended? Against the other peoples of the USSR? Against the Russian people? But surely they have never infringed and are not infringing on these interests? So say outright: We oppose the bureaucracy of the central organs, do not mix in the national element because all peoples and nations of the country and the Russians perhaps even more than everyone else suffer from this bureaucracy. They are not thinking of "the defense of national interests" but of placing their own interests above others, of using the blackmail of the threat of "withdrawal" to wrest special advantages and benefits at the expense of others, primarily, of course, at the expense of the Russian people. And having embarked on this slope they inevitably start to slide even further down, to overt chauvinism and even nazism. Those who today are being called "foreigner" or "occupier" and are beginning to be subjected to the most overt discrimination are naturally embarking on the path of defending their own vital rights and elementary human rights. The result is that one hatred generates another and one extremism gives rise to another.

[Litvin] I agree there is logic in your arguments. But after all we cannot identify the majority of members of the people's fronts with the small groups of irresponsible extremists. Incidentally, the process of delimitation of functions is now under way in many fronts...

[Kostishin] Yes, in our republic, in Moldavia, there has also been a split in the People's Front. Only that does not change much. Under our Soviet conditions public organizations, even the most mass-based, which put "national" goals foremost are in fact struggling for power and a change in the political structure. After all, by its nature socialism is internationalist and radically hostile to nationalism and that means it must be "dismantled." Even the very name "front" stresses the bellicose nature of these organizations. To wage hostilities the "frontliners" need the image of an enemy, most preferably, of course, an "enemy of the nation." It is a simple, comprehensible method customary since the days of the personality cult and, most important, it rapidly inflames the crowd. Whatever their supporters may say in fact the people's fronts are an attempt to destroy the legal socialist structures of power. First they emerge and exist in parallel, as it were, to the soviet and party organs. Then they stand next to and together with them. And then they totally crush them and, seizing real power and threatening inconvenient party and soviet workers with real gallows, as was the case in Baku. I recently read in your newspaper that informal organizations in the United States are not allowed even close to the helm of leadership for fear they undermine the efficiency of state management. Informal organizations there engage in more specific and businesslike questions—humanitarian, ecological, educational questions, and so forth. That is a sensible approach which it would do us no harm to borrow.

[Litvin] But the people's fronts have now entered into politics so deeply that switching their activity into the channel of routine, daily business in the situation which has taken shape seems simply impossible...

[Kostishin] Then they must simply be disbanded. And the sooner the better. But what is happening? We speak of the full power of the soviets but we allow and even legalize the existence of organizations which turn them into a fiction. And we also permit extremists openly

leading matters to the disintegration of the Union to export nationalism to other republics.

[Litvin] For all that, however, the people, at least the majority of the people, are following the fronts...

[Kostishin] I have already said that a people, even a very cultured and progressive people, as the sorry experience of fascist Germany shows, can easily be stultified by the poison of nationalism and chauvinism. Particularly when the mass media switch to what is essentially a monopoly of the fronts. From morning to night people are being brainwashed in a spirit of, excuse me for my frankness, racial supremacy and hostility toward other nationalities. Any attempt to speak the truth, to urge people to start thinking and not to set themselves alight with worthless emotions is branded as "treachery" and "the intrigues of Moscow."

In our republic, Moldavia, there was a referendum in Tiraspol and Rybnitsa on the question of creating an autonomous formation. Some 92 percent of those with the right to vote took part and 97 percent voted "for." That is the will of the people, as they say. You think they took account of it? Not at all! They began shouting about the "illegality" and "antipopular nature" of the decision taken. A very typical example of dual standards.

That is what is happening in the Baltic republics, the Transcaucasus, wherever the people's fronts have arrogated the right to speak on behalf of the people. Actually, the events in Azerbaijan showed that a considerable proportion of the population is simply scared and frightened of repressions from the completely unbridled thugs who have often been tolerated by the local authorities.

[Litvin] Incidentally, about the local authorities: Their position with regard to the nationalist manifestations is frequently perplexing. Can seemingly sensible and knowledgeable people not see that, by using official favor for their own ends, the leaders of the fronts, when they deem it necessary, will simply throw them out onto the street, taking the places in those same leading offices. It is too naive to rely on gratitude in politics made on the basis of prosaic interests and not on personal sympathies and the "word of honor." Although Brazauskas played up to "Sajudis," when matters came to sharing out seats, he was obliged to surrender his to Professor Landsbergis, who does not even conceal his probourgeois, nationalist sympathies...

[Kostishin] I think the example you cited will soon become typical. We have too many fearful bureaucrats in high posts and too few real fighters who know how to battle for the party and state cause. Yes, the notorious "flexibility" is based on fear. For their posts, their position, their benefits. And they do not think about tomorrow—they forgot how to do that during the years of stagnation and indeed of perestroyka. They try to keep in step, to go with the current. But that is very bad job for a politician, for a communist. Hence the flirting with the nationalists on the pretext of "dialogue" and "compromise." What "dialogue" is there here! The complete, unprincipled surrender of positions. And the national chauvinists take advantage of this.

[Litvin] It is now becoming fashionable to blame everything on the center...

[Kostishin] The center undoubtedly takes a considerable share of the blame. It lacks firmness, principledness, the ability to say "no" in good time and to insist on its opinion. But ultimately, since we have steered a course toward decentralization and the transfer of power to the localities, the republican and local leaders must use their increased rights and opportunities. It is impossible to envisage, predict, and resolve everything from Moscow. So no, the rights exist, but there is no desire to make use of them. It would seem that the preaching of nationalism and calls for secession and even the preparation of armed actions are there, the facts are indisputable, so bring in the militia, the courts, and the prosecutor's office. But no, they are afraid of aggravating relations with the leaders of the fronts, they heed them attentively and close their eyes to the numerous violations of laws and legality.

[Litvin] That means the "iron hand" once again, the stagnation method of "coercion and not permission" which has palled on everyone?

[Kostishin] Attempts at intimidation with the "iron hand" do not impress me. Swift, resolute, and radical measures are needed now. Only such measures can radically alter the situation. After all, those who are pulling the Union apart are acting vigorously, aggressively, and cynically, using the entire arsenal of possible means—from lies and falsification to direct physical reprisals against inconvenient people and members of their families. Perestroyka needs iron discipline, the strictest order, and tough individual responsibility for all—from the worker to the general secretary. For instance, we should publish the specific names of those guilty of kindling the nationalist orgy in the Baltic republics, the Transcaucasus, and other republics together, of course, with the names of those party leaders who are indulging them by their own inactivity and verbosity. And, the main thing, they should be taken to court, expelled from the party, doing all this widely, openly, and frankly. Then the tension will recede and the emotional people in the Transcaucasus will see in reality that those to blame for the pogroms and mass murders are specific people and not socialist and Soviet power as such, not "hostile" nations and peoples. It is naive to think that the nationalists can be overcome merely with ardent sermons and appeals to "reason," "cohesion," and "unity." What "unity" is there here when people are openly calling for the overthrow of Soviet power and withdrawal from the Union! It is time, high time, to switch from persuasion and exhortations to resolute actions or, to call things by their name, to turning the screws. And the overwhelming majority of ordinary people tired of the rampaging anarchy, impunity, violence, and crime, will support such measures.

[Litvin] But what about the rule-of-law state, the ardent speeches heard in its defense from the Supreme Soviet rostrum? I can already here the noble voice of Deputy Sobchak quavering with an indignation which, it is true, is not always well calculated...

[Kostishin] But I am not calling for the breaking of laws and the flouting of the principles of the rule-of-law state. On the contrary, I am demanding their strictest observance and the use with regard to criminals and violators of elementary norms of behavior accepted in any civilized state and the full severity of the law, as is done everywhere. As for the angry accusations of "violence" and "army brutality," it would be a good thing for these "accusers" to stand in front of the raging thugs in Tbilisi or the terrorists' bullets in Baku or at the center of a brutalized mob committing a pogrom. That is a slightly different matter from shining with your erudition and eloquence on a lofty rostrum or in a television studio. I wonder what the highly moral "accusers" would say then about our army and our soldiers who risk their lives and their health for the sake of the safety and peaceful life of the overwhelming majority of people, to ensure that our brave professors and doctors can win international popularity and trips abroad.

Reportage on Moldavian Supreme Soviet Session

Agenda Outlined

LD1804214290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] The first session of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet of a new convocation continued its work in Kishinev today. About 40 issues are on the agenda, including Moldavian SSR sovereignty, procedure for putting USSR laws into operation on the territory of Moldavia, symbols, and other issues. An uneasy situation is developing in the session. The deputies commenced the morning sitting by adopting an apeal to the republic's citizens to be calm and endure and to strive for mutual understanding that will make for greater success in the session's work in the tense social and political situation in the republic.

Moscow Reporter Barred

LD1904200790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 19 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The session of the Moldavian parliament started work in Kishinev today. We had expected to receive a reportage about this event. However, at the demand of a number of Moldavian people's deputies, USSR Gosteleradio's own correspondent for the republic, Petkov, was not admitted to the session. The deputies expressed no confidence in him for his biased and, in their view, incorrect coverage of the sociopolitical situation in the republic.

It seems to me that these actions, which, after all, cannot be called lawful and democratic, place coverage of the session on Central Television under threat.

Session Suspended

LD1904200390 Moscow TASS in English 1944 GMT 19 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Takii]

[Text] Kishinev April 19 TASS—On the third day of the first session of Moldavia's Supreme Soviet, deputies passed by a majority of votes the decision to suspend the session until April 24.

Endorsement of deputies' credentials became the stumbling block at the initial stage of the new parliament's activity. The credentials commission formed at the session received remarks concerning the election of over 50 Supreme Soviet members. The commission was unable to see into such a great number of complaints within the initially set dates.

The session's agenda includes over 30 items. The most important of them are formation of the Supreme Soviet's agencies, bills on the development of the republican sovereignty and perfection of Moldavia's socio-economic set up.

The session will have to endorse the structure of ministries and departments and appoint government members. Following a stormy parliamentary debate, one more item was put on the agenda—namely on formation of the autonomous Gagauz Republic within Soviet Moldavia. Representatives of the Gagauz people, who live in compact communities in two southern areas, have lately been insistently demanding realisation of their constitutional right to national- territorial self-determination.

Caucasus

Georgian Anti-Draft Moods Criticized

PM1904142190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Lieutenant Colonel L. Arshantsev report under the rubric "Direct Line": "All-Around Pressure?"]

[Text] Tbilisi—I recently came across a leaflet which appeared to originate from an organization belonging to the Georgian International Front. We are now familiar with these structures in union republics. Protecting the political, economic, and social rights of the nonindigenous population and upholding the principle of equal rights for all of our country's peoples, wherever they live, falls within the scope of their activity.

But the leaflet to which I am referring and which, since its creators have set the ball rolling, is now doing the rounds, immediately put me on my guard with its obvious tendentiousness and anti-Georgian thrust. I am not alone in this, incidentally. A republic television

broadcast and some local newspaper articles have sharply rebuffed this essentially anonymous "document" for its tone, which is offensive to Georgians, and for its attempt to draw a distinction between them and the rest of the republic's population and to destabilize a situation which is already far from calm.

So, the indignation of representatives of the "National Accord" Association, the Georgian People's Front (about 2,000 representatives of virtually every nationality living in the republic), and the All-Union Society of Soviet Greeks who have made their feelings known in the press, is perfectly understandable. This wide range of responses includes statements by the Union of Georgian Lawyers and the republic's philanthropic cultural society of Armenians, published by the newspaper KOMMUNIST.

It is all perfectly clear. Acts of provocation cost us too dear in an atmosphere of nerves and rumors. This latest fake document obviously stinks. Especially as those responsible for it have invited the non-Georgian population to Tbilisi's Victory Park on 9 May for a rally which is to initiate an international movement in the republic.

The time and place make you stop and think. Thousands of people traditionally go to the park on that day to pay their respect to the living and the dead. Despite its small size, Georgia sent almost its entire adult population to the war: 700,000 of its sons and daughters, more than 250,000 of whom never returned from the battlefield. Victory Day is just as sacred to the Georgian people as to any other nation living in our country.

The fact that leaders of the opposition have used recent rallies to urge people to rebuff the self-styled international front on 9 May rather than on any other day is cause for sad reflection. Particularly when taken against the background of increasingly frequent appeals not to celebrate Soviet military days in Georgia. I would not like to think that, on a day sacred to the people, Victory Park could become the arena of possible confrontation or, to be more precise, a crudely fashioned political game. It is a place for flowers and silence and not for the faintly blasphemous exercise of settling differences.

It would be a great honor for the fake document to be given so much newspaper space. If.... If one of the leaders of the opposition had not said for all to hear at a recent rally outside the Transcaucasus Military District Headquarters (already reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA) that the leaflet had been prepared in the military district's political directorate and staff headquarters, of which he claimed to have irrefutable evidence. Dispelling myths is an extremely thankless task and, even more important, useless. But this essentially fantastic statement does not prompt a condescending smile. The reverse is more likely to be the case: It would be funny, as the saying goes, if it were not so sad—given the backdrop of other factors.

The aura of "an evil empire" has been created around members of the military in the republic recently. The closer the spring draft gets, the clearer and more stark it becomes. It seems as if pressure is being brought to bear all around. That is to say, throughout the republic. The newspapers are writing about a rally staged by personnel from medical establishments in the city of Mayakovskiy demanding an end to the persecution of draftees refusing to do service outside their own republic. A campaign designed to wreck the draft process has been launched in many other cities throughout the republic, including Tbilisi.

A conference held recently at the Georgian Academy of Sciences, involving scientists, the creative intelligentsia, and informal organizations, adopted a resolution which says, in particular, that Georgians must not serve in the "army of occupationists" and that young Georgians must be demobilized and returned home. Young people have been recommended to hand in their military service cards to the Defense Ministry, while physicians have been told not to take part in the work of the draft commissions. The demand to organize national military formations has flared up again.

Another interesting memorandum, entitled "To the Moscow and Georgian Leadership" and published in the youth newspaper AKHALGAZRDA IVERIYELI (MOLODOY IVERIYETS), was compiled by the Georgian Helsinki Union and the Saint Ilya Pravednyy Society. It contains more than 20 different points. I will highlight just a few. To end army conscription, ban Georgian genocide in the army, and drop criminal charges against "refuseniks." To stop stationing troops withdrawn from East Europe on Georgian territory. To introduce a Defense Ministry ban on housing construction in Georgia. To stop military exercises in Georgia, especially in the immediate vicinity of historical monuments, and so forth. If these demands are not met, the authors of the memorandum threaten demonstrations, strikes, and acts of civil and national disobedience.

"Ban," "stop," "remove".... It is not hard to imagine the state of mind of those who continue to fulfill their duty to protect the country along its southern borders after reading statements like these or listening long and hard to gems from the arsenal of soapbox democracy.

A local "cold war"? A subtly calculated campaign inciting draftees to criminally punishable acts connected with evading military service? For the sake of what? Georgian independence and sovereignty? To drive from Georgian soil the "occupationists" whom the Georgians joined in sacrificing the lives of their best sons in the Great Patriotic War, the story of which is told with such inspiration and poignancy in one of our people's best loved movies, "Father of a Soldier", made by a Georgian, incidentally?

Long memories, short memories.... Believe me, those people on whose uniform some are now trying to hang humiliating labels will not consequently stop remembering and taking pride in the fact that they have always stood alongside the Georgian people in their times of

misfortune and joy, in the black hours of their natural disasters, and in their bright celebrations.

The recipes now being used to prepare anti-Army dishes in the kitchen of the "hardline opposition" are closer to the dictatorship of the recent past than to the present-day interpretation of dialogue. However much the piquancy of local spices is diluted with Baltic seasoning, our country's new, free federation of peoples cannot be built on the crumbly foundations of hatred and confrontation.

Central Asia

New Kirghiz Agriculture, Food Ministers Named

LD1904130690 Frunze SOVETTIK KYRGYZSTAN in Kirghiz 8 Apr 90 p 2

[Text] The presidium of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To appoint Comrade Petr Grigoryevich Stelmakh, first deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Agriculture and Food, as minister of the Kirghiz SSR.

2. To release Comrade Esenbek Duysheyev, first deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Agriculture and Food, from his duties as minister of the Kirghiz SSR, in connection with his election as Kirghiz SSR people's deputy.

[Signed] T. Akmatov, chairman of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

A. Mirzaliyeva, secretary of the presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.
City of Frunze, 7 April 1990.

Tajik Supreme Soviet To Appoint Officials

LD1904230390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1541 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Dushanbe, 19 Apr (TAJIKTA-TASS)—The formation of a new cabinet is proceeding at the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] which is taking place here.

In accordance with the constitution of the Tajik SSR, the composition of the Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium was formed. The chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, his deputies, likewise the chairman of the People's Control Committee, and the chairmen of the standing commissions of the republic's parliament were included in it.

The session adopted decisions about the election of the chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Court, and appointed the state arbiter of the republic, deputy chairmen of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, and the leaders of a number of ministries. All the candidacies were examined beforehand at sittings of the standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

The deputies examined the question of the draft law of the Tajik SSR "On the Status of People's Deputies in the Tajik SSR", and adopted it at the first reading.

The session is continuing its work.